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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The World Bank’s interactions with the public in both Southern and Northern countries have 
frequently been contentious. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have long accused the Bank of 
financing socially and environmentally harmful projects, and of imposing stringent 
macroeconomic policies on poor countries that have had profoundly detrimental impacts and 
have constrained their abilities to pursue their own development strategies. In response, the 
World Bank has increased its efforts to engage with civil society critics, and has recognized that 
civic engagement is central to achieving legitimacy and increasing development effectiveness. 
Yet despite this progress, many CSOs still find that the institution remains insufficiently 
transparent, accountable, and responsive to public concerns. They object that too often, the Bank 
has failed to adequately consider their most important concerns or incorporate their 
recommendations into policy or project decision-making. As a result, there is a growing 
scepticism that the Bank is actually interested in, or responsive to, public inputs.  
 
The World Bank’s status as a public development organization entails a dual imperative to 
expand meaningful public participation in its decision-making processes. As a public institution, 
the Bank has an obligation to make decisions in accordance with basic principles of democratic 
public governance, such as transparency, inclusivity, responsiveness and accountability. As a 
development institution, it has an obligation to increase the ability of affected people to 
meaningfully participate in public decision-making, since meaningful participation not only 
improves development outcomes, but also is itself a key component of human development. 
Taken together, these imperatives require the Bank to adopt a more participatory approach to 
decision-making throughout its governance and operations. Participation in decision-making 
requires that all stakeholders have the opportunity to influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources that affect their lives. Since the poor and 
other marginalized groups often have limited capabilities and opportunities to influence 
decisions, they must be empowered in the decision-making process, if their participation is to be 
meaningful.   
 
This paper explores the opportunities for more meaningful, empowering forms of participation in 
World Bank decision-making. First, it examines the challenges of improving public participation 
in the Bank’s institutional governance, and in its operations at global, national, and local levels. 
Then, it proposes a set of principles and a framework for thinking about how to expand and 
deepen the opportunities for meaningful public participation in all stages of Bank decision-
making. Finally, it uses the framework to propose a set of recommendations for improving Bank 
practice for consideration by the World Bank’s management and Board. 
 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE WORLD BANK’S GOVERNANCE 
 
The World Bank’s governance model has been widely criticized as being inconsistent with the 
basic tenets of democratic and accountable decision-making, and therefore inappropriate for a 
public development institution. Many critics have argued that the Bank is not sufficiently 
  5 
representative, transparent, open to public participation or directly accountable to those who are 
affected by its operations. The major criticisms of World Bank governance include: 
  
• Affected citizens have few opportunities to directly influence the decision-making of 
the Board of Executive Directors; 
• Representation of affected people is compromised by: (a) the disproportionate 
allocation of voting shares to donor countries; (b) the inequitable allocation of 
Executive Director seats; (c) the United States’ prerogative to name the Bank’s 
President and (d) the extent to which finance and development ministries of member 
states dominate decision-making; and 
• Accountability to affected people is undermined by (a) the fact that Board oversight 
of management and staff is often perfunctory; (b) weaknesses in transparency, 
representativeness and accountability of Executive Directors to citizens within 
borrowing countries and (c) the lack of mechanisms of “horizontal” accountability 
through which states or citizens can hold the Bank to account. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY EXPERIENCES IN PAST CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES 
 
To understand how the Bank has incorporated participatory approaches into its operational 
decision-making, we reviewed four types of consultative experiences: global policy reviews of 
safeguard policies and lending practices, national policymaking through Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs), participation in decision-making for projects and program and 
institutionalized dialogue mechanisms such as the Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC).  
Participation in Global Policy Reviews 
 
Since the 1980s, civil society organizations have mounted sustained advocacy campaigns to hold 
the Bank to account for the negative environmental and social impacts of its operations. These 
campaigns have been successful in forcing the Bank to consider the negative impacts of its 
lending operations, and to adopt a set of “safeguard policies” on sensitive issues such as, 
environmental impacts, involuntary resettlement, and impacts on indigenous peoples. Over the 
past several years, the Bank has revised several of its most important environmental and social 
safeguard policies and has also conducted strategic reviews of some of its most controversial 
lending practices. Many of these reviews have included a significant public consultation 
component. This reflects the World Bank’s recognition that review processes would not be 
considered legitimate or methodologically rigorous unless they included the perspectives of 
affected stakeholders. Despite this improved access, many civil society organizations still find 
that: 
 
• Their most important concerns have been adequately considered or addressed in these 
reviews; 
• Public input often is not solicited until after internal consensus on key issues has been 
reached;  
• The Bank has not been clear about the range of issues that are under consideration; 
• The public often has had limited input into setting the scope and agenda for these 
reviews; 
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• Limited civil society participation in the design of these reviews has caused them to get 
bogged down in disputes over process; 
• Many public consultations meetings have been implemented in a rushed, ad hoc, or 
unprofessional manner; 
• The Bank has failed to honour some of the commitments that it has made to stakeholders 
during the course of review processes and  
• The Bank does not provide adequate feedback to inform participants how their inputs 
have influenced policy development. 
 
Participation in National Policymaking through PRSPs 
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were adopted by the World Bank and IMF in 1999, 
as part of a new framework for development assistance to low-income countries. The PRSPs are 
designed to be country-authored documents built on broad-based public consultations. In many 
countries, these consultation processes have helped draw together different NGOs, donors, and 
government officials and helped them to harmonize their development priorities. In the process, 
they have often improved relations between civil society and their governments. By broadening 
and deepening civil society’s understanding of budget issues, PRSPs have also increased public 
scrutiny of public expenditure practices at the local and national levels. However, despite these 
positive impacts, PRSPs have failed to meaningfully engage civil society in a number of critical 
respects: 
 
• The policy debate has usually excluded issues of macroeconomic policy, human rights, 
and gender equity; 
• Transparency and access to information have generally been inadequate; 
• PRS processes have frequently been rushed; 
• PRS processes have not systematically included parliamentarians and key line ministries; 
• Many stakeholders lack the capacity to analyze alternative policy scenarios; 
• Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) have not been adequately participatory nor 
produced more explicitly pro-poor policies; 
• CSO participation has resulted in very limited influence on the content and 
implementation of poverty reduction strategies and 
• PRSPs do not necessarily influence Bank and IMF lending in any significant way. 
 
Participation in Projects 
 
The Bank’s project lending has often been a source of public contention. The Bank has financed 
a number of socially and environmentally damaging projects over concerted local opposition. In 
addition, the effectiveness of its projects has often been compromised by failure to incorporate 
the experience of project-affected people, or allow them to take “ownership” projects. Thus, 
much of the conflict over project lending has been over issues of local control, participatory 
decision-making, and project ownership. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the Bank has made some progress in improving participation in its 
projects, particularly in consultations during environmental assessments and in making better use 
of public meetings, disclosure, and increased interaction between the Bank and stakeholders. 
Despite these gains, the actual influence of civil society on Bank-supported projects remains very 
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limited and uneven. Much of the increased participation has been narrow in scope, rushed, 
superficial, or otherwise ineffective. A number of systemic constraints have limited more 
meaningful participation in projects: 
 
• The Bank’s Information Disclosure Policy limits informed participation; 
• Participation usually does not occur until project preparation and appraisal; 
• Participation has also been weak during monitoring and evaluation; 
• Participation processes have often been of poor quality; 
• Social analyses are not integrated with project decision-making; 
• Public participation is hindered by a number of external and internal constraints, 
particularly insufficient funding and inadequate support from management; 
• Insufficient capacity in communities and local CSOs has limited their abilities to 
participate; 
• Systematic improvements in the quality of participation are constrained by inadequate 
benchmarks, standards, and learning systems in the Bank and  
• The Bank’s accountability mechanisms for ensuring meaningful engagement are 
inadequate. 
 
Participation through Institutionalized Dialogue Mechanisms 
 
On several occasions, the Bank and civil society organizations have attempted to go beyond the 
normal ad hoc approach to engagement, and have sought to create more formalized engagement 
mechanisms. The JFC is one example of these types of efforts, as are the World Bank-NGO 
Committee, ECA NGO Working Group, and the External Gender Consultative Group (EGCG). 
These mechanisms have not, however, played a major role in policy or project development. In 
our experience with the JFC, the anticipated benefits of improved mutual learning have proven 
extremely difficult to realize in practice, since:  
 
• Generalized dialogue mechanisms are not well-suited to the current operations of the 
Bank or the state of global civil society; 
• Institutionalized dialogue mechanisms have suffered from weaknesses in transparency, 
representativeness and accountability; and 
• The potential usefulness of these mechanisms has been undermined by the widespread 
perception that they are vulnerable to World Bank manipulation and co-optation. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING 
 
In light of the concerns raised by civil society organizations, the World Bank should do much 
more to be more responsive to affected people, and to give them a more meaningful voice in its 
decision-making. Civil society complaints have clustered around five core principles of 
participatory decision-making that should be applied across all stages of the World Bank’s 
project/policy cycles: 
 
1. Transparency and Access to Information. Effective transparency mechanisms make 
information available to citizens in ways that the information can influence their political 
choices. They provide complete information about activities and options before key decisions are 
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made, and in local languages, culturally appropriate formats, and in ways that are readily 
accessible and affordable.  
 
2. Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness requires that all people have the opportunity to participate in 
making decisions that will directly affect their lives. In particular, it involves bringing in 
politically disenfranchised or marginalized groups that might ordinarily be excluded from 
decision-making processes. This may include efforts to systematically identify all those whose 
rights may be affected, or who may bear the risks associated with the decision; and to reach out 
to them and provide whatever assistance they may need to participate (e.g. translation services, 
travel support). 
 
3. Quality of Discourse and Deliberation. Deliberative processes allow affected people to 
freely and equally express their competing interests, perspectives, and visions of the public good. 
For decision-making to be based on deliberation rather than raw political power, marginalized 
stakeholders must be able to participate on an equal basis with more entrenched interests. Thus, 
where contested issues are highly technical, all participants should have comparable access to the 
expertise necessary to independently challenge the technical claims of other parties. Participants 
must also have the option to withhold their consent to an agreement if their concerns are not 
adequately addressed. 
 
4. Fairness under Rule of Law. Fairness requires that both the process and its substantive 
outcomes comport with shared principles of justice and equity. Procedural fairness requires that 
policies, rules and standards be developed and enforced in impartial and predictable ways, and 
that processes of representation, decision-making and enforcement are clear, mandatory and 
internally consistent. Substantive fairness requires that the distribution of costs, benefits and risks 
from policy outcomes are just and equitable.   
 
5. Accountability. Accountability implies that decision-makers must answer for their actions 
and, depending on the answer, be exposed to potential sanctions. Accountability mechanisms 
allow citizens to control the behaviour of government officials and representatives to whom they 
have delegated public power. Effective accountability mechanisms require compliance and 
enforcement.  
 
Compliance involves evaluating the actions of decision-makers against clear standards that are 
based on publicly accepted norms. These include both procedural standards (regarding 
transparency, inclusiveness, etc.) and standards for assessing outcomes (e.g., on poverty 
reduction, social equity, and human rights). Enforcement involves imposing sanctions for failing 
to comply with those standards.  
 
The consistent application of these principles to all strategic and operational decision-making 
processes would help to structure fairer, more deliberative, and more responsive decision-making 
processes that can better reconcile competing interests and visions of the public good. As such, 
they would help the Bank to realize better, more sustainable development outcomes, and to 
improve its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens who seek to influence its decision-making. To do 
so, they must be applied in ways that can redress the profound inequities of voice, access and 
political power between different interests in development debates. If they are applied in this 
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way, they can be powerful tools to enhancing the capacity of poor and marginalized people to 
influence the decisions that affect their lives. If they are not, they are unlikely to significantly 
improve development outcomes.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO PARTICIPATORY DECISION-
MAKING  
 
Like most large and complex bureaucracies, the World Bank has multiple and competing 
organizational cultures and incentive structures. These organizational cultures and staff 
incentives help explain why the Bank has so often failed to translate its stated commitment to 
participation into more inclusive decision-making. In particular, there is an incompatibility 
between short-term incentives and long-term objectives within the Bank. The dominant 
organizational cultures and more immediate incentives reward staff for quick appraisal and 
disbursement, and decision-making based on technical expertise rather than collaborative 
problem-solving. Meanwhile, the countervailing incentives for more meaningful participatory 
decision-making—reducing reputational risk and increasing development effectiveness—are 
more diffuse and long-term. The result is a set of organizational incentives and expectations that 
devalue participatory decision-making. Thus, public voice and accountability are subordinated to 
satisfying the demands of borrower and donor governments, minimizing overhead, and moving 
loans through the approval process in an expeditious manner. Ultimately, these organizational 
imperatives can lead the Bank to value public engagement, more as a mechanism for gaining 
public approval for its decisions than for improving the quality of performance or empowering 
citizens to determine their own development destinies.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There a number of specific actions that the World Bank should take to facilitate more meaningful 
public participation in decision-making. A number of specific recommendations for each set of 
experiences in the Recommendations section are available at the end of the report. We also call 
upon the Bank to integrate participation into its decision-making in four cross-cutting ways: 
 
1. The World Bank should increase participation in its decision-making at each stage of the 
project/policy cycle. The project/policy cycle provides a structure for improving participation in 
Bank operations. In Section IV, we propose a framework for considering how each stage in this 
cycle can be informed by basic standards of participatory decision-making. This framework 
offers an approach to developing benchmarks for what good process requires at each stage of 
decision-making. The Bank should use it as a way to think comprehensively about how public 
participation and influence should be expanded at each stage of the cycle. Civil society 
organizations could also use it to: (a) assess in advance whether a proposed process meets their 
normative expectations, and therefore to help decide whether, or under what terms, to participate; 
and (b) evaluate processes to determine whether expectations and commitments were fulfilled. 
 
2. The World Bank should establish mandatory minimum standards and improve staff 
incentives for consultation and participation. There is an overriding contradiction at the centre 
of the Bank’s approach to public participation. On the one hand, Bank literature and policy 
statements are replete with testimonials to the importance of participation and empowerment to 
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achieving good development outcomes. However, on the other hand, the Bank has no required 
procedures for developing policy, and no clear minimum standards for soliciting or incorporating 
public inputs in its lending operations. Moreover, its internal incentive structures tend to 
subordinate participation to other considerations. As a result, public participation is usually ad 
hoc and discretionary, and the Bank generally only formalizes or requires it when forced to do so 
under external pressure.  
 
The Bank should develop two sets of mandatory process-based participation standards. First, it 
should articulate a fixed administrative procedure for developing and revising Bank operational 
policies and strategies. Second, it should develop a set of minimum requirements for public 
involvement in different types of lending operations. Many bank staff objected that this second 
set of standards would be unworkable in practice, and could only result in “tick the box” 
requirements that would not enhance the quality of participation. We recognize that 
performance-based standards could be unnecessarily restrictive if they were to specify strict and 
uniform outputs without regard to country context (e.g., number and diversity of participants, 
length of engagement). Instead, we recommend process-based standards that require a 
commitment to continuous improvement through mechanisms of transparent review, stakeholder 
involvement, and organizational learning, but do not set rigid output requirements.  
 
There is a wealth of Bank literature on how to implement high-quality, participatory decision-
making throughout the Bank’s operations, and many Bank staff, at their own discretion, strive to 
follow best practice. As a result, there is an ample basis for crafting effective participation 
policies within the parameters of existing Bank practice. For example, the Latin America and 
Caribbean Region has articulated a formal strategy for civil society engagement. There is no 
reason why each region should not be required to develop its own strategy, subject to regular 
peer review and improvement based on systematic assessment of lessons learned. 
 
To ensure that best practice becomes routine practice, the Bank should also revise its internal 
incentives for staff to improve participation through increased budgetary support, time 
allowances, capacity building and performance appraisals that reward quality participation.  
 
3. The World Bank should improve the transparency of its governance and operations. 
Transparency is, in many ways, the basis for participatory decision-making. Transparency 
enables people to participate meaningfully in public decision-making by providing them with the 
information they need to understand, evaluate, and influence the actions of decision-makers. 
While the World Bank has recently improved its information disclosure policies and practices, 
they still fall well short of international best practice.  
 
4. The Bank should respect, and proactively seek to expand and protect, political space for 
democratic and participatory decision-making in national political processes. The potential 
for democratic, participatory decision-making processes is much higher at the national and sub-
national levels than in global public institutions, such as the World Bank. As a result, while it is 
essential for the Bank to increase participation in its own governance and operations, it is equally 
important for it to respect local democratic institutions and processes. In countries in which 
democratic spaces are limited, the Bank should facilitate the use of more inclusive and 
democratic domestic decision-making processes. While the Bank is (and should be) constrained 
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in the extent to which it can involve itself in domestic politics, there are a number of avenues for 
it to expand political space for affected people by: (a) minimizing conflicts between Bank 
operations and domestic democratic processes; (b) working with parliamentarians and a broad 
range of public agencies, and encouraging parliamentary review of loans; (c) identifying 
opportunities for expanding political space by, at a minimum, providing an assurance that 
decision-making will be transparent and participatory, particularly for those that are marginalized 
in the domestic political process and (d) assessing the political risks faced by those who 
participate in its consultation processes, and taking steps to ensure that they will not be punished 
as a consequence. 
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Large parts of the public no longer believe that their interests are 
represented in institutions such as the . . . World Bank . . . or that the 
institutions are adequately accountable for what they do. 
 
—United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002 (p. 112) 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This discussion paper examines the interactions between the World Bank and civil society 
organizations that critically engage it at the global, national, and project levels. It was 
commissioned by the sixteen civil society organizations that are members of the World Bank – 
Civil Society Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC), and was prepared independently of the World 
Bank.1 The JFC is an ad hoc, consultative body comprised of senior representatives of national 
and international civil society networks and World Bank management. It was established in 
October 2003 to facilitate a dialogue on how to make the World Bank more transparent, 
accountable, and responsive to public concerns. Its overall objective is to secure deeper and more 
meaningful opportunities for civil society to engage with the World Bank in its governance, 
operations, and policy development. The mandate of the JFC expires in May 2005 with the 
distribution of this paper.2  
  
1. The Politics of Critical Engagement in an Era of Environmental and Social 
Retrenchment 
 
The World Bank faces a crisis of legitimacy among large segments of the public in both 
Southern and Northern countries. The Bank, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
has long been accused of imposing stringent loan conditions on aid dependent countries—such 
as market liberalization, privatization of public goods and services, expanded industrial 
extraction of natural resources, and restrictions on spending on basic social services—that have 
severe social and economic impacts, and unduly constrain these countries’ ability to pursue their 
own development strategies. The Bank also has been accused of financing a number of projects 
that have profoundly negative environmental and social impacts, or that do little to alleviate 
poverty. Many citizens attribute these failures to the fact that the public does not have an 
adequate voice in Bank decision-making, and that the Bank is not sufficiently transparent, 
accountable, or responsive to public concerns. As a result, civil society interactions with the 
Bank are often a defensive struggle to hold the Bank accountable for the impacts of its projects 
and programs.  
 
There is growing scepticism within civil society that the Bank is actually interested in, or 
responsive to, public inputs. Despite the Bank’s stated commitment to openness and 
                                                 
1
 The civil society members of the JFC had complete authority over the methodology and content of the paper. The World Bank’s 
involvement was limited to providing documents, information and perspectives as requested. The World Bank also contributed to 
the budget for the paper.  
2
 For further information about the JFC, including its Terms of Reference, see: http://www.civicus.org/new/PG_world_bank-
CSO_engagement.asp?c=FD8912 
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participation, many CSOs do not believe that the Bank has adequately considered their most 
important concerns or incorporated their recommendations into policy or project decision-
making. For example, despite consistent public advocacy by CSOs for stronger and more 
comprehensive environmental and social policy standards, the Bank has sought to expand 
discretion on environmental and social issues, and to increasingly devolve responsibility of 
environmental and social outcomes to borrowing countries. Moreover, civil society’s limited 
influence on policy-making appears to be waning as many within the Bank, including some of its 
senior leadership, increasingly question the legitimacy of civil society organizations and seek to 
refocus the Bank’s attention on the preferences of its borrowers.3 Consequently, there is a deep 
cynicism among civil society participants who have been drawn into consultative processes with 
the implicit, but unfulfilled, promise that they can influence decision-making. Many have come 
to believe that the Bank continues to engage with the public mainly to defuse criticism and to 
increase the popular legitimacy of its decision-making. 
 
Civil society organizations that focus on improving the environmental and social impacts of 
Bank lending have developed a range of different advocacy strategies to meet their objectives. 
For purposes of discussion, these strategies can be grouped into three categories—principled 
non-engagement, selective engagement, and collaborative engagement. In practice, however, the 
individual organizations often adopt hybrid approaches that defy easy categorization.4 
 
Principled Non-Engagement. This category includes many CSOs in the global North and South 
that have come to see policy engagement as counterproductive, and thus choose not to engage in 
policy dialogue at all. Some, though not all, of these organizations would like to see the Bank 
abolished; as they do no believe that it can be reformed to the point where it will be a reliable 
agent for alleviating poverty and encouraging environmentally sustainable development.  
 
Principled non-engagers make four main arguments in support of this strategy. First, they argue 
that the history of engagement on policy issues demonstrates that the Bank is fundamentally not 
interested in accommodating public concerns.5 They therefore believe that the minimal 
opportunity for improving policy language is not worth the price of allowing the Bank to claim 
unwarranted public legitimacy.6 Second, they see little point in debating policy minutiae that do 
not address their core concern, the Bank’s adherence to a fundamentally flawed development 
paradigm.7 Third, they believe that decisions about the Bank’s development paradigm are not 
actually made by the Bank, but rather by the United States Treasury and the other G7 Finance 
Ministries that control the Board. Discussing these issues with Bank officials, therefore, 
mistakenly focuses advocacy efforts on those that implement policy decisions, rather than those 
who make them. Finally, they believe that their limited time and resources are better spent 
elsewhere—on bearing public witness to the environmental and social harms that Bank policies 
                                                 
3
 Sebastian Mallaby, The World’s Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations. 
New York: Penguin Press, (2004). 
4
 Joseph Hanlon, “How Should South African Countries Deal With the World Bank” SANGOCO Briefing Paper, (1998), pp. 1-
2; Stephanie Weinberg, “The Changing Terms of Engagement: A Survey of Washington-Based NGOs on Strategies to Challenge 
the International Financial Institutions and Corporate-led Globalization” (2003), pp. 6-7. 
5
 See, e.g. Freedom from Debt Coalition, “World Bank—International Finance Corporation Projects—Sinking the People into 
Deeper Poverty” (Nov. 3, 2004). 
6
 Weinberg (2003), pp. 9. 
7
 Jubilee South, “Pan-African Declaration on PRSPs: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Structural Adjustment Programmes in 
Disguise” (May 2001); Freedom from Debt Coalition (2004).  
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have caused, and on building grassroots political movements that can effectively pressure 
Northern decision-makers and borrowing governments to adopt alternative development 
strategies.8   
 
Selective Engagement. Many civil society organizations that advocate policy reform at the World 
Bank are willing to critically engage on a selective basis. They offer several reasons for doing so. 
Some groups have serious trepidation about engagement, but make a pragmatic determination 
that the risks of non-engagement exceed the risks of engagement. They recognize that their 
recent efforts have not produced outcomes that reflect their positions,9 and they appreciate that 
they may be conferring a patina of legitimacy on a process that does not actually allow for 
meaningful public influence. But they note that the outcomes of many recent engagements would 
have been significantly worse had civil society not raised objections.10 Given the broad scope of 
the Bank’s influence in developing countries, they conclude that even relatively small or “less 
negative” changes in the Bank’s behaviour can have profound impacts on those who are directly 
affected.11 Moreover, some organizations that work closely with people that are affected by a 
specific policy feel compelled to engage when that policy is under review. For these groups, 
then, “to disengage is to abdicate.” Finally, for some organizations such as labour unions, 
engagement is partly a matter of principle. They maintain that since the Bank is a public 
institution, the public has a right (even a duty) to insist that the Bank take their views seriously. 
 
Selective engagers typically seek out targeted opportunities to prevail on contested issues, and 
use those victories as stepping stones to more transformative institutional change.12 They also 
recognize that the Bank is not necessarily monolithic in its outlook, and that on many issues 
there may be a “war of ideas” being waged within the institution. By staking out firm positions, 
they hope to expand the political space for progressive internal voices to effect more 
fundamental change over time. 
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 See e.g., Hanlon (1998); Weinberg (2003).  
9
 Bank Information Center (BIC), Bretton Woods Project, Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale,  
Third World Network, “60 Years Of The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund: Civil Society Strategy Meeting 
Summary Report,” prepared by the co-organizers of the Penang Conference (January 2004), p.3. 
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International Environmental Law (CIEL), “Country Systems Approach to World Bank Social and Environmental Safeguards: 
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Defense, Friends of the Earth and International Rivers Network, “Gambling with People’s Lives: What the World Bank’s New 
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 Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots 
Movements, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1998), p. 2. 
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  15 
 
 
Collaborative Engagement. Organizations in this category take a more “collaborative” approach 
to engagement. These organizations tend to focus more on substantive research and policy 
analysis than overt political advocacy.13 They cultivate long-term relationships with management 
and staff, and seek to influence policy development by providing external advice on issues in 
which they have developed substantive expertise. 
  
2. The Perspective of the JFC-CSOs 
 
The civil society members of the Joint Facilitation Committee have primarily used selective or 
collaborative engagement strategies to affect changes in Bank policies and operations. 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on these kinds of engagements. By focusing our discussion on 
critical engagement with the Bank, however, we do not mean to suggest that engagement is 
always appropriate or desirable. Rather, we recognize that direct public pressure, including non-
violent public protests and grassroots mobilization, is a legitimate and often effective means of 
democratic political expression. We also do not intend to suggest that organizations should focus 
on the Bank as a primary target of their advocacy efforts. Many organizations will view the Bank 
as peripheral to their struggle for broader systemic change, and will continue to focus on other 
approaches, such as local resistance and innovation, deepening democracy and improving 
policies at the national level, or strengthening or creating other global governance institutions as 
agents of progressive change.14 Such strategy decisions are highly contextual, and must be taken 
by individual organizations based upon their resources, competencies, constituency preferences, 
and political opportunities or constraints. Those organizations that do choose to engage the Bank 
directly should fully understand the potential risks and opportunities of doing so. We hope that 
this paper can help inform these strategic decisions.  
 
3. Overview of the Report 
 
Because civil society perspectives on Bank engagement vary considerably, it would be 
impossible to articulate a “consensus civil society position” on these issues. This paper does not 
attempt to reconcile the diverse, multifaceted, and at times even contradictory, perspectives of 
civil society organizations that seek to reform the Bank or influence its decision-making. Rather, 
                                                 
13
 Weinberg (2003), pp. 13-14.  
14
 Jonathan Fox, “Introduction: Framing the Inspection Panel,” in Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox, and Kay Treakle, Demanding 
Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel, (2003), p. xvii.  
The World Bank is a public institution that works with public money. There is therefore not 
only a right, but a duty, to engage with the World Bank to try to take back an institution that 
belongs to the public. People tend to think of the [Bank] as being outside ourselves, but its 
not. 
—Latin American civil society leader, interview 29 January 2005.  
 
We interact with the Bank regularly. We believe that only dialogues can we resolve 
differences in order to achieve the same development goals. We do not choose non-
engagement because it would be against our faith-based value of respect and dignity for each 
other. 
—Anonymous respondent to on-line survey 
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it represents the opinions and analyses of the civil society organizations on the JFC. The paper 
has three main objectives. First, it examines recent engagements between the World Bank and 
civil society organizations and identifies some of the major issues and challenges that have 
emerged in those relations. Second, it proposes a set of principles and a framework for thinking 
about how to expand and deepen the opportunities for meaningful public participation in all 
stages of Bank decision-making. And third, it uses the framework to propose a set of 
recommendations for improving Bank practice for consideration by the World Bank’s 
management and Board.  
 
The paper is divided into six sections. Section II describes how broad trends in both international 
politics and development thinking converge to create an imperative for the Bank to adopt a more 
participatory approach to decision-making. It argues that the proliferation of democratic 
governance at the national level, and the growing recognition that affected people should have a 
direct voice in framing and implementing development strategies, provide a strong moral and 
pragmatic basis for more participatory development decision-making. In Section III, we argue 
that the Bank’s governance structure does not provide sufficient opportunities for affected people 
to express their preferences and influence Board-level decision-making. In Section IV, we 
examine recent World Bank-civil society engagements at the global, national, and project levels, 
to assess whether public actually has had meaningful opportunities to participate in Bank 
decision-making at the operational level. We find that there is a wide gulf between the Bank’s 
stated commitment to participation, and its actual decision-making practices, and that public 
complaints about participation have been remarkably consistent at each of these levels of 
engagement.  
 
Section V draws on these experiences with Bank operations to argue that public criticisms have 
generally corresponded with five core principles of participatory decision-making—
transparency, inclusiveness, quality of deliberation, fairness, and accountability. It contends that 
public participation would be far more consistent and meaningful if these principles informed 
decision-making at every stage of the Bank’s project and policy-making cycles. It therefore 
proposes a framework for thinking about how to integrate these principles into all stages of the 
Bank decision-making. Section VI describes the broader structural constraints and staff 
incentives that have impeded more meaningful participation in decision-making, and that need to 
be addressed if participation is to improve going forward. Finally, section VII provides a set of 
recommendations for Bank management and the Board to consider.  
 
This report was drafted by two independent researchers commissioned by the civil society 
members of the JFC, from December 2004 to April 2005.15 It draws upon several group 
consultations and focus groups with CSOs, and over fifty interviews with members of civil 
society, the World Bank, and academics. It also relies heavily on secondary materials, including 
an extensive body of studies and reviews already conducted by CSOs, the World Bank, and 
academics.16 In particular, the researchers carefully considered the Bank’s recent paper entitled 
“Issues and Options for Improving Engagement between the World Bank and Civil Society 
                                                 
15
 The researchers are Steve Herz and Alnoor Ebrahim. Steve Herz is a lawyer who specializes in the environmental and social 
policies of international institutions. Alnoor Ebrahim is an associate professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University and is co-director of the Institute for Governance and Accountabilities. 
16
 See Appendix A for additional details on the methodology. 
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Organizations.”17 The two papers reach many similar conclusions regarding the state of World 
Bank-civil society relations, but are quite different in focus and recommendations. The Bank’s 
Issues and Options paper looks primarily at how to improve internal Bank mechanisms for 
providing support and advice to staff and management for engaging with civil society. This 
discussion paper, however, focuses more on how to expand and deepen the opportunities for 
meaningful public participation in all stages of Bank decision-making. 
 
                                                 
17
 World Bank, “Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organization,” 
External Affairs, Communications and United Nations Affairs, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, 
Operations Policy and Country Services Network (March, 2005a). 
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II THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING 
AT THE WORLD BANK 
 
The World Bank’s status as a public development organization entails a dual imperative to 
pluralize its decision-making processes. First, as a public institution, the Bank has an obligation 
to make decisions in accordance with contemporary standards of participatory and democratic 
governance and public administration. Second, to be effective as a development institution, the 
Bank must be inclusive, responsive and accountable in its decision-making, since participation 
not only improves development outcomes, but also is itself a constitutive part of human 
development.  
 
1. The Democratic Imperative for a Public Institution 
Over the past several decades, democracy has proliferated at the national level to the point where 
more people, and more countries, are now ruled by democratically elected governments than 
ever before.18  Democratic governance, in all of its forms, has become the uncontested 
benchmark of political legitimacy; there are no longer any respectable alternatives.19   
 
Although democracy has become the litmus test of acceptable governance at the national level, it 
has had limited influence on governance at the global level. International organizations lack 
inclusive mechanisms for identifying and deliberating the public interest, and cannot 
persuasively claim to derive their authority from the consent of affected populations.20 Instead, 
most international institutions continue to be governed under the old Westphalian system, in 
which sovereign governments are assumed to be the only legitimate representatives of their 
people. Thus, many international organizations, including the World Bank, claim their 
democratic legitimacy from the representation of their member states in their governance 
structures.  
 
But the traditional Westphalian system of international politics is breaking down. While national 
governments still play a central role in articulating and representing the interests of their citizens, 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, it can no longer be credibly argued that they 
are the exclusive representatives of their people on the international stage.21 As democratic 
standards have become the benchmark against which citizens evaluate their national 
governments, citizens are increasingly insisting on the same kind of openness, responsiveness 
and accountability from international institutions. As a result, democracy has now assumed a 
place in the public’s imagination alongside sovereignty as a guiding principle of global 
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 Freedom House,“Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century,” (1999), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.pdf; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 
2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, (2002), p. 1. 
19
 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 1997). 
20
 Scholte (2002), p. 7; Gerald Karl Helleiner, “Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?” 
Paper presented at the Palais des Nations: 10th Raúl Prebisch Lecture, Geneva, Switzerland, (11 December 2000). 
21
 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” International Law 
and Justice Working Paper 2004/1, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law (2004), p. 
13. (“In our view, international lawyers can no longer credibly argue that there are no real democracy or legitimacy deficits in 
global administrative governance because global regulatory bodies answer to states, and the governments of those states answer 
to their voters and courts.”)  
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governance.22 To earn public confidence and legitimacy, global governance institutions must 
therefore provide opportunities for multiple actors to play a role in articulating the best interests 
and judgments of the public. 23 This requires that they engage the public directly, and that they 
are responsive and accountable to public concerns. 
 
Moreover, the old view of exclusive state representation is no longer consistent with the 
actual practice of global governance.24 As citizens have become more aware of how 
decisions that are made by international institutions can affect their lives and livelihoods, 
they have become increasingly assertive about influencing international decision-making.25 
Through non-governmental organizations, social movements, and other voluntary advocacy 
associations, they have placed issues of pressing concern on the global agenda—including 
climate change, human rights, gender equity, AIDS, and debt relief—and have mobilized 
public opinion to demand that they are adequately addressed.26 And when these issues have 
not been adequately addressed, citizens have expressed their dissatisfaction with how their 
governments are representing them, and have contested their governments’ claims to retain 
the exclusive authority to articulate public interests in multilateral forums.27  
 
As the public increasingly expects that democratic principles will inform international as well 
as national decision-making, the pressure on international institutions to increase public 
participation in their decision-making will only rise. Indeed, most, if not all public 
international institutions have been forced to at least begin to re-align their decision-making 
with these expectations.28 The Bank, no less than these other institutions, must meet this 
challenge, or it will find it increasingly difficult to earn public support for its policies and 
programs, and its effectiveness, relevance and legitimacy will suffer accordingly.29  
 
2. The Democratic Imperative for a Development Institution 
 
In addition to the imperative to democratize decision-making for a public institution, the Bank 
also has an imperative to pluralize and democratize as a development institution. Development is 
no longer viewed as a primarily top-down, government driven endeavour. Rather, there is now a 
broad recognition that development initiatives are more likely to be sustainable and effective if 
they are based upon affected people’s own analyses of the problems they face and the 
                                                 
22
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative,” Global Governance (1995). 
23
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Press, (2004), p. 165. 
24
 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs (1997), 76(1): 50; United Nations Commission on Global Governance, 
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 United Nations, Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, “We the Peoples: Civil 
Society, the United Nations and Global Governance,” (June 2004) p. 26.  
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000): 3. 
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Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance,” (June 2004); Asian Development Bank, “The Public 
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appropriate solutions.30 Thus, the Brundtland Commission concluded that “securing effective 
citizen participation in decision-making” is one of the main prerequisites of sustainable 
development.  
 
Increased public participation in decision-making advances human development in two 
important ways. First, it significantly improves development effectiveness. The World Bank has 
consistently found a high correlation between the extent and quality of public participation and 
overall project quality.31 Moreover, democratic participation and accountability have also been 
shown to be critical in enabling societies to avert catastrophes such as war and famines, by 
providing governments with the information and political incentives necessary to avoid them.32 
With respect to environmental decision-making, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, adopted by 178 countries, recognized the importance of 
transparency, participation, and access to mechanisms of redress and accountability in effective 
environmental decision-making.33   
 
Second, increasing people’s ability to participate in public decision-making is also a constitutive 
component of development.34 Development is now understood to be a multidimensional 
challenge that is broader than alleviating income poverty.35 It includes improving the capacity of 
the poor to exercise voice and political power to gain equitable access to resources and 
opportunities, and to defend their rights and interests in the political process.36 As the World 
Bank has recognized, empowering the poor to influence the decisions that will affect their lives 
is therefore a critical dimension of development.37 This requires that the poor must be able to 
express their interests, and to impose sanctions on decision-makers that fail to respond 
effectively to those interests.38  
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3. Participation and Empowerment in World Bank Decision-Making 
 
The democratic and development imperatives require that the Bank adopt a more participatory 
approach to decision-making. As the Bank has noted, participation in decision-making does not 
mean merely being consulted. Rather, it is “a process through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them.”39 
This is particularly important for the poor and other marginalized groups. Since they often have 
limited capabilities and opportunities to influence decisions, they must be empowered in the 
decision-making process if their participation is to be meaningful.40 Empowerment, according to 
the Bank, requires “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, 
negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives.”41 To 
be empowering, then, participatory mechanisms must address unequal power relations in a way 
that transfers decision-making authority, and the ability to hold other decision-makers 
accountable, to those who will be affected by the decisions.42  
 
Currently, when the Bank involves the public in its decision-making, it is almost always in non-
empowering ways—by informing the public of its decisions, or by consulting them as an input to 
its decisions. It rarely uses more empowering participatory mechanisms, in which decision-
making authority is shared with, or transferred to, those who will be affected.43 To fulfil its 
imperatives as a public development institution, the Bank must therefore be much more attentive 
to expanding space for the poor to control their own destiny wherever possible. 
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III PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
The governance structure of the World Bank is based upon a corporate model, in which member 
government shareholders are represented by a Board of Governors. The Governors meet once a 
year, and delegate responsibility for supervising day to day operations to a Board of Executive 
Directors (the Board). Voting power on these Boards is apportioned based on member 
governments’ ownership share in the institution. Public voice and accountability is secured 
indirectly through state representation. In principle, management and staff are accountable to the 
member states through their board representatives, who, in turn, are accountable to their citizens.  
 
The World Bank’s governance model has been widely criticized as being inconsistent with the 
basic tenets of democratic and accountable decision-making. Many critics, including 
governments, civil society organizations, other international institutions, academics and Bank 
staff have observed that the Bank is not sufficiently representative, transparent, open to public 
participation, or accountable to those who are affected by its operations.44 The following are 
eight primary criticisms of the Bank’s governance model. 
 
1. Affected citizens have few opportunities to directly influence Board decision-making.  
Opportunities for the public to directly petition the Board are quite limited. Meaningful public 
engagement with the Board is inhibited by the fact that the Board meets behind closed doors. 
Often, the public does not know the substance of what the Board is discussing, because many 
critical loan documents are disclosed only after the Board has approved them. Moreover, the 
Board rarely seeks to interact with the public directly by, for example, holding informal public 
hearings to hear testimony or to discuss policy options, or by conducting fact finding missions.45  
 
2. Representation of affected people is compromised by the disproportionate allocation of 
voting shares to donor countries. For citizens in borrowing countries to be fairly and 
effectively represented by their Executive Directors, those Directors must have a meaningful 
voice in institutional governance. Presently, however, borrowing countries have a 
disproportionately small voice in the governance of the Bank. Voting shares are supposed to be 
apportioned to each member country roughly in accordance with the size of its economy. Even if 
this worked properly, it would be problematic from the perspective of fair and democratic 
representation, because it disenfranchises those with the greatest interest in Board decision-
making. But in reality, the formula for allocating voting shares underestimates the size of 
developing economies, and therefore affords them a diminished opportunity to influence 
decision-making.46 The weighted voting system decidedly favors the major donor governments, 
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particularly the United States. The G-7 countries control about 43 percent of the voting shares, 
with the United States alone controlling about 16 percent.47  Meanwhile, the voting rights of 
many poor borrowing countries are so small as to be essentially symbolic. For example, the 46 
sub-Saharan African countries have a combined voting share of only about 5.4 percent.48  
 
The disparity in voting power between developed and developing countries allows the G-7 
countries, particularly the United States, to effectively set the agenda and control the broad 
policy directions of the institution. As a result, the favoured policy prescriptions of the donor 
countries tend to become enshrined as orthodoxy, while “home-grown” solutions that may be 
more appropriate in specific political or cultural contexts are often rejected as not “politically 
feasible.”49 This creates a substantial moral hazard problem--since the donor countries that wield 
the most voting power do not borrow from the Bank, they are not accountable to citizens that are 
affected by their decisions.50 The separation of decision-making power from political 
accountability allows donor governments to govern the institution in accordance with their own 
domestic political interests.51 After all, as Ann Florini has observed, “[g]overnments, answerable 
only to domestic electorates, face few incentives to act for the benefit of someone else’s 
constituency.”52   
 
The governments of the world have recognized that equitable voice and effective participation of 
developing countries in international economic decision-making is critical to legitimacy, 
relevance and effectiveness.53 Thus, the Heads of State that gathered in Monterrey in 2002 to 
address the problems of development finance stressed “…the need to broaden and strengthen the 
participation of developing countries and economies in transition in international economic 
decision-making and norm setting,” and specifically called on the World Bank to enhance 
participation of all developing and transition countries in their governance.54 The Board of 
Governors has begun to consider various options to improve the voice and representation of 
developing countries, but little progress has been made so far. 55  
 
3. Representation of affected people is also compromised by the inequitable allocation of 
Executive Director seats. The Board is comprised of only twenty-four Executive Directors to 
represent all 184 member countries. This means that many countries must share representation. 
Eight of the most powerful countries are represented by their own Executive Directors, while the 
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remaining 176 countries are grouped into 16 constituencies of 4-24 countries each.56 Those 
constituencies that include both donor and borrowing countries are almost always represented by 
an official from a donor country.57  
 
The constituency system is problematic in several important ways. First, most borrowing 
countries are not represented by an official of their own government, and therefore do not have a 
direct voice in Board decision-making. Instead, they are represented by Directors who are not 
politically accountable to them, and who therefore may be tempted to neglect their interests in 
favour of those of their own governments.58 Second, constituent representatives are unlikely to 
be able to advance the interests of all of their members as effectively as a Director that represents 
only one country.59 Constituencies often include a diverse collection of member countries that 
are lumped together by only the loosest historical, geographical, or cultural ties. Constituent 
Executive Directors are elected for two year terms—a tenure that is far too short to develop an 
appreciation of the specific development challenges, and the disparate political economies and 
cultures in which those challenges must be met, for each of these countries. It is also far too short 
to learn to be effective in advancing the interests of the constituent governments within the 
political culture of the Bank.60 Thus, the Executive Director that represents 24 sub-Saharan 
countries for a two-year period can not possibly be as effective for all these countries as the 
United States Executive Director, who represents one country, and is appointed for an indefinite 
term.61  
 
4. Representation of affected people is further diluted by the United States’ prerogative to 
name the Bank’s President. The informal arrangement in which the President is selected by, 
and therefore accountable to, the United States greatly enhances American power within the 
institution.62 Because the President has considerable discretion in shaping the institution’s 
agenda, rules and processes, the United States’ prerogative to name the President means that it 
actually wields much greater power than its voting shares would suggest. This prerogative has 
been widely derided by governments, international organizations, academics, civil society critics, 
and many within the institutions as being impossible to reconcile with basic principles 
democratic governance.63 Thus, in 2001, joint World Bank-IMF working group called for a 
meritocratic selection process open to qualified candidates of any nationality.64 The most recent 
Presidential selection process has brought these concerns to the fore, as many have decried the 
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undemocratic selection process, and fear that the incoming President will seek to more closely 
align the Bank’s agenda with the geopolitical interests of the United States.65   
 
5. Accountability to affected people is undermined by the often perfunctory Board 
oversight of management and staff. Most Executive Directors do not have the time to closely 
scrutinize or take nuanced positions on the wide array of papers, policies, and project proposals 
that management places before them. At best, they can consider them in only a highly selective 
manner.66 Management and staff exploit these capacity constraints by inundating the Board with 
far more paperwork than they can effectively review, particularly during the “bunching season” 
at the end of the fiscal year. Moreover, management and staff seldom divulge internal policy 
disagreements to the Board, preferring instead to present a unified front in Board discussions. As 
a result, the Board is deprived of the opportunity to participate in these debates, or to hear and 
consider the alternative views of those whose arguments did not prevail within the 
organization.67 As a result, once an issue is placed before the Board, its approval is all but 
assured.  
 
Representatives of borrowing governments are particularly disadvantaged by the balance of 
power between management and the Executive Directors. They often lack the kind of analytical 
support from parent ministries that helps donor Executive Directors to stay on top of the complex 
issues before them.68 Moreover, because Executive Directors that represent constituencies are 
rotated frequently, they have little time to master the issues before they are replaced. These 
Executive Directors are further disadvantaged by the widespread perception that Board approval 
is merely a ratification of decisions that have already been made by management in consultation 
with most powerful members, and that efforts to exercise influence are therefore rather futile.69  
 
6. The Bank’s accountability to affected citizens is also undermined by weaknesses in 
transparency, representativeness and accountability of Executive Directors to citizens 
within borrowing countries. For most of the world’s citizens, the chances of holding their 
representatives accountable are vanishingly small. For one thing, public accountability of 
Executive Directors is significantly impaired by Board secrecy.70 But even if Board deliberations 
were more transparent, it would still be difficult for citizens to determine how they were being 
represented, since decisions are usually made by consensus without formal votes being taken.71 
While individual directors are free to explain to their constituencies how they voted and why, 
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few are required or choose to do so, on a routine basis. Since votes are usually not taken, and 
since records of those votes and the deliberations that preceded them are not publicized, citizens 
simply do not know how their Executive Directors are representing them. Without this basic 
information, citizens have no way to hold their Executive Directors to account.72  
 
Even if citizens were apprised of how they were being represented, the lines of accountability 
between Executive Directors and citizens are so tenuous that citizens have no way to ensure that 
their interests are represented, or to hold the Executive Directors accountable where they are not. 
First, there is nothing that citizens in one country can reasonably do to hold an Executive 
Director from another country accountable for his or her actions. Moreover, many member states 
are not representative democracies, and are thus not accountable to their own people. Even in 
those member countries that are democratic, the political distances between the public, their 
elected representatives, and those who represent their interests on the Board stretch the lines of 
accountability beyond their breaking points.73  
 
7. Representation of affected people is further compromised by the fact that finance and 
development ministries of member states dominate decision-making. Although the World 
Bank is supposed to be the agent of its member states, it is in effect administered by a “club” of 
officials that represent only a narrow spectrum of the political apparatus of its member states—
the finance and development ministries.74 Thus, the Bank is governed by “parts of governments 
working with similar parts of other governments,” but excluding other, more democratically 
responsive, parts of their own governments.75  
 
Representation by narrow and relatively unaccountable departments of the government raises 
serious questions about whether the broader public interest, or the interests of other 
constituencies are being adequately represented.76 In particular, citizens concerned about issues 
that have little to do with the authority or expertise of the finance ministries—such as poverty 
reduction, health care, human rights, gender equality or the environment—are not likely to enjoy 
responsive and accountable representation through this arrangement. 
 
8. There are no mechanisms of “horizontal” accountability through which states or citizens 
can hold the Bank to account. At the State level, governments typically bolster public 
accountability through a rubric of institutional checks and balances in which certain branches or 
agencies of government are empowered to oversee and sanction others.77 But no such 
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mechanisms exist at the international level to constrain Bank decision-making by force of law or 
threat of sanction.78   
 
Each of the potential mechanisms of horizontal accountability—the United Nations, the World 
Court, and international human rights courts and tribunals—is inadequate. Of these, the United 
Nations would appear to be the most promising, since the Bank is a Specialized Agency of the 
UN. However, the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the Bank specifically precludes 
the UN from involvement in the Bank’s discretionary decision-making with respect to its lending 
operations.79  
 
The World Court is also unavailable as an accountability mechanism, because only states can 
bring cases before it.80 Also, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement preclude member states from 
bringing legal action against the Bank.81 Finally, international human rights law as applied by 
courts and tribunals has so far proved equally unavailing. The Bank has its Charter prohibition 
on interfering in the “political affairs” of its member countries limits how it can consider 
international human rights conventions.82 While civil society and academic observers have 
sharply and persuasively criticized this argument, and the Bank may be rethinking this position, 
no court has yet addressed the parameters of the Bank’s human rights obligations. 83  
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IV CIVIL SOCIETY EXPERIENCES IN PAST 
CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES 
 
Over the last decade, the World Bank has responded only partially and incrementally to the 
recognition that more participatory decision-making is essential for the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of an international development institution. As a result, large and growing 
segments of the public do not believe that their interests are being represented in the Bank, or 
that the Bank is accountable to those who are affected by its operations.84 This section reviews 
the experiences of civil society organizations at the global, national, and project-level that have 
generated this crisis of legitimacy.  
 
1. Participation in Global Policy Reviews 
 
Since the 1980s, civil society organizations have mounted sustained advocacy campaigns to hold 
the Bank accountable for the negative environmental and social impacts of its operations.85 
These campaigns have been successful in forcing the Bank to consider the negative impacts of its 
lending operations, and to adopt a set of “safeguard policies” on sensitive issues such as 
environmental impacts, involuntary resettlement, and the impacts on indigenous peoples.86 For 
civil society organizations and affected peoples, these policies have become the touchstone of the 
Bank’s accountability for the impacts of its projects. They represent normative commitments by 
the Bank regarding the planning processes and development outcomes that it will require for a 
project or program to be eligible to receive its support. They also establish minimum standards 
regarding how the rights and interests of locally affected communities will be protected, and 
provide some assurances that the costs of Bank-financed projects will not be disproportionately 
borne by vulnerable members of society or their environment. Some of the safeguard policies, 
including the Environmental Assessment, Indigenous Peoples, and Involuntary Resettlement 
Policies, also provide minimum guarantees that local communities will have the opportunity to 
participate in decisions that affect them. 
 
Over the past several years, the Bank has revised several of its most important environmental and 
social safeguard policies, including Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples, and Forests. It has also 
conducted strategic reviews of some of its most controversial lending practices—including 
structural adjustment lending and support for extractive industry and large dam projects. 
Additionally, the World Bank has recently conducted consultations around its proposed country 
systems strategy, and IFC is undertaking a public review of its approach to social and 
environmental safeguards. 
 
Each of these processes has included a significant public consultation component. This reflects 
the World Bank’s recognition that these review processes would not be considered to be 
legitimate or methodologically rigorous unless they included the perspectives of affected 
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stakeholders.87 This is an important advance over its approach in earlier generations of policy 
revisions, in which transparency and public input were far more circumscribed. Despite this 
improved access, civil society’s efforts to influence policy development continue to be impeded 
in a number of important ways. This section describes the different mechanisms that the World 
Bank has used to revise its policies and sector strategies, and reviews the principal obstacles that 
participants have experienced in influencing global policy development in each type of review. 
 
Three approaches to structuring policy reviews  
 
Because the Bank does not have clear and mandatory protocols for designing consultative 
processes, it must create mechanisms on an ad hoc basis. Recent efforts have employed three 
different approaches to evaluating and revising global policies and strategies—unilateral, 
independent, and collaborative. These approaches are distinguished by the extent to which the 
Bank retains the authority to structure the nature and timing of the public consultation process 
and to evaluate public inputs. In all three approaches, however, the Bank remains the final arbiter 
of how those inputs will influence policy outcomes. 
 
In the unilateral approach, public consultations are almost entirely Bank-structured. Bank staff 
devise the format and timing of public inputs, convenes the public consultations, and evaluates 
public inputs. This mechanism is by far the most common, and most of the recent policy revision 
processes, including the Forestry, Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples, and IFC Safeguards policy 
reviews, and the consultations around the Country Systems proposal, have employed this 
approach.  
 
By contrast, the independent approach relies upon external experts or stakeholders to drive the 
process and formulate recommendations. In the World Commission on Dams (WCD), for 
example, the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) established an independent 
panel of civil society, government, and industry experts to conduct a global review of 
development effectiveness of large dams.88 Similarly, in the Extractive Industries Review (EIR), 
the Bank commissioned an “Eminent Person” to conduct an external review of the development 
impacts of the Bank’s project and policy interventions in extractive industries.89  
 
Under the collaborative approach, the Bank and its key stakeholders share responsibility in 
structuring the review and assessing its outcomes. The Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review Initiative (SAPRI) was conceived as a collaborative review, in which the World Bank, 
civil society organizations, and government officials would agree upon research approaches and 
participation procedures, and jointly assess the impacts of structural adjustment.90  
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1.1 Civil society organizations do not believe that their most important concerns have been 
adequately considered or incorporated. Civil society organizations recognize that the member 
governments of the World Bank have the final authority to define the operational policies of the 
institution, and that meaningful public participation does not imply the power to dictate policy 
outcomes. However, civil society participants in each of these processes have complained that 
the Bank has not adequately considered their most important concerns or incorporated their 
recommendations into its policy decisions. Indeed, there is a growing sense that despite the fact 
that CSOs have consistently called on the Bank to strengthen and expand its environmental and 
social standards, the Bank increasingly views these policies as a costly impediment to lending, 
and that the overall trajectory of Bank policy-making is toward relaxing minimum standards. As 
a result, many organizations have come to believe that these consultations are not being 
conducted in good faith—that while the World Bank is willing to go through the motions of 
public consultations to bolster its legitimacy, it is far less willing to seriously consider public 
inputs and incorporate them into its policy-making. 
 
Civil society concerns have been subordinated in different ways in each type of policy review 
process. They have generally given the independent and collaborative reviews high marks for 
considering their priorities and for developing policy recommendations that thoughtfully address 
them.91 Yet in each case, the Bank has failed to adjust significantly its policy framework in 
response to the review’s findings or recommendations. For example, the Bank has refused to 
commit to the WCD guidelines for developing large dam projects.92 Instead, the Bank has agreed 
only to assist governments and project developers to “test” the recommendations in their 
projects.93 Similarly, after accepting much of the background research in the SAPRI review, the 
Bank terminated its involvement and has not revised its policies in accordance with the 
findings.94 Finally, while civil society groups believed that the Eminent Person’s 
recommendations in the EIR broadly reflected their concerns, the Bank agreed to adopt only a 
limited set of second-order or diluted recommendations.95 
 
Many organizations believe that the Bank has been similarly unresponsive to their concerns in 
policy revisions conducted unilaterally.96 In these reviews, the civil society organizations have 
frequently objected that, far from addressing their most pressing concerns, the Bank has used the 
opportunity to lower the standards embodied in the existing policy.97  
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1.2 Public input often is not solicited until after internal consensus on key issues has been 
reached. Some policy consultations have been initiated only after agreement between 
management and the Board has already been reached on key issues.98 This is the result of two 
aspects of internal decision-making: (1) management’s desire to have adequate space for internal 
reflection and deliberation; and (2) the Board’s insistence on approving draft policies before they 
are placed in the public domain. Management and the Board are clearly entitled to have the 
opportunity to flesh out issues and develop initiatives internally. However, the current 
requirement of prior Board approval of management proposals limits the depth and breadth of 
acceptable civil society input, and turns public consultations primarily into efforts to obtain 
public validation for decisions that have already been taken.99  
 
1.3 The Bank has not been clear about the range of issues that are under consideration. The 
Bank rarely articulates what it hopes to achieve from a proposed consultative process. In 
particular, it seldom clarifies which issues are, and are not, open for consideration, or what 
policy options are “politically feasible.”  
 
This failure to make the parameters of the consultation clear early on violates basic tenets of 
participatory and collaborative decision-making.100 It has also falsely raised expectations about 
what could be achieved through engagement.101 This has been a particular issue in 
“collaborative” and “independent” reviews, in which there is greater latitude for deliberations 
and recommendations to depart from established Bank orthodoxies. For example, the outcomes 
of the WCD and SAPRI appear to have so thoroughly transgressed the unspoken boundaries of 
political feasibility that the Bank distanced itself from the processes and refused to explicitly 
adopt any of their conclusions or recommendations.102 The EIR also appears to have exceeded its 
political constraints in similar, but more limited ways. In the EIR, civil society participants and 
the independent Eminent Person believed that the review was to consider the threshold question 
of whether extractive industries investments were an appropriate vehicle for achieving the 
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Bank’s mission of poverty alleviation through sustainable development.103 The Bank, however, 
was only prepared to consider a narrower set of recommendations on how to improve existing 
operations. As a result, the Eminent Person’s recommendation that the Bank phase out certain 
operations was rejected by both management and the Board.104  
 
In other policy revision processes, the Bank has defined the issues at stake more narrowly than 
was appropriate. For example, in the Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples policy revision 
processes, the Bank originally sought to avoid holding extensive public consultations by 
maintaining that only to the format of the policy, not the substance, was under review. Only after 
stakeholders were able to demonstrate to key decision-makers on the Board, and in senior 
management, that the proposed revisions would significantly affect the substance of the policies, 
were processes put in place to solicit public input.105  
 
The lack of clarity about the range of issues under consideration has engendered deep scepticism 
about the Bank’s sincerity in soliciting public inputs. Many participants have come to believe 
that the Bank intentionally exploits ambiguity in the parameters of its reviews to suit its interests.  
 
1.4 The public often has had limited input into setting the scope and agenda for these 
reviews. Civil society organizations often have had little opportunity to contribute to defining the 
parameters of a review, or conducting the background research that will help to frame the 
substantive agenda. Here again, there have been marked differences between the collaborative 
and independent reviews on the one hand, and the unilateral reviews on the other. The WCD and 
SAPRI, in particular, were noteworthy in their inclusive approaches to identifying and answering 
the basic research questions that would inform the policy options.106  
  
By contrast, in the unilateral approach to conducting consultations, management and staff usually 
define the underlying research parameters of the review. Typically, these reviews begin with an 
internal evaluation of recent Bank experience conducted by the Operations Evaluation 
Department.107 These evaluations tend to rely heavily on World Bank documentation of past 
experiences.108 Background research priorities are rarely developed in a participatory or 
collaborative manner, and independent research to complement OED’s work is rarely, if ever, 
commissioned. Moreover, public consultations typically do not begin until after management and 
staff have developed a draft revision of the policy. As a result, the Bank’s unilateral approach to 
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policy revision allows little space for participatory or collaborative identification of policy 
challenges to be addressed in the review process. Just as crucially, it fails to establish a shared 
base of information on which all parties can agree to move forward.109    
 
1.5 Limited civil society participation in the design of these reviews has caused them to get 
bogged down in disputes over process. Global policy reviews have almost invariably begun 
with an imbroglio between civil society and the Bank over the structure and process of the 
review, for two interrelated reasons. First, since the Bank has no mandatory requirements for 
whether, or how to, conduct a consultative process, the terms of engagement must be re-
established each time. Second, although the Bank’s Consultation Guidelines recognize that civil 
society organizations should have a role in designing the consultation process, the Bank has 
rarely tried to develop the framework for a given consultation in a collaborative way.110 In the 
absence of rules that provide minimum procedural guarantees or negotiated agreements on 
acceptable mechanisms, process fights are all but inevitable.  
 
The design of consultations has been particularly contentious in processes in which the Bank has 
taken a unilateral approach. For example, many civil society organizations boycotted the first 
stage of IFC’s Safeguard Policy review because they believed that the duration of the 
consultation period, and the lack of clarity on how feedback on drafts would be provided and 
incorporated, foreclosed meaningful opportunities to influence outcomes.111 Similarly, the 
Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples policy revision processes both began with protracted 
disputes over procedural issues such as whether there would be public consultations, how they 
would be structured, and how long the consultation process would last. The Bank made limited 
efforts to include civil society perspectives into the structure of the Forest Policy review, by 
inviting one civil society organization to assist in designing the consultation process. This 
approach also resulted in controversy. However, many organizations objected that it was not 
sufficiently inclusive, and that it set up the assisting organization to play an inappropriate 
gatekeeper role in the process. These concerns took six months to resolve.112  
 
Independent reviews have not been immune to such controversies. There, the question has been 
whether the external reviewers would be sufficiently balanced and independent of the Bank to 
ensure a fair process. For example, in the multi-stakeholder negotiations around the creation of 
the WCD, the question of whether dam-affected people would be represented on the commission 
was highly contentious and nearly led to the collapse of the discussions.113 In the EIR, civil 
society organizations had no voice in the threshold decision of who would lead the review. While 
they did not seriously challenge this exclusion, they did raise a set of concerns about whether the 
Eminent Person and his staff would have sufficient independence from the Bank. Only after the 
Eminent Person himself took affirmative action to assert his independence was a civil society 
renunciation of the process averted.  
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SAPRI may be the only process that avoided significant disputes over the initial structuring of 
the review process.114 SAPRI’s success in developing a work plan for public outreach that was 
acceptable to all stakeholders is attributable to the fact that the principle of collaborative design 
was adopted at the outset of the SAPRI process.115  
 
1.6 Many public consultations meetings have been implemented in a rushed, ad hoc, or 
unprofessional manner. Both civil society and the Bank have identified a number of 
deficiencies in the conduct of consultative meetings that compromise the quality of the public 
input and deliberations.116  
 
Some of the problems have been logistical. Consultations have been poorly planned and under 
funded.117 Participants have not always been notified of the consultation far enough in advance 
of the meeting to educate themselves on the issues, strategize with colleagues and constituents, 
or prepare their contributions.118 Moreover, the meetings themselves have sometimes been too 
short and insufficiently iterative to allow for meaningful exchange of ideas, reflection, or 
learning.119  
 
Participants have also expressed dissatisfaction with the dissemination of background 
information. Key Bank documents have often been distributed to participants too late for them to 
digest their import before the consultations.120 Translation of critical documents has been a 
consistent problem that has plagued nearly all the reviews.121  
 
Finally, civil society organizations have sometimes found Bank participants to be arrogant, 
excessively defensive, or closed minded in their interactions. Too often, Bank staff have not been 
willing to listen to different perspectives or to re-evaluate approaches.   
 
Collectively, these practices bespeak a lack of seriousness in engaging with civil society 
organizations, or in seeking to benefit from their experience and expertise. Civil society 
recognizes that consultations are time consuming, labour intensive, and logistically challenging 
to arrange. But they suspect that when the Bank is truly serious about consultations, as when it 
solicits the views of donor governments, many of the challenges that beset civil society 
consultations are addressed and resolved. That public consultations are continually plagued by 
these deficiencies leads many to conclude that they are simply not a priority, and that Bank 
views the public as a less important stakeholder. 
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1.7 The Bank has failed to honour some of the commitments that it has made to 
stakeholders during the course of review processes. One of civil society organizations’ most 
persistent and penetrating complaints is that the Bank seems to consider the commitments that it 
makes to stakeholders during the course of its policy dialogues to be provisional. In particular, 
participants have expressed deep frustration with the Bank’s failure to follow through on 
commitments with respect to issues of overriding importance to them. Two examples illustrate 
the problem. First, in the Indigenous People’s policy review, senior management promised 
indigenous leaders that they would convene a “legal roundtable”, in which lawyers representing 
indigenous peoples and attorneys in the General Counsel’s office could discuss the Bank’s 
obligations to indigenous peoples under international law. The Bank, however, delayed acting on 
this commitment for a year and a half, and when the Bank finally did make its lawyers available, 
they refused to discuss the central question of Bank obligations under international law.122  
 
Second, in the Forest Policy review, there was a broad consensus among many stakeholders that 
the new Forest Policy should address the indirect impacts of adjustment and programmatic 
lending on forests.123 Bank management declined to address the issue, assuring civil society (and 
the Board) that these impacts would be addressed in the upcoming review of the structural 
adjustment policy. Specifically, management promised that it would revise the structural 
adjustment policy to include a “transparent mechanism for systematically addressing the 
environmental aspects, including in particular possible forestry impacts.”124 While the new 
policy does address forest impacts, it is neither transparent nor systematic—it fails to specify 
minimum standards to ensure that adequate environmental assessments will be conducted, or that 
identified impacts will be mitigated.125  
 
1.8 The Bank does not provide adequate feedback to inform participants how their inputs 
have influenced policy development. Participants expect to be informed about how their inputs 
have influenced outcomes. Where contributions are not adopted, they expect clear reasons for 
why other policy options were pursued. Such feedback mechanisms demonstrate respect for 
participants, introduce greater transparency into decision-making, and provide assurances that 
inputs have been meaningfully considered. However, Bank review processes have not 
consistently utilized feedback mechanisms to allow participants to understand how their insights 
and expertise have informed policy outcomes The Bank’s failure to explain how public inputs 
inform policy making feeds the widespread perception that public inputs do not have a 
significant influence on policy.126  
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Civil society organizations have identified two feedback mechanisms as being especially 
important, though not uniformly employed. The first involves the distribution of iterative drafts 
for comment prior to Board review. This allows participants to comment on how inputs have 
been adopted before final decisions are taken.127 The second mechanism is a matrix that 
compiles all comments and explains how each input was addressed in the policy revision, or why 
it was not accepted.128 This mechanism, which was used by the Bank in its recent “Issues and 
Options” paper for improving relations with civil society, appears to be gaining greater currency 
within the Bank.129  
 
Conclusion  
 
It is difficult to underestimate the debilitating impact these policy experiences have had on the 
World Bank’s credibility as an institution that is willing to listen and learn from its constituents. 
Cynicism and disillusionment have flourished in the space between the promise of meaningful 
participation and the perception of minimal influence. For many organizations that repeatedly 
engage the World Bank on policy issues, these global consultative processes are iconic, and tend 
to define CSOs perceptions of whether their engagement in a proposed consultation process is 
likely to be useful or not. Thus, the decision of whether or not to devote organizational resources 
to a Bank consultation is often considered, in the first instance, by reference to past negative 
experiences. The threshold question that those who are considering engagement in a World Bank 
policy consultation almost invariably ask is, “How will this process be any more productive than 
the WCD, the EIR, etc.?” Moreover, these experiences are cumulative and self-reinforcing, in 
that disillusionment in one process can engender wariness or even principled disengagement in 
subsequent processes.  
 
 
2. PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING THROUGH PRSPS 
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were adopted by the World Bank and IMF in 
1999 as part of a new framework for development assistance to low-income countries. The 
PRSPs are supposed to be country-authored documents built on broad-based public 
consultations. They are not only foundational documents for setting country-level poverty 
reduction strategies, but they also are intended to serve as a basis for subsequent lending and 
resources from the World Bank and IMF. At the IMF, PRSPs are supposed to inform 
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  37 
concessional lending decisions through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).130 
At the World Bank, the PRSPs are supposed to serve as a basis for developing the Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS),131 and to guide both development policy lending (i.e., structural 
adjustment) and investment lending (i.e. projects). An “Initial PRSP” is required for all countries 
seeking debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  
 
As of mid-2004, 42 countries had completed full PRSPs and had commenced implementing their 
strategies for poverty reduction. An additional 11 countries had developed Initial PRSPs.132 
World Bank, IMF, and independent reviews of these experiences have been remarkably 
consistent in identifying factors that have constrained the ability of the public to influence the 
development of national poverty reduction strategies through the PRSP process.133  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The successes of PRSPs are noteworthy. In many countries, PRSP consultation processes 
have helped draw together different NGOs, donors, and government officials and to harmonize 
their development priorities.134 In the process, they have often improved relations between civil 
society and their governments. 135 By broadening and deepening civil society’s understanding of 
budget issues, PRSPs have also increased public scrutiny of public expenditure practices at the 
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Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). 
 
The World Bank’s adoption of key concepts propounded by civil society, including the 
very concept of participation/civic engagement, in particular its support for Participatory 
Poverty Assessments (PPAs) and other participation aspects of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy papers (PRSPs) have gone a long way in building confidence and trust between 
the Bank and civil society. The support for CSOs to participate in key national policy 
forums such as the donor-Government annual meetings (the Consultative (CG) meetings), 
Public Expenditure Reviews, and invitations to annual meetings of the World Bank as well 
as special events usually around PRSPs were considered positively by CSOs. 
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in Uganda on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement 
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local and national levels.136 These successes have led Oxfam International to conclude that “[i]n 
response to the question whether the PRSP represented the most open policy dialogue in their 
country to date, the uniform response . . . in virtually every country was a clear yes.”137 
 
Despite these positive impacts, PRSPs have failed to meaningfully engage civil society in a 
number of very important respects. Most importantly, many civil society organizations that have 
decried the impacts of structural adjustment lending had hoped that the PRSP processes would 
provide an opportunity for countries to reconsider the standard macroeconomic policy 
prescriptions that the World Bank and IMF require of aid dependent countries in their policy 
lending. So far, however, these issues have generally not been addressed. The World Bank’s 
Operations Evaluation Department has found that PRSP consultations are often unclear in their 
objectives, causing “incompatible expectations among stakeholders.” OED has also found that 
civil society organizations often see consultations as having “only limited impact on the design 
of PRSPs or on domestic policy and that participatory activities have sometimes waned once the 
PRSP was formulated.”138 Below, we identify several weaknesses in PRSPs that will need to be 
addressed in order to foster more meaningful public participation.  
 
2.2 The policy debate has usually excluded issues of macroeconomic policy, human rights, 
and gender equity. Two key principles underlying the PRSPs are that they are to be 
“comprehensive in recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of poverty” and that they are to be 
based on “a long-term perspective for poverty reduction.”139 Yet most PRSPs have not 
considered the full range of issues or policy options required for poverty reduction.140 In 
particular, macroeconomic policy, human rights, and gender issues have generally been excluded 
from the discussion.  
 
PRSP consultations are supposed to include discussions of macroeconomic policy issues such as 
growth and inflation targets, and fiscal, monetary, and structural policy options.141 The IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office has noted, however, that in practice “[t]he PRS process has had 
limited impact in generating meaningful discussions, outside the narrow official circle, of 
alternative policy options with respect to the macroeconomic framework and macro-relevant 
structural reforms.”142 Fiscal and monetary policy, trade and labour policy (including job 
creation strategies), financial liberalization and privatization, land reform, domestic/public 
investment, and foreign investment regulation have typically been excluded from the 
deliberations.143 In cases where Millennium Development Goals have been incorporated into 
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PRSPs, these have tended to focus on education and health, but without sufficient attention to 
how the macroeconomic framework would be adjusted to achieve those goals,144 or its potential 
inconsistencies with poverty reduction goals.145 Thus, an independent review of PRSPs in ten 
African countries found that, “PRSPs make the assumption that the macroeconomic framework 
…is consistent with poverty reduction. However, all ten country reports highlight the disjuncture 
between macroeconomic policies of [existing structural adjustment programs] and PRSP 
objectives.”146 Many observers have attributed governments’ unwillingness to discuss alternative 
economic policy options to the governments’ understanding that they must propose policy 
responses that are consistent with the World Bank and IMF’s orthodox development paradigm to 
ensure eligibility for HIPC relief and other donor support.147  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRSPs have been equally unsuccessful in addressing human rights and gender issues.148 Due to 
the important connections between human rights, empowerment and poverty alleviation, the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has resolved that 
international human rights covenants should be incorporated in the formulation and review of 
PRSPs.149 While some governance issues have become a common feature of PRSPs, human 
rights have largely been overlooked.150 Similarly, PRSPs (and the WB/IMF Joint Staff 
Assessments) have typically neglected women’s rights and the gender dimensions of poverty.151 
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Proof of the effectiveness of engagement by women’s rights and gender equality advocates 
would be an engendered set of Bank policies and an investment portfolio that promotes 
women’s rights and gender equality. . . .  
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Consequently, PRSPs have not adequately considered policy options to redress gender disparities 
in income and wealth, legal rights, mortality rates, or access to essential services.152  
 
2.3 Transparency and access to information have generally been inadequate. Civil society 
concerns with transparency in PRSP processes fall into two general categories. First, many 
participants do not have access to the documents they need to fully understand the issues at 
stake.153 This is because of the dearth of guidelines on transparency of information relating to the 
PRSP process,154 the incomplete disclosure of draft Country Assistance Strategies and World 
Bank/IMF loan documents (including PRGFs and PRSCs),155 and even, in some cases, the PRSP 
policy matrices.156 Nor do citizens have access to draft versions of the Joint Staff Assessment 
(JSA)157 before it is submitted to the Boards of the World Bank and IMF. The JSA is supposed to 
provide “prioritized and candid” feedback to national governments on the PRSP.158 Its disclosure 
after completion makes it impossible for civil society to contest the reasoning behind its policy 
advice. This is of particular concern, given that an OED review found the JSAs to have “mixed 
analytical quality and comprehensiveness, inadequate focus on the quality of process orientation, 
and limited awareness of their findings and recommendations among stakeholders.”159 Moreover, 
even when documents are available, they are often not provided sufficiently in advance of 
consultations, or in a language accessible to participants.160 
 
Second, governments and the World Bank/IMF have not been transparent about their intentions 
in the process, particularly concerning which issues are, or are not, open for discussion. The 
IMF’s review of PRSPs recommends that “[c]ountries should present their intentions and 
objectives, along with the benchmarks selected to monitor progress in a manner open to public 
scrutiny.”161 This recommendation applies with equal force to the World Bank and IMF, which 
do not systematically disclose the range of policy objectives and targets that they deem 
“realistic” for a particular country.162   
 
2.4 PRS processes have frequently been rushed. Because the PRSP is a key condition for 
access to debt relief under HIPC, governments have a strong incentive to complete the PRS 
process quickly. Some full PRSPs have been completed in less than six months after their interim 
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PRSPs.163 Such an expedited schedule is incompatible with meaningful participation, as it 
provides insufficient time for iterative dialogue or for stakeholders to prepare their contributions. 
The quality of the discourse suffers accordingly.164  
 
Moreover, expediting the process creates a bias in favor of elites and middle-class technocrats—
in donors, governments, and CSOs alike—who are better positioned to react to the accelerated 
pace of consultations. Those who may need more time to assimilate information and develop 
their response, including the poor, young people, older people, minority groups, and the disabled, 
are particularly disadvantaged.165 Often, PRS processes have been expedited by holding 
consultations primarily in the capital city, with consultations that are held at the local level being 
hurried and providing little advance notice to participants.166 As a result of these limitations, it is 
not surprising that the IMF has found that PRSPs have “often generated relatively strong 
ownership in a narrow circle of official stakeholders responsible for driving the process, but 
much less among other domestic stakeholders.”167  
 
2.5 PRS processes have not systematically included parliamentarians or key line ministries. 
 
The role of parliamentarians in most PRSPs has been very weak. Legislators have generally had 
only limited access to critical documents about World Bank and IMF operations in their own 
countries. Rather, key decisions have typically been made by the finance and development 
ministries (along with the World Bank and IMF), with only limited parliamentary participation 
and oversight. 168 Thus, there has been little effort to use the PRS process to strengthen 
democratic institutions by establishing durable and effective mechanisms of participation that 
can feed into legislative processes.169 This raises concerns that “the PRSP process may have by-
passed politics in some countries and established forms of representation that do not necessarily 
advance the interests of the poor over the longer term.”170  
 
The Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PnoWB) has recommended that the World 
Bank Executive Board not approve a PRSP unless it has been reviewed by the national 
parliament.171 The Bank has maintained that such a requirement would violate its Articles of 
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Agreement, which prevents it from interfering in the political affairs of any member country.172 
Many parliamentarians counter that the Bank’s focus on finance ministries as the fulcrum of 
fiscal and development policy making is itself political interference, insofar as it tends to alter 
the balance of power between the ministries and parliament. Moreover, even in countries like 
Uganda, where parliament is legally required to scrutinize each development proposal for 
compliance with PRSP goals, parliamentarians have complained that they sometimes only 
review loans after they have already been approved by the Bank’s Board, when it is too late for 
their input to be meaningful.173  
 
In addition, the participation of line ministries beyond education and health has also been weak. 
Ministries that are central to poverty reduction, such as agriculture and trade, are often unaware 
of the PRSP, or exercise minimal influence on it.174  
 
2.6 Many stakeholders lack the capacity to analyze alternative policy scenarios. Diverse 
stakeholder participation will not sufficiently expand the parameters of the policy dialogue 
unless it is accompanied by adequate time, funding, and capacities of key stakeholders for 
participatory assessments and analysis of core issues and their policy alternatives. At present, 
CSOs and parliamentarians often lack training on how to interpret technical documents and 
policy papers, and they also lack resources for organizing meetings, hiring skilled staff, and 
preparing briefs, so they can develop detailed policy alternatives.175 PRS processes have not 
typically sought to redress these capacity constraints through proactive outreach to other 
domestic stakeholders that do have the ability to conduct participatory assessments or to analyze 
technical documents, such as local universities, think tanks, and trade union research centres.  
  
2.7 Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) have not been adequately participatory, nor 
produced more explicitly pro-poor policies. Since the inception of PRSPs in 1999, the World 
Bank and IMF have made repeated commitments to conduct Poverty and Social Impact 
Assessments (PSAIs) for all major reforms.176 The 2004 OED review found, however, that few 
PSIAs have been conducted by the World Bank, and “critical gaps remain in linking policies and 
programs to poverty impact.”177 While the Bank conducted a number of pilot PSIAs between 
2000 and 2002, and is now advancing their use in over 40 countries. However, PSIAs still do not 
figure centrally into the policymaking process.  
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A recent Oxfam review found that: (a) not all the pilot PSIAs are available for public scrutiny; 
(b) there is no clarity on how, and by whom, the topics for the new studies have been chosen; (c) 
controversial issues have sometimes been avoided; (d) PSIAs are being used to inform 
sequencing and implementation of reforms that have already been decided, rather than for 
examining tradeoffs and alternatives to those reforms and (e) almost no attempts have been made 
to engage with a broader range of stakeholders to generate ownership of the analysis.178 These 
weaknesses must be remedied if PSIAs are to fulfil their promise as an effective tool for 
developing sound, pro-poor policies.179 
 
2.8 CSO participation has resulted in very limited influence on the content and 
implementation of poverty reduction strategies. Despite some real openings for dialogue 
between government and civil society, one of the most disappointing aspects of the PRS 
processes has been the limited tangible impacts they have had on poverty policy development.180 
With few exceptions, CSO participation in the PRS process has largely been limited to 
“consultation” at the design stage.181 In many cases civil society organizations “have not been 
considered by their governments as allies in the PRSP implementation process, and effort to 
engage in effective monitoring and evaluation have been thwarted...”182 Trade unions, for 
example, have participated in about half of the PRSP consultations completed by 2004, but have 
not been included in the report drafting, implementation, monitoring or evaluation.183 In addition, 
CSO participants have received little feedback from governments or the World Bank and IMF on 
how their recommendations have been incorporated into the PRS, or why their inputs were 
rejected. 
                                                 
178
 Oxfam International (2004), pp. 11-12. 
179
 PSIA offers the potential to provide insight on policy tradeoffs and poverty outcomes. In 2001, and IMF and World Bank 
Executive Board paper recommended that the “World Bank should take the lead in the development of poverty and social impact 
analysis (PSIA), in order to provide such an input to its own instruments, particularly for poverty reduction strategy credits 
(PRSCs), as well as to partner countries’ PRSPs.” See Caroline M. Robb, “Poverty and Social Impact Analysis — Linking 
Macroeconomic Policies to Poverty Outcomes: Summary of Early Experiences” IMF Working Paper, International Monetary 
Fund (2003). For a set of concrete recommendations on improving PSIAs, see Oxfam International (2004), pp.14-15. 
180
 de Barra (2004),p. 2; Catholic Relief Services (2001), p. 11. 
181
 The World Bank’s own typology of participation uses a four-part continuum, beginning with one-way “information 
dissemination” at one end, moving through “consultation” which involves a two-way flow of information, and finally to 
“collaboration” and “empowerment” which involve shared decision-making and the transfer of control over decisions and 
resources. 
182
 Angela Wood. “World Vision’s experiences with the PRSP process: Perspectives from Ethiopia, Senegal and Cambodia,” in 
Currah et al., (2004), p. 24. 
183
 Egulu (2004). 
There do not exist publicly available official mechanisms for participating in policy 
creation. There is a lack of knowledge [among CSOs] regarding the type of mechanisms the 
Bank uses while preparing [policies], whether there are annual/three-year planning 
programs and how the information process flows. In addition, there is no follow-up 
information after the organizations have been involved in the cooperation with the WB, so 
that other organizations can find out about the ways for their future participation. 
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in the Republic of Macedonia on World Bank-Civil Society 
Engagement (Appendix C), p. 12. 
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Some CSOs have suggested that opportunities for influence can be enhanced, or at least made 
more predictable, through minimum standards for participation. The World Bank and IMF have 
resisted developing minimum standards for participatory processes on the grounds that this 
would violate the principle of country ownership. However, it is not obvious why the sensitivity 
to country ownership should preclude the development of minimum standards for participatory 
processes that could be customized to account for country-specific considerations.184  
 
Perhaps more troubling, the overwhelming influence of donor agendas has had a damaging effect 
on nascent participatory discussions. Some participants have come to believe that backstage 
manoeuvring by donors has impeded the emergence of new policy ideas and frameworks from 
civil society actors. At the same time, CSO participation has been used by borrower governments 
and the Bank to lend legitimacy to the poverty reduction strategies, despite the limited nature of 
CSO influence.185  
 
2.8 PRSPs do not necessarily influence Bank and IMF lending in any significant way. There 
is concern among many CSOs that PRSPs do not actually influence IMF and World Bank 
lending strategies. According to the IMF, “the [World Bank and IMF] have not used the PRS 
approach sufficiently as a mechanism for identifying priorities on what they should deliver.  .”186 
Indeed, the IMF, for its part, does not appear to base its lending on the PRSPs. Its Independent 
Evaluation Office has found that “in most cases PRSPs do not yet provide a policy framework in 
which PRGF-supported programmes can be anchored.”187  
 
Part of this problem may be rectified as PRSPs grow in sophistication, but this will not ensure 
that the World Bank and IMF realign their lending to be more consistent with country-developed 
poverty reduction strategies.  
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 [T]he Bank’s approach regarding civil society engagement is both fragmented and 
inconsistent. It has been very difficult to predict the Bank’s behaviour regarding its 
interaction with civil society. . . . At country level there is no institutionalised mechanism 
for CSO-Bank engagement. It looks like the Bank basically perceives Government as its key 
development partner while viewing CSOs as peripheral stakeholders to be involved only as 
and when it suits the Bank. Despite the establishment of the portfolios of Social 
Development Advisors at country World Bank offices, civil society is yet to see this 
translated into an effective channel for regular civil society engagement. 
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in Uganda on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement 
(Appendix C) 
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Conclusion 
 
As the PRS process moves through its second round, there is a growing concern among CSOs 
and World Bank staff that consultation fatigue is setting in. Civil society organizations are 
increasingly questioning whether their efforts might be better placed elsewhere.188 To the extent 
that PRSP consultations provide CSOs, parliamentarians, and other stakeholders with 
opportunities to influence policy outcomes, there is reason to believe that they will continue to 
engage. However, as the World Bank’s own review notes, if CSOs continue to feel that their 
involvement has had “only limited impact on the design of PRSPs or on domestic policy” then 
there is a good possibility of disengagement.189 Meaningful participation in national 
policymaking ultimately means influence on the process and its outcomes, and not simply access 
to it. The broad concerns raised in this section point to systemic constraints on both the process 
and content of engagement, many of which have been apparent since 2001.  
 
3. PARTICIPATION IN PROJECTS 
 
The Bank’s project lending has often been a source of contention with civil society. The Bank 
has financed a number of environmentally and socially damaging projects over concerted local 
opposition. In addition, the development effectiveness of many of its projects has been 
compromised by a failure to incorporate the experience of project-affected people or allow them 
to take “ownership” of the project. Thus, much of the conflict over project lending has been over 
issues of local control, participatory decision-making, and project ownership. 
 
A more participatory approach to project decision-making would: increase development 
effectiveness, and advance project-affect peoples’ normative interest in having a meaningful 
voice in decisions that directly affect their lives. Civil society participation in projects has been 
shown to significantly improve project design, quality of service, and public support.190 It also 
increases transparency and accountability in contracting and procurement, while improving 
relationships between citizens and their public agencies.191 Overall, it leads to better outcomes, 
lower risks, and increased development effectiveness.192  
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 The consultations surrounding the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) are yet 
another clear programme that has been developed at the total exclusion of the civil society. 
The civil society has constantly requested for a broader stakeholder consultation but 
government and the cooperating partners have not listened.  
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in Zambia on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement 
(Appendix C). 
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Providing opportunities for meaningful participation of all interested stakeholders requires 
special attention to issues of political power. Too often, benefits tend to flow to the powerful and 
well-connected, while the costs and risks are imposed upon marginalized groups who cannot 
defend their rights and interests in the planning process. Thus, while the government is the 
primary decision-maker in many aspects of project development, it is incumbent upon the Bank 
to use its leverage and its own decision-making processes to proactively expand the political 
space for all interested stakeholders to meaningfully participate in project decision-making.  
 
The World Bank encourages its staff and borrowing governments to engage with civil society 
throughout the project cycle.193 For the most part, however, engagement is left to the discretion 
of project staff. Consultations are only required where projects will have significant adverse 
environmental impacts,194 affect indigenous peoples, or resettle people involuntarily.195  Even in 
these circumstances, the operational policies and directives do not specify benchmarks for 
evaluating whether consultations are sufficient.  
 
Since the early 1990s, the Bank has made some notable progress in improving participation in its 
projects. According to OED, stakeholder participation rose from 40 percent of new projects 
approved in 1994 to 70 percent in 1998.196 Similarly, consultations in Environmental 
Assessments rose from about 50 percent in 1992 to 87 percent by 2001.197 Modest qualitative 
gains are also apparent. In 1992, EA consultations were often limited to surveying affected 
groups and making the EA publicly available.198 By 1997, they included better use of public 
meetings, disclosure, and increased interaction between the Bank and stakeholders.199  
 
Despite these gains, however, the actual influence of civil society on Bank-supported projects 
remains very limited and uneven. Much of the increased participation has been narrow in scope, 
rushed, superficial, or otherwise ineffective.200 This section identifies a number of systemic 
constraints that have limited public participation in Bank-supported projects. 
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3.1 The Bank’s Information Disclosure Policy limits informed participation. The World 
Bank’s Policy on Disclosure of Information provides that “timely dissemination of information 
to local groups affected by the projects and programs supported by the Bank, including 
nongovernmental organizations, is essential for the effective implementation and sustainability 
of projects.”201 However, the policy does not require the release of some materials that are 
critical for informed participation. It does not require the release of certain draft project 
documents, which would provide citizens with information while decisions are still under 
consideration. Nor does it require the disclosure of supervision documents, which would enable 
civil society to better monitor implementation.202 And even where the disclosure policy requires 
documents to be made publicly available, there is no independent review mechanism to ensure 
that Bank staff respond appropriately to information requests.203 The failure to disclose project 
information at a time when it can inform public participation has constrained the public’s ability 
to assess the merits and potential impacts of proposed projects.204 It has also undermined public 
acceptance of the Bank and its projects by creating an impression that the organization has 
something to hide.205  
3.2 Participation usually does not occur until project preparation and appraisal.  Projects 
are more likely to be sustainable and effective if they are based upon affected people’s own 
analyses of the problems they face and the appropriate solutions.206 Yet, the Bank does not 
require that borrowers solicit public inputs during the early stages of needs assessments and 
project identification and design, when fundamental decisions about project type and risk are 
made, and when the full range of policy and project options can be considered. OED has found 
that only 12 percent of sampled projects were participatory during project identification.207A 
systemic bias against early consultation is also apparent in Environmental Assessments (EAs). 
Although Bank Operational Policy OP 4.01 requires public consultations to develop the Terms of 
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[A] frequent indigenous criticism is that World Bank-sponsored consultation meetings are 
used primarily by project officials and consultants to give legitimacy to the project, gain 
access to communities, divide opinion and pressure local indigenous communities to accept 
the external agendas of governments, development agencies, big business and NGOs. 
 
—Forest People’s Programme (FPP) submission, Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: 
Experiences with Participation, (Appendix F), p. 16. 
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Reference (TOR) for an EA, consultations are typically held only after a TOR has been 
produced.208  
 
Public consultations typically do not occur until project preparation and appraisal, when the 
problem to be addressed has already been framed and the proposed response has already been 
formulated. This limits the scope of participation to refining specific project proposals.209 As one 
World Bank staff member has explained, “[p]articipation during preparation results in some 
tinkering around the edges of an already defined project, when it is too late for primary 
stakeholder views and concerns to be factored into project design.”210 As a result, many 
participants have concluded that consultations are intended primarily to gain public 
legitimacy.211 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Participation has also been weak during monitoring and evaluation. Participatory 
monitoring and evaluation can improve project sustainability and ownership by affected people, 
and better enable implementing agencies to identify and respond to unanticipated problems.212 It 
can also strengthen evaluation as a tool through which the Bank captures lessons from individual 
projects and disseminates them throughout the institution.213  
 
The Quality Assurance Group at the Bank has identified poor quality monitoring and evaluation 
as one of four major “persistent problems” that have shown little improvement over the years.214 
OED has also found that only nine percent of sampled projects had participatory monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E).215 Even those CSOs that are subcontracted to help implement Bank projects 
rarely participate in project evaluation.216 
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We wanted to alter the proposed route of the pipeline but we had no influence – it was 
already decided. I see it now as a game that has no concrete result for us…the workshops 
and discussions are held simply to comply with Bank guidelines. We conclude that the 
Bank’s discussions are organised to stem our criticism of proposed projects. 
—Indigenous leader, quoted in FPP submission, Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: 
Experiences with Participation, (Appendix F), p. 16. 
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3.4 Participation processes have often been of poor quality. Civil society organizations have 
frequently complained that participatory processes in Bank- supported projects are ad hoc, 
arbitrary, and poorly administered. These complaints include “lack of clear and consistent 
parameters for consultation and feedback, arrogance or defensive posturing by Bank staff, lack 
of transparency about who is invited, late distribution of consultation documents, lack of 
translation, and lack of funds to cover CSO time and travel expenses” and lack of attention to 
alternative project options.217 As a result, consultations have often amounted to little more 
information sessions in which affected peoples are notified of decisions that have already be 
taken elsewhere.218  
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There remains a widespread feeling that so-called “participation” in Bank projects is partial 
and usually restricted to village meetings in which consultants “extract” information about 
development “needs”, more to fulfil their own requirements than to address the genuine 
priorities of indigenous communities. 
 
—FPP Submission, Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: Experiences with Participation, 
(Appendix F) p. 8. 
 
Interactions with the WB have been very one sided. They collect information about an issue, 
do an analysis, make conclusions, and then present them. There is little room for influencing 
their conclusions. There has been some collaboration in the analysis part of the process, but 
for the most part, any thinking outside of the WB mindset is not welcome. The little 
collaboration that exists is perfunctory. WB policies that effect government decisions, whose 
negative consequences are mainly felt by people at the lowest levels of the economic pyramid 
and often times whose positive consequences are reserved for the upper echelons of the power 
and financial ladder, appear to be untouchable by anyone, any organization at the local level. 
Even after a structure for an activity is put in place, there is little room to dialogue about the 
details of setting it up and implementation. 
 
—Respondent to online survey (Appendix B). 
 
Experiences vary regarding the process of planning and implementation of the World Bank 
programs/projects. . . .[I]nclusion in the process of implementation [has] increased. Yet, in 
. . . monitoring and evaluation of the projects/programs there is a complete lack of feedback 
from the local office of the Bank. 
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in the Republic of Macedonia on World Bank-Civil Society 
Engagement (Appendix C), p. 3. 
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The Bank’s own reviews have largely concurred with this assessment. For example, OED found 
that participation is “often poorly planned and executed, rushed, superficial, failed to adequately 
include or protect the interests of marginalized groups, dominated by the more powerful and 
vocal, unrepresentative, or failed to make a difference.”219 Similarly, in its recent Issues and 
Options paper on Bank-Civil Society engagement, the Bank noted that “consultation guidelines 
are not widely followed,” and consultations “often occur in an arbitrary fashion with very short 
notice and/or very late in the process.” In part, this is because task managers tend to “‘tick the 
box’ that CSOs have been involved, rather than take proactive steps to ensure engagement is 
viewed as satisfactory by all stakeholders.”220 Best practice, in which participatory decision-
making processes are developed through collaboration with local CSOs, governments, and 
appropriate international actors, remains the exception rather than the norm. Frustrations arising 
from this lack of deliberation and strategic clarity are further exacerbated by an absence of 
feedback mechanisms to inform civil society on how inputs are used.221  
3.5 Social analyses are not integrated with project decision-making. Bank research has 
shown that development outcomes improve when participation processes are supported by social 
assessments and stakeholder analyses.222 Despite this evidence, and the fact that social analysis 
has been part of the Bank’s lexicon for over two decades,223 it remains underutilized not only 
during project design, but also further upstream when broader economic and sector work studies 
are carried out. The Bank does not, as a matter of standard procedure, systematically evaluate the 
distribution of expected benefits, costs and risks of projects. Rather, it tends to calculate only 
aggregate costs and benefits, which can mask and undervalue differential impacts on 
marginalized groups.224 As such, they do not provide a basis for these groups to understand how 
they will be affected, or to defend their interests in the decision-making process.  
 
There has been some recent progress on this issue. In 2003, the Bank published a social analysis 
sourcebook, and created social development and gender benchmarks as part of its quality 
assurance reviews.225 However, two significant obstacles remain. First, both the sourcebook and 
the assurance reviews assume that participation begins with project design. This means that Bank 
staff have no guidelines for civil society participation prior to project design—during the needs 
assessment and project identification stages—when critical decisions are made. Second, Task 
Managers frequently do not receive clear direction and adequate support to systematically 
incorporate social analyses into project decision-making.  
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3.6 Public participation is hindered by a number of external and internal constraints. Civil 
society and Bank observers have identified a number of in-country and in-house constraints, 
which significantly limited the scope and effectiveness of public participation. According to 
OED, the biggest in-country constraint to participation was government attitude, particularly 
where public officials saw participation as a threat to their jobs, resources, or authority.226 OED 
found that participation was also hampered by the lack of government and stakeholder capacity 
to effectively implement participatory processes, and lack of government follow-up or sustained 
interaction.227 In addition, civil society observers have noted that in autocratic countries, the fear 
of public reprisal often makes meaningful critical engagement impossible.228  
 
World Bank staff sometimes claim that since project loans are made to governments, the level of 
participation ultimately depends on the willingness of governments to solicit public inputs. They 
object that since the Bank has limited ability to make governments listen to their citizens, CSO 
frustration is misdirected at the Bank. However, OED has found that task managers can often 
overcome government resistance through persistent advocacy.229 Indeed, many have been able to 
convert recalcitrant government officials into enthusiastic supporters of more participatory 
approaches.230  
 
Task managers report that the internal disincentives to making their work more participatory 
pose an even greater obstacle than country impediments.231 Overall, task managers “paint a 
sobering picture of the environment for participation within the Bank.”232 Impediments include 
insufficient funding, inadequate time for mission work in the field, pressure to process loans and 
disburse funds rapidly, and inadequate support from management.233 Ensuring public 
participation is frequently seen as optional. The primary source of funding for public 
participation is trust funds, which are limited in size and flexibility, and are often cumbersome to 
use.234 As a result, participation is perceived by task managers as an “add on” to a project rather 
than as an integral part of the operation.235 Furthermore, rigid project cycles do not allow for 
time-consuming and labour-intensive participatory planning processes.236 Finally, Bank 
management has shown little sensitivity to the need for additional funding, time, and flexibility 
for participatory processes.  
 
As a result of these impediments, the extent and quality of participation varies widely by country 
and task manager.237 Yet, despite the institutional disincentives and lack of management support, 
task managers who are willing to attempt participation tend to believe strongly in its benefits. 
The overwhelming majority of task managers that employ participatory processes believe that it 
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has improved the quality of the operations that they manage. As a result, experience with public 
participation motivates more participation. 238  
 
3.7 Insufficient capacity in communities and local CSOs has limited their abilities to 
participate. Local CSOs and communities often lack different kinds of capacities to 
meaningfully participate in project decision making: (1) the ability to understand and critique 
technical issues; (2) sufficient knowledge of their rights under national law and Bank policy;239 
and (3) the skills necessary to negotiate with more powerful actors. Bank efforts to build 
capacity, where they exist, tend to focus only on technical skills. They typically do not seek to 
build long-term capacities or to enhance the negotiating and conflict resolution skills necessary 
for engaging with government officials and Bank staff.240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Bank-led efforts to increase participation through capacity 
building are constrained by a lack of adequate funding and the absence of a centralized 
mechanism to support task manager initiatives.  
 
3.8 Systematic improvements in the quality of participation are constrained by inadequate 
benchmarks, standards, and learning systems in the Bank.  The Bank currently lacks 
adequate systems for capturing lessons learned from CSO engagements, and for tracking 
participation. Various Bank reports have noted that there is a lack of reliable or accessible data to 
track, monitor, and evaluate engagement with CSOs.241 They have also noted that there has been 
a failure to develop appropriate indicators of impact and effectiveness of participation.242 This is 
compounded by training and knowledge management systems that are inadequate for the needs 
of task managers, and a recruitment process that favours technical competence over skills needed 
for participatory activities.243  
 
3.9 The Bank’s accountability mechanisms for ensuring meaningful engagement are 
inadequate. There are few, if any, meaningful avenues for redress for citizens who believe that 
participatory processes have not been sufficient, or that the concerns that they have raised have 
not been adequately addressed in a project. The Bank’s accountability mechanism, the Inspection 
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The speedy consultations have not worked to the interest of the poor whom they claim to 
help or support as the most civil society players are often not adequately prepared for the 
high level and technical discussions that are held. Lack of access to relevant information 
from government and donor agencies has disadvantaged the civil society from effective 
engagement.  
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in Zambia on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement 
(Appendix C). 
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Panel, is not well suited to this task for two main reasons. First, while the Inspection Panel 
reviews compliance with mandatory and enforceable standards, there are few such standards 
with respect to participation for the Inspection Panel to apply. In most cases, public participation 
is considered to be discretionary and “best practice.” And the policies that do require 
consultation, such as the Environmental Assessment Policy or the Indigenous Peoples Policy, do 
not provide clear standards for evaluating their adequacy. Because the operational procedures 
afford so much discretion to Bank staff, it is exceedingly difficult for the Inspection Panel to 
conclude that staff did not comply with consultation requirements. Second, because the 
Inspection Panel process can be cumbersome, it lacks the agility to respond to complaints about 
participation quickly enough that they can be redressed before the project moves forward and the 
issues are mooted.244  
The Bank has, however, done some notable work to improve mechanisms of “social 
accountability,” through which citizens can directly engage politicians and civil servants to 
improve public governance and service delivery. These include, for example, citizen report cards 
that provide a transparent mechanism for the public to assess the performance of public 
agencies.245 But while the World Bank is increasingly supporting such initiatives among CSOs 
and governments around the world, it has failed to employ the same tools in its own operations. 
Engagement between the Bank and civil society could be made much more meaningful if these 
same tools of social accountability were used to improve the Bank’s accountability to the public 
throughout its project cycle.  
Conclusion 
 
World Bank consultations have resulted in very little meaningful influence for citizens. The 
absence of CSO participation throughout the project cycle has led some to view the World 
Bank’s consultations as mere gestures in which participants are “treated like decorations . . . but 
their inputs [aren’t] taken into account.”246 In cases where inputs are considered but not accepted, 
the Bank does not generally explain its rationale. This sense of exclusion is aggravated by a 
disclosure policy that makes much information available only after key decisions have been 
made. And within the Bank, efforts to improve the quality of engagement are undermined by 
inadequate benchmarks and standards, as well as weak learning and accountability systems. 
 
 
4. INSTITUTIONALIZED DIALOGUE MECHANISMS 
 
On several occasions, the Bank and civil society organizations have attempted to go beyond the 
usual ad hoc approach to engagement, and seek to create more productive engagement 
mechanisms. The Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC) is one example of these kinds of efforts. 
                                                 
244
 In particular, investigations can be slowed down unnecessarily by the requirement that the Board review eligibility and 
authorize an investigation. 
245
 Carmen Malena, with Reiner Forster and Janmejay Singh. “Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and 
Emerging Practice.” Social Development Papers, Participation and Civic Engagement Paper No. 76, The World Bank (December 
2004). 
246
 This quote, made by a respondent in an OED consultation, is cited in two OED reports: World Bank (2001b), p. 3; World 
Bank (2002d), p. 2. It is not clear from the report whether the statement was made by a donor agency, government, or CSO 
representative. 
  54 
Previously, the Bank has created other global, regional, and thematic mechanisms, including the 
World Bank-NGO Committee, ECA NGO Working Group, and the External Gender 
Consultative Group (EGCG). These mechanisms have not played a major role in policy or 
project development, and are of minor significance when compared with the global, national, and 
project level consultations discussed in the previous sections. Nevertheless, they are worth 
reviewing here because: (1) the Bank’s paper on World Bank-civil society engagement identifies 
establishing “new global mechanisms” as its most important priority; and (2) we think it 
important to reflect upon our own experiences in the JFC process to allow others to better 
understand the opportunities and pitfalls of these mechanisms. 247 
 
Institutionalized dialogue arrangements have a certain intuitive appeal for both civil society and 
the Bank. For civil society organizations, they appear to offer promising channels for raising 
issues and expressing concerns at the highest levels of Bank management. For the Bank, they 
have the potential to serve as a kind of external advisory board to help capture civil society 
inputs. And for both parties, they can provide opportunities for sustained dialogue on complex 
and contested issues that may help participants develop a more nuanced appreciation for 
differing perspectives that can lead to learning, negotiation and compromise.  
 
In our experience with the JFC, however, these benefits have proven to be elusive. Below, we 
discuss the some of the major obstacles that have compromised the usefulness of the JFC as a 
mechanism of engagement. Where pertinent, we reference similar experiences in other 
institutionalized dialogue mechanisms.  
 
4.1 Generalized dialogue mechanisms are not well-suited to the current operations of the 
Bank or the state of global civil society. Over the past two decades, the World Bank’s 
operations have expanded into a multiplicity of new substantive areas. At the same time, the 
range of organizations that are interested in, and knowledgeable about, the World Bank’s 
operations has deepened and diversified. Many of these organizations have come to expect that 
they will have an opportunity to be heard by the Bank when issues of importance to them are 
being discussed.  
 
Because of this proliferation of issues and actors, dialogue arrangements that lack a clearly 
defined and narrowly circumscribed substantive focus—like the JFC—are unlikely to be useful, 
and may even be counterproductive. Since most civil society organizations are issue or 
constituency focused, it is all but impossible to identify a group of civil society actors that can 
credibly speak to the full range of “civil society issues.” As a result, dialogues on any particular 
issue will tend to be superficial, and will not produce the kind of specialized and rigorous 
analysis that can help shape policy development.248  
 
Moreover, an institutionalized dialogue mechanism that is perceived to have a mandate to 
discuss an open-ended array of civil society concerns risks being seen as usurping political space 
from other organizations that have not been included. This, in fact, is what occurred with the JFC 
process. Some outside of the process accused the CSO members of having aspirations to create a 
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focal point for all civil society engagement with the Bank. As a result, the JFC became divisive 
within civil society, and at least some participants incurred significant reputational costs.  
 
4.2 Institutionalized dialogue mechanisms have suffered from weaknesses in transparency, 
representativeness, and accountability. The legitimacy of each of these mechanisms has been 
challenged on the grounds that the members are not sufficiently transparent, representative or 
accountable to the broader community of civil society organizations. The JFC, World Bank-
NGO Committee, and the EGCG were each criticized for having an insular and opaque selection 
process, in which few other organizations were consulted.249  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The civil society members of the JFC were also sharply criticized for being unrepresentative and 
unaccountable to other civil society organizations, and for failing to consult with other civil 
society organizations in developing the work-plan of the committee.   
 
4.3 These mechanisms have been widely perceived as being vulnerable to World Bank 
manipulation and co-optation. Institutionalized dialogue mechanisms have been perceived as 
being extremely vulnerable to World Bank manipulation, and as providing a means for the Bank 
to deflect strong external criticism.250 For example, critics of the JFC have suggested that it was 
comprised mainly of civil society organizations that would not seek to hold the Bank accountable 
for the failures of past engagements.251 Similarly, a gender advocate within the Bank described 
the EGCG as “Bank defined, managed and implemented. Low level and low-brow...and handled 
like a damage limitation measure.”252 In some cases, the risks of World Bank capture have been 
exacerbated by the fact that many participants have lacked the institutional knowledge or 
technical expertise necessary to engage the Bank as “equal counterparts.”253 Finally, power 
imbalances on the committees have raised concerns about co-optation. Observers of the ECA-
NGO Working Group have noted that the participants have no decision-making authority, and 
that many organizations are reluctant to criticize the Bank—in part, because are not well 
established and depend on the Bank for funding. 
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Conclusion 
 
Many suspect that the Bank has only created these institutionalized dialogue mechanisms for 
public relations purposes, or worse, to redirect more organic interactions into a forum that it can 
closely control. Regardless of whether these criticisms are fair or not, the perception that these 
dialogue mechanisms are controlled by the Bank substantially limits their utility as a tool for 
increasing civil society inputs into policy development or organizational learning. 
 
 
The working group members have almost no decision making power in this process. 
Some things are not consulted at all with the group (e.g. tactical decisions like 
organizing a working group meeting- we do not have a say in where, when, who should 
come, where to stay, how much to spend). When it comes to programmatic events (e.g. 
the local development/accountability conference, the forum) there is even less decision 
making power. We are ‘consulted’ but not empowered. Even in cases when most of the 
group disagrees with a suggestion, we are coerced into agreement/going ahead with 
what has been put forth. There were many times in which we heard the statement ‘Bank 
management would not agree with this’. 
 
—The ECA NGO Working Group, JFC Submission (Appendix E). 
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V A FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATORY DECISION-
MAKING 
 
The preceding review of World Bank engagements with civil society identifies a number of 
common issues that have arisen in various spheres of engagement and decision-making. While 
the Bank has recognized that reaching out to civil society is necessary for the design and delivery 
of more legitimate, effective and pro-poor policies and projects, civil society participants in Bank 
engagements have complained that the consultative processes have diverged from basic 
principles of democratic and participatory decision-making. Worse, the shortcomings in those 
engagements have precipitated a crisis of legitimacy among many public stakeholders. 
 
That the same types of public complaints arise repeatedly in both project and policy 
development, in different geographic areas and policymaking environments, and at different 
levels within the organizational hierarchy, strongly suggests that the problems are systemic. We 
believe, they stem from a common source—a consistent inattention to basic principles of 
participatory decision-making on contested policy issues.  
 
To effectively defuse these criticisms, the Bank must increase the quantity and quality of public 
participation across the full range of its strategic and operational decision-making. This requires 
that the Bank develop a comprehensive and systematic approach to public participation in which 
the basic principles of participatory decision-making are fully integrated into each stage of the 
policy and project decision-making process. 
 
This section addresses this challenge in three parts. First, it identifies five core principles of 
participatory decision-making. Then, it identifies the stages of the decision-making process that 
provide critical opportunities for the public to raise issues and influence outcomes. Finally, it 
combines both parts into an analytic framework for more systematically evaluating and 
expanding public participation in all dimensions of World Bank decision-making. 
 
1. Principles of Participatory Decision-Making 
 
Any effort to make decision-making at the World Bank more participatory and responsive to 
public concerns must address a basic conceptual challenge. On the one hand, participatory and 
democratic decision-making is widely accepted as the touchstone of public legitimacy for 
international institutions like the Bank. But on the other hand, much of the political infrastructure 
that supports citizen participation at the State and local level— geographically bounded political 
communities, direct election of representatives, “one-person, one-vote” apportionment of the 
franchise, political parties, etc.—is conspicuously absent at the international level.254 The 
absence of these mechanisms, and the prodigious challenge of developing them, have led some 
observers to conclude that international institutions like the Bank are unlikely to ever be much 
more than venues for bureaucratic bargaining between elites.255  
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We agree with these “democratic sceptics” that the World Bank will not soon (and may never) be 
governed under a system that meets the minimum standards of a Madisonian or Continental 
democracy. The central question for us, however, is how much more the World Bank could be 
doing to pluralize its decision-making within these structural constraints, by opening avenues for 
more meaningful public participation. We believe that there are substantial opportunities to 
apply basic participatory principles to all levels of policy, program, and project Bank decision-
making.256  
 
Towards this end, we have identified five core participatory principles that should inform World 
Bank decision-making. These are: 
• Transparency and Access to Information; 
• Inclusiveness; 
• Quality of Discourse and Deliberation; 
• Fairness under Rule of Law and 
• Accountability. 
 
The consistent application of these principles to all strategic and operational decision-making 
processes would help to structure fairer, more deliberative, decision-making processes that could 
better reconcile competing interests and visions of the public good.257 As such, they would help 
the Bank to realize more just and sustainable development outcomes, and to improve its 
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens who seek to influence its decision-making.  
 
To do so, they must be applied with an eye towards redressing the profound inequities of voice, 
access and political power between different interests in development debates.258 If applied in 
this way, these principles can be powerful tools for enhancing the capacity of poor and 
marginalized people to influence the decisions that affect their lives.259 On the other hand, 
participatory mechanisms that merely replicate the power imbalances of domestic political 
processes are unlikely to empower the poor to determine their own development destinies. For 
example, if only special interests have voice and access, increased participation in technocratic 
decisions, will likely lead to bureaucratic capture. Similarly, comfortable orthodoxies will persist 
unquestioned if the terms of the debate do not allow sufficient space for dissenters to challenge 
the received wisdom. For this reason, the empowerment of marginalized stakeholders is a critical 
cross-cutting objective of applying these principles to the governance and decision-making 
structures of the Bank.  
Principle 1: Transparency and Access to Information  
 
Transparency involves making information accessible and understandable to interested 
stakeholders.260 Transparency enables people to participate meaningfully in public decision-
making by providing them with the information they need to understand, evaluate, and influence 
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the actions of decision-makers. As such, it serves both normative and instrumental functions—it 
gives content to the public’s right to know what their representatives on doing in their names, 
and it leads to better governance and decision-making.261  
 
Effective transparency mechanisms make information available to citizens in ways that the 
information can influence their political choices.262 They provide complete information about 
activities and options before key decisions are made, and in local languages, culturally 
appropriate formats, and in ways that are readily accessible and affordable.263 This requires both 
a general presumption of disclosure, in which information is considered to be public unless there 
are compelling reasons to keep it secret, and specific mechanisms to ensure that disclosure is 
timely and adequate.264   
 
Principle 2: Inclusiveness  
 
Inclusiveness requires that all people have the opportunity to participate in making decisions that 
will directly affect their lives. In particular, it involves bringing in politically disenfranchised or 
marginalized groups that might ordinarily be excluded from decision-making processes.265 
Depending on the issues under consideration, this may include peasant associations and 
collectives, community-based organizations, environmental advocates, trade unions, women’s 
organizations, religious organizations, indigenous peoples' organizations, youth groups, the 
disabled and health and education advocates.  
 
 Inclusive participation is a critical to the political legitimacy of decision-making. Even in 
democratic regimes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain societal consensus around 
decisions reached in secret by small groups of elites-- particularly when those decisions impose 
substantial burdens and costs on excluded groups.266 As a result, policy solutions are more likely 
to gain public acceptance when all those who are affected have a voice in developing them.267 
 
Inclusive participation improves the effectiveness and quality of decision-making in two 
important ways. First, by expanding the pool of information available to decision-makers, it 
increases the likelihood that critical issues will be addressed. Including contrarian voices is 
especially critical in this regard, as dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering problems that would 
otherwise go unnoticed. Second, decision-making processes that expose people to diverse ideas 
and perspectives, including those that they are inclined to reject, serve an important moderating 
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function. They help to build a culture of pluralism that dampens the tendency towards extremism 
that can occur when decision-makers only listen to people who see the world as they do.268  
 
Proactive efforts to include marginalized stakeholders are often required to ensure that they have 
the opportunity to participate. This may include efforts to (1) systematically identify all those 
whose rights may be affected or who may bear the risks associated with the decision; and (2) 
reach out to them and provide whatever assistance they may need to participate (e.g. translation 
services, travel support, etc). 269 
 
Principle 3: Quality of Discourse and Deliberation  
 
Decision-making processes must also allow participants to engage in meaningful deliberations 
about policy alternatives and objectives. They should be interactive and influential--that is, they 
should be structured to facilitate deliberative discussion and direct political exchange between all 
affected parties, and they should have a direct impact on policy outcomes.270 “Consultations” 
that seek only to extract information, or apprise stakeholders of decisions that have already been 
taken elsewhere, are rarely sufficient.271 
 
Deliberative processes allow affected people to freely and equally express their competing 
interests, perspectives, and visions of the public good. All contested issues, including those that 
are highly complex or technical, should be open to debate.272 Participants should have the 
opportunity to make arguments and raise concerns with the expectation that the best ideas, not 
the most powerful interests, will prevail, and that they will be reflected in final decisions. Ideally, 
the objective is to resolve differences through negotiated outcomes that do not simply aggregate 
pre-existing preferences, but allow for those preferences to change, and common interests to be 
revealed, through reasoned discourse, ethical reflection, and political bargaining.273  
 
For decision-making to be based on deliberation rather than raw political power, marginalized 
stakeholders must be enabled to participate on an equal basis with more entrenched interests.274 
Thus, where contested issues are highly technical, all participants should have comparable access 
to the expertise necessary to independently challenge the claims of other parties. Participants 
must also have the option to withhold their consent to an agreement if their concerns are not 
adequately addressed. The freedom to withhold consent can help to neutralize the profound 
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inequities in political power and technical capacity between participants, and can help ensure that 
the concerns and aspirations of key participants will be accommodated. 
 
In order for decision-making processes to be deliberative, they should:  
 
• Ensure that clear expectations of what can be achieved are established at the outset 
through dialogue with interested parties. Decision-makers should be explicit about how 
the discussions will inform policy decisions;  
• Justify decisions by providing clear explanations for the decisions that have been taken 
and the alternatives that have been rejected, so they can be evaluated and reasonably 
questioned, and so decision-makers can be held accountable;275 
• Provide all participants with full and equal access to all politically relevant information, 
and the capacity to evaluate it; 
• Honour negotiated agreements. When negotiated agreements are achieved, they should 
be fully respected by participants and those who will implement decisions and 
• Afford participants the option to withhold their consent to an agreement if their 
concerns are not adequately addressed. Negotiated agreements become coercive if, at 
the end of the day, aggrieved parties cannot say no.  
 
Principle 4: Fairness under Rule of Law 
 
Public governance is inherently messy and potentially conflictual. Decisions about priorities, 
policy options, and objectives often require difficult tradeoffs between interests, and at least 
some groups may not be well-served by the outcomes. The willingness of those groups to bear 
the costs of collective decisions depends in large measure on their having been treated fairly in 
the decision-making process. If they do not believe that they have been treated fairly, they will 
have little reason to view adverse decisions as legitimate. Fairness, then, is a necessary 
prerequisite for the legitimacy of participatory decision-making. 
 
Fairness requires that both the process and its substantive outcomes comport with shared 
principles of justice and equity.276 Procedural fairness requires that policies, rules and standards 
be developed and enforced in impartial and predictable ways, and that processes of 
representation, decision-making and enforcement are clear, mandatory and internally 
consistent.277 Common mechanisms to ensure procedural fairness include clear and mandatory 
rulemaking procedures, public participation requirements, and guarantees of individual access to 
appeals processes and other dispute resolution mechanisms. Substantive fairness requires that the 
distribution of costs, benefits and risks from policy outcomes are just and equitable.278 Principles 
of substantive fairness include equal protection under law, protections for fundamental rights, 
and prohibitions on apportioning outcomes on the basis of invidious distinctions between groups 
or individuals.    
 
A clear commitment to fairness is particularly important for politically marginalized stakeholders 
that lack the wherewithal to defend their interests through raw political power. Fairness 
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principles can provide these stakeholders with indispensable assurances that their concerns will 
be heard, their interests will be balanced equitably, and that the agreements they negotiate will be 
respected.279 To provide these assurances, however, fairness principles must be mandatory and 
consistently enforced. Occasional or discretionary enforcement of these principles sends a signal 
that fairness is only a second-order concern, and is not likely to be sufficient to induce politically 
vulnerable groups to voluntarily participate.  
 
Principle 5: Accountability 
 
Accountability implies that decision-makers must answer for their actions and, depending on the 
answer, be exposed to potential sanctions.280 Accountability mechanisms allow citizens to 
control the behaviour of government officials and representatives to whom they have delegated 
public power.281  
 
Effective accountability mechanisms have four core components: transparency, justification, 
compliance with standards, and enforcement or sanctions.282 Transparency and justification 
have been discussed in detail above. In short, they require that citizens be able to understand 
what public officials are doing and why. Compliance involves evaluating their actions against 
clear standards that are based on publicly accepted norms. These include both procedural 
standards (regarding transparency, inclusiveness, etc.) and standards for assessing outcomes 
(e.g., on poverty reduction, social equity, and human rights).Enforcement involves imposing 
sanctions for failing to comply with those standards.  
 
2. Stages of Decision-Making 
 
Civil society organizations have consistently complained that there are too few entry points in 
the World Bank’s lending and policy-making processes for the public to influence decision-
making. For example, public inputs are often solicited only after key strategic or operational 
decisions have already been made, and rarely during implementation or evaluation. To expand 
these opportunities, the principles of participatory decision-making described above should be 
integrated into all stages of the Bank’s strategic and operational decision-making. 
 
Despite their differences, the World Bank’s lending and policy-making processes share a similar 
set of decision points, from agenda setting through evaluation. The project and policy lending 
cycles of the World Bank, like those of many public institutions, are generally described as a 
stable and predictable progression of discrete steps.283 Operational policy-making processes at 
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the Bank also follow a similar progression of steps, although they tend to be less well defined 
and more procedurally fluid than in lending operations.  
 
These decision-making processes can be described, in somewhat stylized terms, as a series of six 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: Issue framing and agenda setting  
 
Needs are assessed, diagnostic research is conducted, and key issues and agendas are 
framed, defined, and prioritized. For lending operations, this may involve conducting 
diagnostic research such as strategic poverty and social assessments, and establishing broad 
directions and priorities through the formulation of Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS). For operational policy-making, it involves identifying 
key areas of concern that may require a revised policy response.  
 
Stage 2: Policy or project identification  
 
Options are identified within the bounds set at stage 1. For lending operations, this involves 
developing more specific programs, projects, or policy reforms to achieve the priority 
objectives. Preliminary assessments of financial, economic, social and environmental factors 
are conducted, and alternatives are considered. For operational policy making, specific 
policy options and approaches are considered. By the end of this stage, all major decisions 
concerning the range of policies or projects under consideration have been made. 
 
Stage 3: Preparation and appraisal/analysis 
 
Studies are prepared to further assess technical, institutional, economic, environmental, social 
and financial issues facing the proposal. For lending operations, the Bank may provide technical 
and financial assistance to clients to conduct this analysis, and prepare its own appraisal. For 
project lending, this may include appraisal of sensitive environmental and social impacts as 
required by the Safeguard Policies. For policy lending, it may also include more systemic and 
indirect environmental, economic and social impacts of proposed reforms. For both projects and 
policies, alternative methods for achieving the same objectives are, ideally, also appraised. For 
operational policy-making, assessments of the likely impacts of the proposed policy change are 
expected at this stage. In all three contexts, this is currently where the majority of public 
consultation takes place.  
 
Stage 4: Negotiation and approval by official decision-makers 
 
The terms of a loan or policy are finalized and submitted for approval to official decision-
makers. At the Bank, these decisions are made by the Board of Executive Directors. In 
borrowing governments, this may involve ratification by a specific ministry, a council of 
ministers, or a country's legislature, depending on national law.  
 
Stage 5: Implementation, supervision and completion  
 
The policy, program or project is implemented. For project lending, this may involve the 
construction of infrastructure or the implementation of service delivery programs. For policy 
lending, the reforms are put into effect, and may involve changes in a range of arenas such 
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as monetary and fiscal policy, trade and labour policy, privatization, foreign and domestic 
investment, etc. Plans may be adjusted to account for unanticipated challenges or events, in 
accordance with legal requirements, previous commitments, and the expectations of key 
stakeholders. Reviews may be conducted by World Bank staff to ensure that Bank 
guidelines and policies are being followed. For operational policies, the policies are applied 
to Bank operations. 
 
Stage 6: Evaluation, adaptation and learning 
 
The project or policy is reviewed to assess accomplishments and problems. Outcomes are 
measured against original objectives. Lessons learned are captured and disseminated. This is 
typically done well after completion of the project or policy reform. 
 
 
3. A Framework for Participatory Decision-Making 
 
A participatory approach to decision-making requires that the basic participation principles be 
applied at each stage of the project/policy cycle. As the experiences described in Section IV have 
shown, most engagements have been limited in scope and insufficiently participatory in quality. 
Currently, in Bank projects, citizens are sometimes engaged in project appraisal (stage 3), but 
this is primarily limited to public hearings required by the Bank as part of the environmental 
assessment process. In some cases, CSOs serve as implementers of development projects (stage 
5), but even then are not involved in project evaluation. For Bank policies, civil society 
involvement is largely confined to consultations for Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (stage 1). 
This applies only to IDA-eligible countries, and is constrained by the fact that the parameters for 
discussion are usually set in advance by governments and donor institutions. Even during those 
limited windows, public participation often fails to meet the minimum standards of transparency, 
inclusiveness, deliberativeness, fairness and accountability. In short, the project/policy cycle fails 
to systematically incorporate or encourage participatory citizen engagement. 
 
Yet, a number of past World Bank efforts demonstrate that it is possible to include much deeper 
and broader participation at various stages of the cycle.284 Indeed, the former head of the Bank’s 
Operations Evaluation Department has argued that the entire project cycle should be reconceived 
as a “learning cycle” to, among other things, more systematically incorporate the views and 
concerns of all significant stakeholders, adapt projects or policies built on consensus among 
stakeholders, and strengthen accountability and transparency in implementing agencies.285 
 
The challenge for the Bank, then, is to ensure that the principles of participation are consistently 
and rigorously applied throughout the project/policy cycle.286 To help think through how this can 
be accomplished, Table 1 combines the principles and stages into a framework for thinking about 
what participatory decision-making should require at each decision point in the process. For the 
World Bank, this matrix should be used to structure engagement processes around its decision 
                                                 
284
 For a series of examples from World Bank and IMF experience, see Robb (2003), as well as Caroline M. Robb,. Can the Poor 
Influence Policy? Participatory Poverty Assessments in the Developing World. Second Edition. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2002).  
285
 Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving, “A New Project Cycle for the World Bank?” Finance and Development, volume 31, 
no. 4, (1994), pp. 42-44. 
286
 A number of the suggestions in this section are adapted from Robb (2003) and World Bank (2003b). 
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making cycles. For civil society, it suggests entry points for participation and a basis for 
assessing whether proposed opportunities for input meet their normative expectations of what a 
participatory process should look like. This matrix is intended to be a preliminary review of the 
opportunities for pluralizing decision-making, and to provide a basis for further discussion on 
how more participatory and democratic decision-making can be operationalised. 
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Table 1: A Framework for Participatory Decision-Making 
 
Stage/         
Principle 
Issue-Framing & 
Agenda-Setting 
Identification Preparation & 
Appraisal 
Negotiation & 
Approval 
Implementation, 
Supervision & 
Completion 
Evaluation, 
Adaptation & 
Learning 
Transparency 
& Access to 
Information 
• ensure access to all 
key documents, 
including 
Economic and 
Sector Work, 
CASs, PRSPs, and 
Joint Staff 
Assessments prior 
to discussions and 
key decisions 
(ensuring 
timeliness, 
translation, and 
affordability, 
subject to 
considerations of 
cost and 
relevance) 
 
• make available 
the Project 
Concept Note, 
Project 
Information 
Document*, 
Integrated 
Safeguards Data 
Sheet,* and 
Sector Strategy 
Papers prior to 
board reviews 
• make available 
the Project 
Appraisal 
Documents or 
Program 
Documents and 
Letters of 
Development 
Policy prior to 
approval 
decisions 
• make available, 
upon request, all 
documents and 
data used in 
preparing 
Environmental 
Assessments*, 
Indigenous 
Peoples 
Development 
Plans*, and 
Environmental 
Action Plans prior 
to board decisions 
 
• make public 
the minutes of 
board 
meetings, as 
well as voting 
records of 
members 
• make public 
all draft 
documents 
used for 
deliberation, 
including the 
Memorandum 
of the President 
 
• make available, for 
public comment, prior 
to finalization, 
Implementation 
Completion Reports as 
well as interim OED 
reviews of projects and 
programs, (e.g., Project 
Performance 
Assessment Reports, 
Impact Evaluation 
Reports, Country 
Assistance Evaluations, 
sector and thematic 
evaluations) , and QAG 
synthesis reports. 
• make available 
the OED’s 
internal audit of 
projects 
Inclusiveness  • conduct • revisit  • submit PRSPs  • revisit initial 
                                                 
*
 The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information currently allows for release of some documents (marked with *) in time for public review before key decisions are made. 
However, most of documents listed in this table are made available only after discussion and decision making by the Executive Directors. 
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comprehensive 
stakeholder 
analysis (e.g., 
through PSIA) 
• prioritize 
participation based 
on a rights-and-
risks approach 
 
stakeholder 
analysis to 
ensure its 
adequacy 
and CASs to 
the Board after 
they have been 
subject to 
debate in 
national 
legislatures 
stakeholder 
analysis to 
examine how it 
might have 
been improved 
Quality of 
Discourse & 
Deliberation 
• explicitly negotiate 
expectations for 
the engagement 
• provide 
justification for all 
major decisions 
• provide capacity 
building and 
funding for less 
powerful 
participants 
• allow affected 
stakeholder groups 
freedom to 
withhold consent  
• involve 
stakeholders in 
drafting PRSPs 
and CASs 
• broadly 
disseminate JSAs, 
and invite public 
comment prior to 
board discussions 
in order to better 
inform those 
discussions. 
• involve 
stakeholders in 
identifying 
projects or 
policy reforms 
• build 
stakeholder 
capacity to 
assess risks, 
alternatives, and 
timetables 
• conduct 
participatory 
assessment of 
potential impacts 
of proposed 
reforms or 
projects 
• subject all 
proposals to 
public scrutiny 
and challenge 
• disaggregate 
potential impacts 
on different 
stakeholder 
groups 
• involve 
stakeholders, and 
especially 
affected groups, 
in developing 
EAs (beyond 
nominal public 
hearings) and in 
assessing risks 
and alternatives. 
• subject EAs and 
plans to public 
scrutiny prior to 
approval 
• conduct 
comprehensive 
and public 
analyses of 
alternatives, 
including no-
project options 
• examine tradeoffs 
and distributional 
impacts. 
• encourage 
board members 
to provide 
rationales for 
their decisions 
• use participatory M&E 
to develop indicators, to 
track poverty impacts, 
and to identify mid-
course corrections 
• revisit policies, 
programs, and 
indicators to amend 
them as needed, 
through a follow-up 
process of participatory 
dialogue 
 
• involve 
stakeholders in 
designing final 
reviews, using 
participatory 
M&E to 
evaluate impact 
on poverty 
• establish a 
centralized 
system for 
feeding 
findings back 
into policy and 
project cycle to 
enable learning 
for future 
reforms and 
projects  
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• examine trade-
offs 
• discuss how 
sequencing of 
policies might 
mitigate possible 
adverse effects 
• set outlines for 
a participatory 
M&E 
framework 
 
Fairness 
under Rule of 
Law 
• use predictable 
rules and 
standards for 
deciding who 
participates and 
how decisions will 
move forward 
• develop a just and 
equitable basis for 
allocating costs, 
benefits, and risks 
• educate citizens on 
the country 
regulatory 
framework and 
Bank policies, 
including their 
rights to 
information, 
participation, and 
redress 
• check that 
projects or 
reforms 
distribute risks, 
costs, and 
benefits in a just 
and equitable 
way 
• pay special 
attention to risks 
faced by 
marginalized 
groups 
 
 • require JSAs 
and other 
reviews to 
consider equity 
and justice 
issues  
• encourage 
governments to 
develop 
protections for 
marginalized 
groups 
• use participatory M&E 
to revisit initial 
assessments on the 
distribution of risks, 
costs, and benefits 
 
Accountability • establish 
mandatory 
minimum 
 
 
• employ 
    
• develop social 
accountability methods 
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standards for 
consultation and 
participation at 
each stage of the 
cycle (standards 
that are 
enforceable but 
not cumbersome) 
• identify penalties 
or sanctions for 
failure to comply  
 
independent 
social scientists 
to examine 
whether any 
stakeholders 
have been 
coerced, and 
what sanctions 
may apply 
–e.g., Citizen Report 
Cards, Budget Watch 
initiatives, and other 
participatory means to 
publicize successes and 
failures, and to apply 
pressure on 
governments to 
improve performance 
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VI. INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO 
PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING 
 
Section IV has shown that despite the Bank’s stated commitment to participation, 
empowerment and good governance; its operations do not meet the basic standards of 
participatory decision-making necessary to achieve better development outcomes. This raises 
fundamental questions about the extent of the Bank’s actual commitment to participatory 
decision-making, or, at a minimum, whether it has the ability to ensure that this commitment 
is implemented across its operations. Why, if the Bank recognizes that inclusive decision-
making is so important to development, does it not ensure that it is done consistently well? 
Or, conversely, why, if the Bank is not serious about participation in its operations, does it 
continue to extol the virtues of participation? 
 
Answering these questions requires some examination of the various organizational 
imperatives at play within the Bank that militate both for and against public participation. 
Like most large and complex bureaucracies, the Bank has multiple and, at times, competing 
organizational cultures and incentive structures that influence its priorities and 
effectiveness.287 This section explores these forces and explains how they affect the public’s 
role in Bank decision-making. 
 
1. Organizational Cultures 
 
There are multiple and competing organizational cultures within the Bank, each of which 
affect the public’s ability to influence decision-making. The first is a culture of expertise. The 
Bank prides itself on being an apolitical institution staffed by policy experts in a wide array 
of technical disciplines who rely on specific types of data and methodologies to inform and 
justify decision-making.  
 
The culture of expertise constrains participatory decision-making at the Bank in several 
important ways. First, it tends to systematically undervalue other forms of knowledge and 
experience.288 Bank staff frequently complain that public inputs are “not substantive enough” 
or that CSOs do not always back up their assertions with methodologically sound evidence. 
As a result, they are more inclined to consult with each other, or with similarly credentialed 
experts employed by their borrowers, than with civil society and project affected peoples. 
And when they do consult with non-experts, it is often only to gain information and opinions 
to better inform their own decisions.289 Moreover, many civil society organizations have 
found that Bank experts are often dismissive of local or other knowledge systems that, for 
instance, may rely more on experience than on formalized technical analysis. As a result, they 
see the Bank’s approach as condescending and arrogant, especially given the imbalance in 
financial and technical resources available to citizens and civil society organizations. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that Bank staff often represent political and social elites, who tend to 
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 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books (1989), 
pp. 90-110; Judith Tendler’s work describes similar institutional tensions at the U. S. Agency for International Development. 
Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press (1975). 
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 Innes describes four different kinds of information central to deliberative communication: technical information, 
participants’ own experience, stories told by participants, and images and representations used in discussions. See Judith E. 
Innes, ‘Information in Communicative Planning’, Journal of the American Planning Association, volume 64, no. 1 (1998), 
pp. 52-63. 
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 World Bank (1996), available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sb0100.htm#External 
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be privileged in terms of economic, educational, and social status in comparison with their 
CSO counterparts. 
 
Second, an emphasis on expert driven decision-making creates incentives for problems to be 
framed in a way that appears to require expert solutions. Expertise thus becomes an obstacle 
to broader participation, as only those who have the requisite professional credentials are 
assumed to be relevant actors in policy making.290 This has the affect of marginalizing more 
participatory and disaggregated forms of analysis, thereby limiting the range of policy 
alternatives that can be considered.291 
 
Third, issues that are framed as “technocratic” are often, in reality, inherently political, and 
can not be legitimately resolved by the application of professional expertise.292 For example, 
technical or policy experts are often confronted with situations in which the underlying 
scientific knowledge is incomplete or highly contested, or where decision-making entails 
determining whether costs and risks are acceptable or fairly allocated. Sorting out these 
conflicts is ultimately the responsibility of political decision-makers, and should be publicly 
resolved through negotiation and by reference to principles of distributive justice.293 While 
the insights of experts should be brought to bear on such complex and technical issues, these 
experts should not be cast in the role of primary decision-makers. Rather, educated experts 
should try to understand the views and concerns of citizens, in the citizens’ own terms, while 
also building long-term local capacities to engage on technical issues.  
 
Participatory decision-making at the Bank is also limited by a culture of secrecy. Many civil 
society organizations, and some of the Bank’s own staff, have criticized the organization for 
being unnecessarily secretive with respect to information disclosure, decision-making, 
governance and deliberation.294 Although the Bank ostensibly operates under a “presumption 
of disclosure” that entitles citizens to the timely release of non-confidential information, the 
Bank usually only applies this presumption to documents that are specifically referred to in 
the Disclosure Policy. For all documents that are not specifically required to be disclosed 
under that policy, the Bank actually applies a presumption against disclosure. Thus, only a 
limited set of information is placed in the public domain, and often it is released too late for 
critical review and response or to inform public participation. This culture of secrecy results 
in extreme information asymmetries between the Bank and those who wish to engage it on 
policy or project related issues, and dis-empowers interested citizens from asserting and 
defending their interests.  
 
An additional tension arises from what has been famously termed a “culture of approval”, 
based on the findings of an internal World Bank task force in 1992, headed by then Vice 
President Willi Wapenhans. The Wapenhans Report found that only a small minority of staff 
interviewed believed that the Bank’s analytical work during project preparation was adequate 
to ensure project quality. The report called into question the credibility of the Bank’s 
appraisal process, observing that many Bank staff used appraisals as marketing devices for 
                                                 
290
 Coleman and Porter (2000), p. 381. 
291
 This is what Michel Foucault has called “power/knowledge.” Michel Foucault “Two Lectures: 7 January 1976, 14 
January 1976,” in Colin Gordon (ed) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, New York: 
Pantheon, (1980), pp. 78-108. 
292
 Ngaire Woods. “Multilateralism and its Alternatives: The Public Accountability Gap in Global Governance,” in Alnoor 
Ebrahim and Edward Weisband (eds), Forging Global Accountabilities: The Public Ethics of Participatory Practices (under 
review), pp. 5-6. 
293
 See, Williams and Matheny, (1995), p. 18; UNDP et. al. (2004), p. 15. 
294
 BIC (2004). 
  72 
securing loan approval. In short, the Wapenhans Report observed “an ‘approval culture’ in 
which appraisal becomes advocacy.”295 Staff surveyed for the report provided various reasons 
for poor portfolio performance management; the most significant factors cited were 
inadequate resources, especially to inadequate time for supervision; deficient staff skills; 
distorted incentives; and pressures to lend.296   
 
We could find no recent documentation of the extent to which these same problems persist 
today. However, the 2001 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness reported that “[a]n 
emphasis on lending appears to have limited the Bank’s effectiveness in some countries. 
Lending pressures were reported in five out of thirteen recently evaluated countries.”297 And 
the Bank’s recent return to higher-risk large infrastructure projects, particularly in middle-
income countries with better repayment rates, suggests that the pressures to move money 
remain strong.298 This is also evidenced by a heightened concern that the transactions costs of 
its environmental and social safeguard policies are a substantial impediment to doing 
business.299 This deference to large borrower governments, which may not be particularly 
receptive to participation in the first place, serves to reinforce lending pressures at the 
expense of civil society engagement.  
 
Taken together, this cultural landscape—of expertise, secrecy and approval—creates an 
institutional climate inhospitable to participatory decision-making. A culture of expertise 
undervalues forms of citizen knowledge and deliberative discourse that might instead 
complement technical analyses; a culture of secrecy undermines transparency and reasoned 
decision-making; and, a culture of approval values aggregate lending outputs over long-term 
outcomes such as empowerment, poverty reduction, and improved living standards.  
 
 
2. Staff Incentives 
 
Within this institutional context, there are a number of positive and negative incentives for 
staff to promote meaningful participation. The disincentives include: 
 
• Technical expertise is necessary for justifying project and policy lending 
decisions, for recruitment, and for maintaining status. Considering a full range of 
alternative policy and project options would require collaborative, rather than 
authoritative, use of knowledge; 
• Lending pressures reward quick appraisal and disbursement, and deference to 
borrower governments. Moving money is valued for promotion, while attention to 
participatory monitoring and evaluation is not; 
• Resources available to task managers do not include special allocations for civil 
society engagement. Participation is thus viewed as an “add on” and a drain on 
time, money, and capacity and 
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• Staff appraisals do not evaluate the quality and impact of participatory 
mechanisms employed by staff. Staff, have neither positive nor negative 
incentives to improve the quality of participation beyond compliance with the 
letter of consultation requirements. Guidance and training are optional, and 
incentives to improve participation skills are weak. As a result, consultations can 
be held for the limited purpose of technically complying with the policy 
requirements, rather than to obtain and incorporate local inputs.  
 
Despite these strong disincentives, there remain a number of positive incentives within the 
Bank for encouraging participation: 
 
• Reduced reputational risks are achieved through early and frequent engagement 
with civil society. This is particularly true of large infrastructure projects, where 
the Bank has frequently been embarrassed by public opposition; 
• Improved performance and effectiveness result from participation in all stages of 
the project and policy cycles. Because the impacts of projects and policies are not 
uniform across social sectors, participation by civil society enables better design, 
monitoring, and learning. It also facilitates the development of better qualitative 
measures of performance in poverty reduction.; and  
• Empowerment is only possible through forms of participation in which decisions 
and resources are shared with the poor. The Bank’s mission of poverty reduction 
cannot be achieved without such engagement. 
 
The negative and positive incentives for participation differ in one key respect: the 
disincentives arise from immediate day-to-day pressures on operational staff, whereas the 
positive incentives are longer-term and are premised on a commitment to the Bank’s mission 
of poverty reduction. In other words, there is an incompatibility between short-term and 
long-term incentives. Short-term incentives and rewards are not aligned with organizational 
objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the Bank’s assets identified by CSOs is a team of well informed and professional 
staff who at a personal level are highly appreciative of civil society contribution. This is 
particularly in reference to the Participation and Civic Engagement Group at the Bank 
Headquarters in Washington and the Social Development Advisors/NGO Liaison Officers 
and some Country Directors at the Country Offices. 
 
[However]. . . The WB is strong on the rhetoric and weak on practice. . . World Bank 
Missions are fond of promising civil society good working relations which never 
materialise. As one participant observed, ‘The World Bank does nice things about 
participation but doesn’t implement them through their economic programmes. 
 
—Report of CSO Consultation in Uganda on World Bank-Civil Society Engagement 
(Appendix C). 
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Conclusion  
Taken together, organizational cultures and staff incentives explain a lot about why the Bank 
has so often failed to translate its stated commitment to participation into more inclusive 
decision-making. The dominant organizational cultures and the more immediate staff 
incentives subordinate meaningful public involvement to other considerations. Meanwhile, 
the countervailing incentives for more democratic decision-making—reducing reputational 
risk and increasing development effectiveness -- are diffuse, long-term, and difficult to 
measure. The result is a set of organizational incentives and expectations that devalues 
participatory decision-making. As a result, public voice and accountability are subordinated 
to satisfying the demands of borrower and donor governments, minimizing overhead, and 
moving loans through the approval process in an expeditious manner. Ultimately, these 
organizational imperatives can lead the Bank to value public engagement more as a 
mechanism for gaining public approval for its decisions than for improving the quality of 
performance or empowering citizens to help determine their own development destinies.  
 
 
 
[A]s a consultant at the World Bank working on participation, while I saw many Task 
Managers doing their utmost in encouraging those they hired to ensure effective 
participation in project planning, I often saw their efforts fall flat in implementation. At 
the same time, I saw Task Managers and even country Directors clearly state that while 
they were required to invite public participation (by which they meant civil society 
"consultation") they were not required to do anything with the information that resulted 
from that participation. 
 
I would suggest that people at the WB who truly want to improve their own practice are 
often stymied by the system within which they are working - time pressure (in terms of 
balancing competing demands from multiple projects) and low priority placed on the 
effectiveness/success of project interventions (vs. getting the loan out) and lack of funds 
to do more than the minimally required in-country project preparation activities, along 
with a focus on participation/consultation with big civil society (e.g., large national and 
international NGOs) vs. local civil society (e.g., potential beneficiaries) may be factors. 
 
—Respondent to online survey  (Appendix B) 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Cross-Cutting Recommendations 
 
1.1 The World Bank should increase participation in its decision-making at each stage 
of the project/policy cycle. The project/policy cycle provides a structure for improving 
participation in Bank operations. In Section V, we proposed a framework for considering 
how each stage in this cycle can systematically be linked with basic standards of participatory 
decision-making. This framework offers an approach to developing benchmarks for what 
good process requires at each stage of decision-making. The Bank should use it as a way to 
think comprehensively about how to structure and expand participatory decision-making at 
each stage of the cycle. We also believe that civil society organizations could use this 
framework to: (a) assess in advance whether a proposed process meets their normative 
expectations, and therefore to help decide whether, or under what terms, to participate; and 
(b) evaluate processes to determine whether expectations and commitments were fulfilled.  
 
As the matrix in Section V (Table 1) suggests, a comprehensive approach to pluralizing 
decision-making requires, at a minimum, that: 
 
• All stages of the project/policy cycle should be transparent and enable access to 
information for public deliberation before key decisions are made; 
• The capacity constraints of citizens and CSOs should be identified, so that efforts 
can be made to improve capacities and accessibility at all stages of decision-
making (including, for example, considerations of language, timing, location, 
negotiation skills, etc.). This is particularly important for politically marginalized 
groups such as women, rural populations, and indigenous peoples; 
• The Bank should provide adequate budgetary resources for participation and 
capacity building through all stages of decision-making. Where direct capacity 
building by the Bank risks cooptation, resources should be made available to third 
parties for building the capacities of participants; 
• The Issue Framing and Agenda Setting stage should be preceded by a 
comprehensive stakeholder analysis, and prioritization based on a rights-and-risks 
approach, with special attention to marginalized groups; 
• The Identification and Preparation and Appraisal stages should be based on 
participatory identification of options and risks, comprehensive and public 
analyses of alternatives (including no-project options), assessment of 
distributional impacts and trade-offs, and openness to public scrutiny and 
challenge; 
• The Negotiation and Approval stage should involve public disclosure not only of 
board minutes and voting records, but also materials that can help citizens 
understand board decisions, such as board committee minutes and reports, 
meeting summaries, and draft documents used for deliberation. The Bank should 
also encourage debate on the project or policy reform in national legislatures prior 
to board discussion;  
• The Implementation, Supervision, and Completion stage should use participatory 
monitoring and evaluation and 
• The Evaluation, Adaptation, and Learning stage should involve participatory 
design and implementation, should include benchmarks for determining whether 
  76 
engagements are meaningful, and should feed into a centralized system for 
informing future operations. 
 
1.2 The World Bank should establish mandatory minimum standards and improve staff 
incentives for consultation and participation. Although, Bank literature and policy 
statements are replete with testimonials to the importance of participation and empowerment 
to achieving good development outcomes, the Bank has no required procedures for 
developing policy, and no clear minimum standards for soliciting or incorporating public 
inputs in its lending operations. Moreover, its internal incentive structures tend to subordinate 
participation to other considerations. As a result, public participation is usually ad hoc and 
discretionary, and the Bank generally only formalizes or requires it when forced to do so 
under external pressure.300  
 
The Bank should develop two sets of mandatory process-based participation policies or 
standards. First, to increase fairness, predictability and transparency, it should adopt a fixed 
administrative procedure for developing and revising Bank operational policies and 
strategies.301 Currently, the Committee on Development Effectiveness sets the parameters and 
procedures of these processes on a case-by-case basis. Second, the Bank should adopt a set of 
minimum requirements for public participation in different types of lending operations.  
 
Many bank staff objected that this second set of standards would be unworkable in practice, 
and could only result in “tick the box” requirements that would not enhance the quality of 
participation. We recognize that performance-based standards could be unnecessarily 
restrictive if they were to specify strict and uniform outputs without regard to country context 
(e.g., number and diversity of participants, length of engagement).. Instead, we recommend 
process-based standards, for which there is a well-established precedent in the private sector 
(e.g., quality control through ISO 9000, environmental management systems through ISO 
14000, or social auditing through the Accountability 1000 standard). Such standards do not 
set uniform output targets, but do require a commitment to continuous improvement through 
mechanisms of transparent review, stakeholder involvement, and organizational learning.  
 
We note that there is a wealth of Bank literature on how to implement high-quality, 
participatory decision-making throughout the Bank’s operations and many Bank staff, in the 
exercise of their discretion, strive to follow best practice. As a result, there is an ample basis 
for crafting effective participation policies within the parameters of existing Bank practice. 
For example, the Latin America and the Caribbean Region has articulated a formal strategy 
for civil society engagement. There is no reason why each region should not be required to 
develop its own strategy, subject to regular peer review and improvement based on 
systematic assessment of lessons learned.  
 
The participation policies/standards should include, for example:  
 
• A predictable basis for including all parties that have a right or an interest at stake 
in the decision, or who may bear risks; and for establishing the range of issues 
under consideration. This includes identifying the specific interests and 
accessibility needs of various stakeholders, especially marginalized groups, and 
planning the outreach necessary for their inclusion;  
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• A process or set of ground rules for determining how decisions will move 
forward; 
• Adequate notice and comment periods; 
• A basis for building the capacities of less powerful participants; 
• Procedures for public reporting and evaluation that might include: a list of 
stakeholders involved and how they were identified; details of the participatory 
process and schedule; discussion of main issues raised and how the process 
addressed them; an annex prepared by representatives of civil society on their 
views of the process and how those views have been addressed;302  
• Participatory procedures for background research and analysis, including for 
assessing and distributing costs, benefits, and risks from the proposed policy or 
project in a just and equitable way and 
• Accountability mechanisms, including penalties or sanctions for failure to comply 
with the standards, coupled with guarantees of access to dispute resolution or 
other appeals mechanisms. 
 
A process-based participation standard would allow Bank staff to customize participation 
based on context (e.g., country-level political economy). At the same time, it would provide 
civil society with a more clear and predictable basis on which to engage with the Bank. More 
importantly, such a standard would allow for continuous improvement and organizational 
learning.  
 
Moreover, to ensure that best practice becomes routine practice, the Bank should also revise 
its internal incentives for staff to improve participation through increased budgetary support, 
time allowances, capacity building, and performance appraisals that reward quality 
participation 
 
1.3 The World Bank should improve the transparency of its governance and operations. 
 
Transparency is, in many ways, the basis for participatory decision-making. Transparency 
enables people to participate meaningfully in public decision-making by providing them with 
the information they need to understand, evaluate, and influence the actions of decision-
makers. While the World Bank has recently improved its information disclosure policies and 
practices, they still fall well short of international best practice. According to a recent 
UNESCO study, such international best practice includes: 
 
• A guiding principle of maximum disclosure, in which all information is subject to 
disclosure unless there is an overriding public interest in keeping it secret; 
• Broad definitions of the scope of information subject to disclosure; 
• An obligation to publish proactively key documents and categories of information, 
even in the absence of a specific request;  
• Clear, accessible mechanisms for the public to exercise of the right to information, 
including an independent mechanism through which denials of information 
requests can be appealed; 
• Specific and narrow exceptions to the presumption of disclosure that can be 
overridden by a determination that disclosure will not cause substantial harm, or 
that the public interests would be served by release and  
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• Practical steps to promote greater access to information.303 
 
We see no reason why, the world’s leading development institution should not meet 
international best practice standards with respect to transparency. For the Bank to meet these 
standards, it would need to: 
 
• Improve the transparency of its own governance structure and decision-making; 
• Expand the range of draft and final documents, as well as other key decision 
documents, that are required to be disclosed proactively; 
•  Specify strict timelines for the disclosure of information, and in a timeframe that 
enables public deliberation before key decisions are made; 
• Require that any refusals be justified by a written, substantive explanation of the 
reasons for the denial;  
• Establish an independent appeals mechanism to review denials of requests for 
information; 
• Subject all exceptions to disclosure to substantial harm and public interest tests 
and 
• Limit the discretion of borrowers to determine whether a document should be 
released. 
 
1.4 The Bank should respect, and proactively seek to expand and protect, political space 
for democratic and participatory decision-making in national political processes. The 
potential for participatory decision-making processes is much higher at the national and sub-
national levels than in global public institutions like the World Bank. Thus, while it is 
essential for the Bank to increase participation in its own governance and operations, it is 
equally important for it to respect local democratic institutions and processes. The Bank 
should therefore seek to minimize conflicts between Bank operations and domestic 
democratic processes, and take steps to avoid usurping or crowding out effective mechanisms 
for public participation that may already exist. Towards this end, it should increasingly and 
proactively work with parliamentarians and a wider range of public agencies, and encourage 
parliamentary and local government review of loans and programs. Moreover, in countries in 
which democratic spaces are limited, the Bank should facilitate the use of more inclusive and 
democratic domestic decision-making processes. While the Bank is (and should be) 
constrained in the extent to which it can involve itself in domestic politics, there are a number 
of avenues for it to expand political space for affected people and their organizations to 
influence development decision-making. These include: 
 
• Expanding the opportunities for the public to participate in dialogues between the 
Bank, other donors and borrowing governments on key strategic issues. 
• Requiring borrowers to meet minimum standards in their participatory processes, 
and to explain how they will make those processes meaningful and effective. These 
standards should include protections for those that are marginalized in the domestic 
political process, such as requiring that particularly risky projects have broad 
community support.304 
• Working to create positive enabling environments for civil society organizations to 
operate; and  
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• Prioritizing lending to those agencies with a demonstrated commitment to 
participatory decision-making. 
 
The Bank’s traditional reliance upon finance ministries as the fulcrum of national policy-
making should be reduced. This emphasis comes at the cost of disempowering governmental 
agencies that are potentially more representative and politically responsive, such as national 
parliaments. In so doing, the Bank may distort the checks and balances that make government 
entities accountable to one another. And, by marginalizing these other entities in decision-
making, it precludes them from developing the experience and capacity that might enable 
them to discharge a more assertive oversight role in the future. While, admittedly, the 
Articles of Agreement require the Bank to interact with countries through their finance 
ministries, this does not preclude the Bank from concluding that serious governance problems 
exist where a finance ministry is unwilling to include parliament or other relevant 
government actors in decision-making, and rethinking the wisdom of the loan accordingly.  
 
Finally, the World Bank should defend the political space it creates in domestic political 
processes. Meaningful participation, at the end of the day, is often about dissenting from 
popular positions, challenging settled orthodoxies, and confronting powerful interests. In 
many countries in which the Bank operates, this can be considered seditious, and can expose 
those who raise concerns to reprisal. The Bank, however, does not offer adequate assurances 
to those that participate in its consultation processes that they will not be punished as a 
consequence.305 The Bank should assess the political risks faced by those who participate in 
its consultation processes, and explicitly require borrower governments to respect the rights 
of those who participate. It should also be willing to take steps necessary to ensure that those 
who participate in its consultative processes will not suffer reprisals (including by calling 
loans or threatening to withhold disbursements).  
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2. Specific Recommendations 
 
2.1 Recommendations for reforming institutional governance. In order to better align 
institutional governance with contemporary standards of participatory and democratic 
decision-making, the member countries should: 
  
• Address the serious power imbalances between donor and borrower governments. 
This will require (a) re-allocating voting shares and Board seats, (b) providing some 
borrowing country Director offices with additional capacity and resources, and (c) 
ending the anachronistic prerogative of the United States to name the Bank 
President. Toward this end, the Board of Governors should solicit public input and 
publicly deliberate a range of proposals to strengthen the voices of borrowing 
countries, and should develop a fair and transparent Presidential selection process. 
 
• Improve transparency to better enable the public to directly influence decision-
making, and to hold their directors accountable for how they are represented. Draft 
documents should be made public before they go to the Board, so the public knows 
what issues the Board is addressing. Agendas should be available in advance of 
meetings, and transcripts should be released afterwards. Formal votes should be 
taken so that the public can understand the positions taken by their representatives.  
 
• Develop new mechanisms to allow the public to put issues directly before the 
Boards of Executive Directors and Governors. For example, on particularly 
contentious issues, the Executive Directors should hold public hearings in which 
affected people are invited to testify, or host tripartite dialogues with bank 
management and civil society. These mechanisms would not only increase citizen 
voice, but would also enhance Board oversight of management, by improving its 
ability to gather information from external sources. The Board of Governors should 
use similar mechanisms for the issues that it does not delegate to the Executive 
Directors. An excellent precedent for this occurred during the second review of the 
Inspection Panel, in which the Board held an informal meeting with civil society 
organizations to discuss proposed revisions to the Panel’s procedures.306  
 
• Explicitly recognize the need for horizontal mechanisms of accountability and 
checks and balances on Bank decision-making. Most important, member 
governments should recognize international law, including international human 
rights law, as a limitation on Bank conduct. Where the Bank violates its legal 
obligations, aggrieved parties should have the opportunity to seek redress in courts 
of competent jurisdiction.  
 
2.2 Recommendations for improving categories of engagement. In order to enhance 
participatory decision-making in the development of World Bank policies, the Bank should: 
 
• Develop and implement a fixed administrative procedure for developing policies 
(cross-cutting recommendation 2); 
• Be clear at the outset what issues are, and are not, under review; 
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• Use mechanisms such as civil society advisory groups to the public to participate 
in setting the agenda of the review, developing the research that will inform it, and 
developing the procedural guidelines under which it will be conducted; 
• Provide meaningful avenues of redress for flawed consultations or failures to 
follow through on commitments made during the process; 
• Clearly inform participants how their inputs were received and taken into account 
by providing minutes of meetings, iterative drafts, and a compilation of responses 
to substantive comments; 
• Use participatory processes for monitoring and evaluating policy implementation 
to allow for ongoing learning and policy improvement and 
• Establish participatory mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of the new administrative procedure for policy development.  
 
In order to enhance participatory decision-making in national policymaking through 
PRSPs, the World Bank should: 
 
• Ensure that issues of macroeconomic policy, human rights, and gender equity are 
placed on the PRS agenda, and that priorities are identified by PRS participants 
through a deliberative dialogue;  
• Establish clear guidelines and policies for transparency and access to information 
for PRS processes, including timely disclosure of key documents necessary for 
participatory decision-making. These documents should include, but are not 
limited to, the draft CAS, loan documents (including PRGFs and PRSCs), PRSP 
policy matrices, draft versions of JSANs, and Letters of Development Policy 
(cross-cutting recommendation 3); 
• Make clear their intentions and objectives in a manner open to public scrutiny, and 
encourage governments to do the same; 
• Require transparency and participation during all stages of the policy cycle, 
including drafting, implementing, and monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP 
(cross-cutting recommendation 1); 
• Develop minimum standards for participation in PRSs, supported by country-
specific benchmarks. Each country should carry out an independent “PRSP 
Lessons Review” based on these standards.307 (Also see cross-cutting 
recommendation 2); 
• Work with national governments to establish a permanent framework for effective 
participation that feeds into and builds on legislative processes. This includes 
increasing the participation of parliamentarians and line ministries, ensuring 
adequate time for broad public participation (especially in rural areas), and better 
integration of the process with national poverty planning procedures;  
• Proactively work to expand and defend political space (cross-cutting 
recommendation 4);  
• Provide resources and time for building the capacities of participants to engage 
more effectively. This includes training on interpretation of technical documents 
and technical papers, and on the development of policy alternatives, and more 
proactive inclusion of domestic stakeholders that may already have such 
capacities, such as local universities, think tanks, and trade union research centres; 
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• Require PSIAs for all major policy reforms, accompanied by minimum standards 
to guarantee that the selection of PSIA topics represents multi-stakeholder 
interests, that there is support for local and independent researchers, and that 
PSIAs examine a broad range of alternative policy options rather than simply 
mitigation measures; 
• Explain how World Bank and IMF lending programs and strategies (i.e., PRGF, 
PRSC, CAS) have been shaped by the PRSP and 
• Refuse to approve PRSPs unless minimum participation standards have been met, 
and they have been reviewed by national legislatures.  
 
For enhancing participatory decision-making in projects, the World Bank should: 
 
• Ensure full and timely disclosure of key documents necessary for participatory 
decision-making throughout the project cycle. These documents should include, 
but are not limited to, draft project documents and supervision and completion 
documents (cross-cutting recommendation 3); 
• Expand participation at all stages of the project cycle, especially during agenda-
setting, identification, and monitoring and evaluation (cross-cutting 
recommendation 1); 
• Develop minimum standards and staff incentives for participation in projects in 
order to improve deliberation, strategic clarity, and feedback (cross-cutting 
recommendation 2); 
• Systematically incorporate social analysis throughout project decision-making; 
• Provide capacity-building support to project stakeholders not only on technical 
issues related to the project impacts, but also on legal rights and negotiation skills; 
• Develop a learning system based on improved and participatory monitoring and 
evaluation (especially for poverty and social impacts), training and knowledge 
management systems better suited to the needs of task managers, better 
supervision and lines of responsibility for overseeing participation, and standards 
and benchmarks for participation coupled with mechanisms for redress and 
accountability; 
• Ensure that participatory processes achieve broad community support for all high 
impact projects before loan approval and 
• Develop meaningful avenues for redress for citizens that believe that participatory 
processes have not been sufficient, or that the concerns that they have raised have 
not been adequately addressed in a project. 
 
2.3 Recommendations for institutionalized dialogue mechanisms: 
 
• Institutionalized dialogue mechanisms such as the JFC have lacked credibility, 
raised suspicions among excluded civil society organizations, and have not had a 
demonstrable impact on policy development. To be useful, such mechanisms 
should: 
• Focus on specific substantive areas. They should not be used as forums for 
generalized dialogues on a range of issues affecting civil society;  
• Have a clearly articulated purpose and scope, transparent selection process, and 
broad representation; 
• Be used primarily as an advisory mechanism during the planning stages of a 
broader consultative process. In this way, they can provide a means for civil 
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society to experts to help prioritize substantive issues to be addressed, frame a 
research agenda, and develop procedural guidelines to be used during 
consultations; 
• Complement, and not supplant, more broad-based, organic and democratic 
consultation processes and  
• Terminate at a specified time. 
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APPENDIX A: Methodology 
 
This report was drafted by two independent researchers commissioned by the civil society 
members of the JFC, from December 2004 to April 2005. The methodology consisted of: 
 
1. Heavy reliance on secondary materials for analysis. The researchers drew from an 
extensive body of studies and reviews already conducted by CSOs, the World Bank, 
and academics. Drawing on this very recent work provided a much larger evidentiary 
base for our conclusions than would have been possible through reliance on primary 
research alone.  
2. Consultations and focus groups with civil society organizations. A total of seven 
consultations and focus groups were conducted. Four of these were national-level 
consultations (in Uganda, Zambia, Senegal, and Republic of Macedonia), two focus 
groups were held at the World Social Forum in Brazil, and a focus group in 
Washington, D.C. These consultations and focus groups were intended to serve as an 
additional means of checking the validity of findings that were emerging from the 
existing literature. 
3. Interviews. Fifty-three individual interviews were conducted with members of CSOs 
(23), Bank staff, management, consultants, and executive directors (25), and 
academics (5). This does not include interviews or conversations with CSO 
representatives on the JFC.  
4. Online survey. Several short-answer questions were distributed through an online 
survey in the first week of February to approximately 18,000 subscribers of the 
CIVICUS electronic newsletter, and to 283 email addresses that included JFC list-
serve members, and other civil society contacts and list-serves. A total of 79 
responses were received at the time of writing. This low return rate suggests that these 
responses should be treated with caution, and that they are probably less 
representative than the findings from the national consultations (point 2 above).  
 
In addition, this is a draft document that is now undergoing a review process that involves 
several steps: 
 
1. Detailed review by the CSO members of the JFC.  
2. Public release of the draft document (on April 13) for comment and distribution on 
the CIVICUS list-serve and others. 
3. Discussion and feedback at the World Bank Civil Society Forum (April 20-22), with 
translations available in French and Spanish. 
4. Review by several scholars familiar with Bank-civil society engagement issues. 
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SURVEY MONKEY RESULTS (N=79) 
 
1. DESCRIPTION OF ORGANISATION OR NETWORK (72) 
 
a. Location of respondents 
 
Africa: 22 Europe: 10 
1 Burkina Faso  1 Austria  
1 Cameroon  2 Cyprus  
1 DRC  2 France  
2 Ghana  1 Germany  
2 Kenya  1 Poland  
1 Malawi  1 Romania  
6 Nigeria  1 Russia  
2 South Africa  1 Scotland  
1 Togo   
3 Uganda  Middle East:2 
1 Horn of Africa  2 Turkey  
2 Sub-Saharan Africa (Kenya,  
Uganda, Cameroon)  
 
 Asia:8 
Americas:4 1 Cambodia  
1 Latin America  1 India  
1 Mexico  1 Malaysia  
1 Canada  2 Nepal  
1 USA  3 Pakistan  
  
West Indies: 1 No location provided 24 
 
b. Types of respondents  
 
9 Local CSOs 
16 National CSOs  
3 Regional CSOs  
12 International CSOs  
3 Media  
1 NGO liaison service  
1 UN association  
1 Faith-based organisation  
1 Centre for governance and qualitative studies  
2 Government owned development finance institution  
1 Interdenominational development agency  
2 Trust  
2 Grantmaking institution  
1 Constitution and Bill of Rights Education project to train 
paralegals  
1 Law firms  
2 Individuals  
5 Universities  
9 Cannot tell  
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2. ENGAGEMENT/CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE WORLD BANK (56) 
 
a. Frequency of interaction 
 
 no interaction/ experience 
with WB 
with occasional or indirect 
interaction 
frequent or direct 
interaction 
Frequency of interaction 
 
 
8 
 
24 
 
12 
 
 
b. Nature of interaction 
 
 Positive negative confrontational collaborative 
Nature of 
interaction 
 
 
7 
 
12 
 
6 
 
15 
 
c. Quotes that capture the overall tenor of the responses: 
 
 ‘WB has played a very important role in the creation and development of the Romanian Association for Community development. In 
1998, most RACD members have been trained by WB trainers as community development facilitators. The training quality and high 
relevance of the approach for the Romanian context had determined us (the trainees) to create an organization (RACD) focused on 
community development. World Bank had also supported RACD in its starting stage through a start up grant of 10,000USD. Since 
1999, we have constantly tried to learn more about WB experiences world wide and to use these experiences in what we do.’ 
 
‘WB funded (with IIZ-DVV) an international conference in Botswana: Adult Education and Poverty Reduction: A Global Priority in 
June 2004. Conference asked for WB to engage with relevant AE organisations to devise an international policy on adult education. 
Have since started to talk to individuals in WB about how to progress this agenda. In order to start this process WB rep was invited 
to speak at our centre's launch here in UK. This decision was made in order to identify a suitable person who would be willing to 
listen to our centre as a starting point for the envisaged discussions. Original decision to involve WB in conference was taken by 
IIZ-DVV. This was a pragmatic funding issue, but it also brought in government officials and NGOs who would otherwise not have 
attended.’ 
 
‘Interactions with the WB have been very one sided. They collect information about an issue, do an analysis, make conclusions, and 
then present them. There is little room for influencing their conclusions. There has been some collaboration in the analysis part of 
the process, but for the most part, any thinking outside of the WB mindset is not welcome. The little collaboration that exists is 
perfunctory. WB policies that effect government decisions, whose negative consequences are mainly felt by people at the lowest 
levels of the economic pyramid and often times whose positive consequences are reserved for the upper echelons of the power and 
financial ladder, appear to be untouchable by anyone, any organization at the local level. Even after a structure for an activity is put 
in place, there is little room to dialogue about the details of setting it up and implementation.’ 
 
‘We have been involved with the World Bank in the context of the Joint Assessment Mission for Sudan. The JAM was intended to 
produce a document indicating needs for a post-conflict Sudan which would be presented to the bank's donor countries at the 
upcoming Oslo Conference in April 2005. Donor countries would then make pledges for the reconstruction of Sudan and post-
conflict transformation efforts following the peace agreement which was signed by the warring faction in Sudan last January 2005. 
The JAM invited our organization to validate the document and ensure that CSO views and feedback were incorporated. The 
engagement was a last minute attempt to bring on-board CSO and NGO working in Sudan and did not clearly show how feedback 
and input into the JAM process and findings would be incorporated into the final document. At another level SUDIA has most 
recently developed an action-research project for the region of Darfur State, in western Sudan. The bank has indicated an interest in 
funding our work, and we were keen on keeping institutions like the WB and the other multinational organizations informed about 
our work. The success of the Darfur action-research project is dependant on the extent whereby these players (WB/IFAD, EU etc.) 
endorse our findings and incorporate recommendations into their planning and interventions.’ 
 
 ‘We have had conflicting views on relations with the WB within the organization. More "powerful" levels (e.g., at the international 
headquarters or in regional offices) have sometimes been more critical of engagement with the WB than country-office levels, 
where in view of the larger context, we have sometimes found it important to maintain constructive links if only to keep up to date 
with the debates and share our views as appropriate. One area of consensus across the organization, however, is not to accept 
official funds from the WB.’ 
 
‘Our experience interacting with the World Bank has been mostly confrontational due to the fact that some WB employees tried to 
control the process of public participation in the Nile Basin Initiative. We had to submit complaints to the WB against specific 
employees, which went unanswered. The structure formed by the World Bank/Nile Basin governments to fake public participation 
called the Nile Basin Discourse had excluded international NGOs and Diaspora organizations from sharing in the process mainly 
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through selective invitations/sponsorship. We had to confront the WB employees involved because we believe there is no real 
sustainable development without real public participation in the whole process from decision making, to planning, implementation 
and monitoring. Also the fact that a project supported by the WB had very unfavourable response from the IMF CAO; the Bujagali 
hydroelectric dam in Uganda.’ 
 
‘Founded in 1990, FPP has been actively engaged in trying to halt/mitigate destructive WBG projects and programmes and create 
greater accountability through policy reform ever since. Senior staff have been engaged in this effort since 1984 under previous 
NGO hats. Our human rights based approach makes us focus on abuses and then push for reforms that will respect rights. Despite 
the prevarications of WBG and many broken promises we continue to engage with WBG, but have less and less belief in reform and 
more and more of an emphasis on damage limitation.’ 
 
‘Our organization did not confront the WB in fact we were the Prime Movers in recommending to the National Accountability Bureau 
(NAB) following approvals from major stakeholders and finally in their National Anti Corruption Report (NACS) that the World 
Bank guidelines should be implemented across the board. This recommendation was then taken up by the Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority (PPRA) with a few changes related to the Integrity Pact and the LCS.’ 
‘ECA region NGO WG on interaction with the WB, JFC, sub-contractor of the WBI on several projects in St. Petersburg and North-
West Russia. Participation in a number of consultations with CSOs organized by the WB. For NGOs it's important to engage with 
large intergovernmental organizations, as well as perform a watchdog function, since WB exercises great influence on internal 
policy of a borrowing country.’ 
 
‘We interact with the Bank regularly. We believe that only dialogues can we resolve differences in order to achieve the same 
development goals. We do not choose non-engagement because it would be against our faith-based value of respect and dignity for 
each other.’ 
 
‘The World Bank has a very strong influence over the government and its policies in our country. Informal discussions with some of 
the members of the cabinet in government have for long blamed the World Bank for some of the decisions we, community based 
organisations, were challenging or questioning. So we wanted to visit the representatives of the World Bank in the country. This has 
been an impossible task. They say that we have to discuss with the government and not with them. The Bank is not open to dealing 
directly with community based organisations. We have not managed to have one single meeting with the World Bank office in the 
country. And we have tried in the last 3 years to have one. Writing letters, calling, etc... does not work. We gave up last year! Then 
the government informed us of the PRSP and the possibilities of getting engaged. We participated in it, happy to be given space. But 
then that space started to decrease and be reduced by the organisers, because of some key disagreements. Instead of a culture of 
dialogue and compromise, we discover that we were mere objects of decoration. Someone forced the government to have us there, 
but they really did not want us there. So we decided not to participate any longer in these fake consultations.’  
 
 
3. QUALITY OF ENGAGEMENT PROCESS (49) 
 
“yes” 
 
“no” “somewhat” “n/a” 
    a. Influence on structure of the consultations and issues 
 
9 12 7 17 
b. Adequate information of the nature and purpose of the 
dialogue 
 
15 7 5 15 
c. Documents provided ahead of time and in appropriate 
languages 
  
9 15 4 16 
d. Open, inclusive and participatory consultation  
 
12 9 8 16 
e. Feedback on how their views were taken into account 
after the  consultation 
4 19 4 16 
 
f. Quotes that capture the overall tenor of the responses: 
 
‘When consultations are organised by Paris-based French desk, there are preparatory discussions on points to be evoked. It is different 
when organised by Washington. b. Yes, but needs to have an e-mail address (which is a problem for some African CSOs) C. No, 
lack of documents in French (again a problem for African CSOs)and often less than 1 month before, which is not enough ahead to 
read materials d. Not open and inclusive. The WB selects NGOs it wants to invite on each particular subject on her list of NGOs 
(which is not complete). Consultations are participatory when not too big. e. Not at all. No final minutes of meetings compiled and 
diffused, no follow-up of the process.’ 
 
 ‘We have had many opportunities to influence the consultation process. We mostly do not have bad experience with any of the 
process from a. to e. What we question however, is how serious the Bank is taking the CSOs' comments. Whether or not there are 
changes at the heart of the Bank's operation. Sometimes it feels like it is business as usual for the Bank and that our comments do 
not have any impact.’ 
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 ‘We knew that they existed but were not provided copies in advance of the meetings themselves d. Regarding the last such 
consultation that I attended: It was open and inclusive in the sense that the door was not barred to interested attendees. It was not 
inclusive in that substantive participation was not available to those who did not have an opportunity to study relevant documents 
well ahead of time. It was not particularly participatory in that time had been allocated to a few participants and there was little to no 
space for those not already on the agenda. At the same time, few of the people on the agenda seemed to have time to finish voicing 
their ideas/concerns/opinions. It was not particularly participatory in that the WB staff who ran the meeting primarily listened to 
comments from the attendees but did not provide substantive reactions on them or indicate whether the comments from the 
attendees were deemed relevant or not. In sum, rather than "participatory" the meeting seemed to be part of a bi-directional 
exchange of information in which the WB provided information to key attendees ahead of time and the key attendees provided their 
reactions to the materials that they had been given. e. (Again re the meeting commented upon in d above) I don't know. I received a 
brief written report on the meeting. I heard about some of the results through a friend who is a WB staff member who was 
peripherally involved with the meeting. I also heard expressions of frustration from one of the key participants who said that, while 
they had received a written communication and thanks for participation they did not know whether anything substantive had come 
out of their participation.’ 
 
 ‘Not sure if we actually influenced structures, though we have over the last 4 years attended WB consultation meetings and 
expressed our views there. b.c.d.e. large documents in English were received for reading 1-2 days before the consultation meeting. 
Sometimes, the larger context within which the consultation was taking place was not adequately clear. As NGOs coming from 
outside the system, this made it difficult to contextualize our comments (independently, for now, of what the quality of our 
comments would have been). Since we often did not know what proceeded and came after the particular consultations we attended, 
it was difficult to assess whether they had indeed been participatory including wider sections of the population or not. Certainly at 
the meetings we attended, all comments were taken and noted down in seemed, in a fairly open atmosphere. the main concern of 
ours has been that participants do not seem to be informed of what happens to their comments, what happens after consultation 
meetings and what final documents come to look like. in contrast, the ADB seems to have become much better in providing follow-
up feedback, certainly since 2003 onwards.’ 
 
 ‘We presented the issues and they were well addressed -it was an open discussion and the officer took time to listen and she took the 
action to contact NACC programme. -By the end of the discussion we felt well attended. But we still fill that the World Bank needs 
to de-link the civil society funding from the government and involve people from the rural community in discussions and decision 
making.’ 
 
 ‘This is a daft question. We have been involved in very numerous consultations and each one is different. You should be asking 
which consultations have been better and which worse.’ 
 
 ‘We engaged in consultations with the Bank on the foregoing assessment. The Bank did not accept all our suggestions (most 
prominently the suggestion that more the report be actually researched and written by local experts, in addition to involving 
stakeholders in consultations). The Bank was receptive to a number of other suggestions. Participants were informed of the nature 
and purpose of the dialogues we held around these issues in-country. One problem, however, is that this was often explained in 
"Bank-speak." Documents were provided in advance, and the dialogue was open, inclusive, and participatory. Participants received 
some feedback on how their views were taken into account. THE PRIMARY PROBLEM IS THAT THE REPORT HAS BEEN 
TIED UP WITHIN THE BANK'S BUREAUCRACY. INDEED, PROCESS SEEMS TO PREVAIL OVER SUBSTANCE. MORE 
THAN A YEAR HAS PASSED SINCE INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND BY THE TIME THE REPORT 
IS FINALLY RELEASED, IT WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY OUT-OF-DATE.’ 
 
 ‘Consultation is not participative decision making.’ 
 
4. CONSULTATIONS SERVING WIDER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES (44) 
 
 # reporting that WB 
practice did change 
# reporting that practice 
did not change 
# who do not know* 
a. Improvements in 
WB policy or 
practice 
5 10 9  
b. Increased domestic 
political leverage 
8 10 5  
* The ‘don’t knows’ are often because it is too early to tell 
 
Quotes that capture the overall tenor of the responses: 
 
‘Yes, in the procedures, not in the substance. Improvements on paper, did not always lead to improvements on the ground. Success or 
failure was related to many factors, such as political, economical etc.’’ 
 
‘My sense is that the Bank is becoming more open to civil society consultation and increasingly recognizing - not just at the level of its 
President but more generally throughout the organization - the importance of civil society engagement. However, the Bank warns 
that the representative character of civil society needs to be assured. Some CSOs in the North purport to represent opinion of CSOs 
in the South but whether they do so in fact is far from clear. Engagement with the WB increases visibility, and people in our 
organization have appreciated that contact. It's too much to say that we gained leverage 'in the domestic political context,' especially 
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since our Washington DC Chapter/Division (UNA-NCA) is only part (though the largest individual chapter, by far!) of a larger 
national organization, UNA-USA, and UNA-USA is the central policy formulating body. UNA-USA also is more likely to interact 
with the top management of the WB than UNA-NCA.’ 
 
‘HEROFAT GROUP believes that the WB is now opening more collaboration links with NGOs.’ 
 
‘We were not trying to change policy. However, it seems to us that the Bank is missing a significant opportunity in not becoming more 
engaged in the global networks we're working with...it seems to me that the problem has to do with the Bank pushing along on a 
certain trajectory, and not being able to raise it's head up to see what is happening that's new and different in global governance and 
how it might get involved.’ 
 
‘WB policy improved in the 1980s, peaked in the mid-1990s and has been weakening ever since although new lines of dialogue are 
opening up as others close off. Project level due diligence seems to have become more routinised and perfunctory but malpractice 
has been harder to expose. They tick more boxes now but actual change is not widely evident. Increased programmatic lending and 
'process projects' have all decreased community level accountability.’ 
 
‘The TI-Mission of April 2002 did help in that the WB officials led by James Wall and Abid Hassan were aware of our views and 
supported / influenced the decision of the MOF to go ahead with the recommendations of the WB given in the CPAR with regards 
to the establishment of the PPRA. Unfortunately the WB itself has not fully appreciated the recommendations of TI-Pakistan with 
regards to the LEAST COST SYSTEMS for all Engineering / Consultancy services with respect to Pakistan.’ 
 
‘I don't know. For instance, in discussions after our brown-bag presentations we have frequently been told that the WB already uses 
the types of best practices that we refer to. However, as a consultant at the WB working on participation, while I saw many Task 
Managers doing their utmost to in encouraging those they hired to ensure effective participation in project planning, I often saw 
their efforts fall flat in implementation. At the same time, I saw Task Managers and even country Directors clearly stated that while 
they were required to invite public participation (by which they meant civil society "consultation") they were not required to do 
anything with the information that resulted from that participation.’ 
 
‘In some instances, we were able to include languages in Bank documentations. Our criticisms of the Bank's conditionalities and 
among other CSOs' complaints may have triggered the Bank's review of and the IMF's seeking to reduce their conditionalities 
imposed on borrowing countries. Leverage on the Bank can only be obtain with help of key governmental/donors support as well as 
allies in the Bank. CSOs can not hope to bring about change on our own.’ 
 
‘The WB says to CSOs it is going to change, but it is only announcements. No change in reality, partnership with civil society is only a 
communication operation.’ 
 
‘Some policies were decided beforehand and were not negotiable as was made explicit in corridors.’ 
 
c. Factors leading to success or failure: 
 
1. The World Bank policy is too meticulous. 
2. Any policy that is not people oriented would surely fail by matter of time. 
3. Administrative bottle neck and corruption 
4. Lack of genuine interest in having a dialogue with CSO the dialogue with CSO. The WB seems  interested in dialogue as 
'window-dressing', and only as far as the CSO's with whom it is involved are in agreement with policy and direction that the 
WB is taking. 
5. Capacity of NGOs to continue the engagement; follow up on the issues- info sharing is getting better. 
6. Being not really committed to public participation lead to its failures, e.g. Bujagali and the Nile Basin Discourse. 
7. More could have been achieved if there had been more continuity in pursuing the issues. 
8. The WB should first introduce best practices, outcomes, benefits in developing countries which had to struggle with similar 
problems to the public, NGO's and administration. 
9. Excellent research, good communication and real participative decision making make for successes. Dealing with the 
fundamental goal of the bank and its neo liberal agenda often mean wins rarely occur. 
10. I would suggest that people at the WB who truly want to improve their own practice are often stymied by the system within 
which they are working - time pressure (in terms of balancing competing demands from multiple projects) and low priority 
placed on the effectiveness/success of project interventions (vs. getting the loan out) and lack of funds to do more than the 
minimally required in-country project preparation activities, along with a focus on participation/consultation with big civil 
society (e.g., large national and international NGOs) vs. local civil society (e.g., potential beneficiaries) may be factors. 
  
 
5. LESSONS LEARNED (48) 
 
a. Respondents who would participate again 
 # yes* # no # yes with 
reservations 
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Respondents who would participate again 
 
32 
 
2 
 
5 
* No-one said yes with reservations, they were very keen to participate again, but did have the 
following suggestions 
 
Key reservations or conditions: 
1. There should be real assistance given to grass roots organisations who work very hard to ensure that poverty is reduced, 
people are empowered and life becomes more comfortable for grassroots people in hidden corners of Africa. 
2. The WB must be open to criticism and recipient of constructive external advises 
3. There must be proper information coordination, and assurance that policies and instructions are adhered to when 
implementing programmes. 
4. The right individuals within WB must be consulted 
5. Interactions should be well advertised so that participants prepare themselves for such events. 
6. Written concerns or feedback around the consultations signed on by participating CSO's should be sent to the WB offices in 
the region and in Washington. 
7. There should be on going information sharing session.  
8. There should be respect for the role played by NGOs as well as advocacy and transparency of the process itself which often 
determines the outcome 
9. Consultations should be better focused and have more continuity.  
10. There should be greater transparency/disclosure in the discussion of the pros and cons of our application 
11. There needs to be flexibility on part of the Bank in approach e.g. agenda setting, less of the technical language. 
12. There need to be longer lead in times. Mediating institutions should attenuate Bank control of agenda and outcomes. Open 
participation. Self selection of sponsored participants. Shared control of minutes. Clarity about possible outcomes at the 
outset. Provision of all information in the right languages well in advance. Multilingual interpretation as standard practice. 
13. All Contracts should be placed on the WB’s website and should include details of award of Contracts, fund dispersal, 
Implementation of IP's and appropriate sanctions etc. We would recommend that the WB in participation with TI-Pakistan 
hold training workshops for Contractors, Consultants and Government Organizations etc. so as to improve interfacing and 
transparency in evaluation and award of contracts, which to date is being manipulated by certain Government Organizations.  
14. All shades of opinion should be included without pandering to in country political pressures for example issues of sexual 
minorities in Nigeria 
15. The World Bank should not recycle old people for consultations, new people should be utilized for divergent views for a wide 
range of actions 
16. People outside of the capital should be invited and sent more background information, well in advance, report on how the inputs 
were used/not used, consult with civil society before a document (for ex. Russia's CAS) was adopted by the Board of the 
Directors and not after, etc. 
17. There should be a wider net cast in substantively involving NGOs in the discussion. The largest NGOs, while they are clearly 
important and should have a voice, do not always have sufficiently close links to WB project beneficiaries and do not have a 
monopoly on good ideas. 
18. Only if there is a commitment from the coordinators (government and Bank) to make us participate in defining the agenda, 
the participants and the space for negotiation. 
 
 
b. Key recommendations: 
1. WB should be open in its operations and engaging in more similar consultations and dialogue where necessary. My advice is 
that my being open minded in its policy advisory to nations without any hidden agenda, more CS would then interact readily 
with WB or issues relating to its improving concerns for accountability and good will of the citizens, via even an annual 
convention sponsored by WB and its affiliates. 
2. A quarterly WB bulletin that would present WB programs and future working directions. This is on the web but it would be 
helpful to have this kind of bulletin 
3. WB membership and power should be more equally divided and representative of the types of communities it was set up to 
help serve. Not those countries themselves (i.e. post-war Europe) but countries in or coming out of conflict. 
4. What is critical is that CSOs show (a) they have done their homework, and know the facts of the situation and policy that are 
raising with the Bank; (b) know how the Bank works - particularly if the objective is to change how it works; (c) can 
demonstrate, through membership or otherwise, that they represent an important development issue and constituency, 
affecting the development of poor countries and the perspectives of poor countries - and this in contrast to a perspective of an 
interest group formed in the North consisting of a limited number of people in the North - trying to use the WB to promote 
certain policies in the South. We need also to bear in mind the importance of the Bank's current decision - making structure, 
and bring our pressures to bear in the member states and their representatives on the Bank's Board of Directors, and not just 
on the staff. 
5. Open-Door Policy that allows Civil Society to link up with the World Bank at any time.  
6. Create networks with mass. Be able to show real and tangible results of your CSO work and how collaboration with you will 
benefit not only the target population, but also the WB. (Self interest is always powerful.) Identify people within the WB 
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(IMF and UN, too) who are strategically thinking about real CSO input, and create relationships with them. They can 
advocate from within. Be willing to go to the press, to the streets, and make noise. 
7. Try and prepare in advance for these consultations. Talk to other CSO's and NGOs who will be involved in the consultations. 
Elaborate your position post-consultations and make the WB aware of these positions. 
8. The WB should aim to establish long-term relations with reliable, trust-worthy NGOs independently of ad-hoc consultation 
meetings. That way, we would know one another, where each was coming from, and this would improve the outcomes of 
actual consultations in my view. also, as said earlier, to inform NGOs of consultation meetings more in advance from now on, 
provide the documents in time, inform about the context of the consultation (what occurred before and what comes after) and 
revert to consultation participants with the final document once it is ready. 
9. Avoid confrontation, be highly professional, and acknowledge that you are dealing with people as dedicated to overcoming 
poverty as you are. Listen to what the staff has to say, it often makes good sense. 
10. To engage with Bank, you need to be very clear with your facts - and they (Bank) like statistics. You need to know what 
exactly you want the Bank to do 
11. Be sceptical; be very well prepared; write everything down and agree on minutes/records of all meetings to avoid Bank being 
able to forget the promises it made in previous rounds of the dialogue. Be prepared to be in for the long haul. 
12. Study the WB structure and work in a country in advance, write your suggestions/amendments in advance and send to the WB 
staff, agree your positions on the issues discussed with your partner organizations to present a collective view, work with your 
government as a main interlocuteur of the WB 
13. Take a proactive role. Use the opportunity to help people at the WB figure out how to run with the good ideas that they have. 
14. Set the rules of engagement, define what every party wants to negotiate, analyse together the situation (not get an analysis 
beforehand made by others), create an ombudsman for the process. 
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• Republic of Macedonia    
• Senegal    
• Uganda    
• Zambia 
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Summary of key issues 
 
1. The participation of the main actors of civil society in the process of 
creation/planning of the World Bank general policy and development strategies in the 
Republic of Macedonia in the previous period is insignificant. The majority of 
organizations do not have sufficient information neither regarding the mechanisms 
nor the possibilities and ways in which they could provide their contribution in the 
creation of the Bank's strategies. An exception from this situation is only the 
participation of FOSIM in several development strategies.     
 
2. The approach towards informing the civil society organizations, in order to present 
the World Bank programs  or to collect the experiences and opinions  of the civil 
society organizations regarding certain issue/s  is non-existent, nor is there any 
information regarding such a necessity.    
 
3. In situations when the Bank concludes agreements with the Ministries for the 
development of certain fields (exp. The Ministry of culture or the Ministry of labor 
and social policy), again, in the process of preparations of the policies and strategies 
there is a lack of  participation of local organizations and local self-government from 
the region for which the project is intended, including the target groups as well. Also, 
throughout the implementation phase of such three-party agreements supported by the 
World Bank, during the mediation of the Ministries and the Local self-government 
there is a lack of any type of communication between the civil society organizations 
and the World Bank.     
 
4. Experiences vary regarding the process of planning and implementation of the World 
Bank programs/projects. It can be concluded that the Bank's approach towards the 
civil society organizations is closer to a certain degree, while the inclusion in the 
process of implementation is increased. Yet, in the part of the monitoring and 
evaluation of the projects/programs there is a complete lack of feedback from the 
local office of the Bank. The same applies to the possible follow-up activities.     
 
5. The communication of the Bank with the Union, as one of the important factors 
within civil society sector, is frequent.  The Bank listens to the opinion of the 
employees and employers, poses questions, without giving explanation on the goals 
of its visits, the aims and follow-up activities.       
 
6. Despite the fact that the results achieved on the level of implemented projects 
supported by the Bank are satisfactory, still one cannot talk about some significant 
results or wider effects from the project itself. This is due to the short time-span of the 
projects (6 months), a period which is not even close enough to grasp the impact of 
the implemented projects over the wider environment or their possible replication 
effects. In those places where the projects should become the obligation of the local 
self-governments there exists neither a form nor a mechanism that would continue the 
cooperation between the local-self government   and the civil society organizations 
with the aim to reinforce the effects from the project and enable sustainability. 
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7. The tardiness of placement of funds on the side of the Bank and not adhering to fiscal 
agreements places the civil society organizations in a situation whereby they are not 
able to fulfill the obligations towards the implementers of certain activities. In 
addition, the civil society organizations face serious difficulties due to exchange rates 
differences and the decrease of value of the American dollar and are put in a situation 
to cover these differences from other funds.  
 
 
Recommendations308 
 
- Increasing the informing and communication between the World Bank- civil 
society sector through establishing regular practices of informing the civil society 
organizations regarding the goals and objectives of the World Bank in Republic of 
Macedonia. 
- Increasing the opportunities for cooperation and impact of the civil society sector 
in the creation of the development policies of the WB on national level. 
- Increased transparency of the Bank for possible mechanisms of impact of the civil 
society sector in the creation of general policies, strategies and programs at 
national level.  
- Inclusion of civil society organizations in the needs assessment and strategies and 
programs preparation of the World Bank. This type of inclusion refers not only to 
key actors in the civil society sector, but also through use of various forms and 
channels of joint forms (networks – formal and informal, on regional, national and 
local level, support centers etc.). This or similar type of participation of the civil 
society sector in the creation of national strategies and programs to be established 
as one of the Bank's general principles. 
Possible forms: 
- Forming a national consultative body with the representatives from civil society 
organizations form different sectors, to be consulted with regards to preparation of 
policies, strategies and programs of the World Bank. 
- Forming local committees/bodies etc. 
- Establishing the practice of gender concepts mainstreaming in the creation of the 
general policies, strategies and programs of the Bank at national level. 
- Establishing practices of financing long-term and mid-term length programs, in 
order to increase the results and impact of the projects/programs and their 
sustainability. 
- Improving communication with the local Bank office in the process of monitoring 
and evaluation of projects, especially in the part of providing feedback from the 
conveyed evaluation to the users of the funds. 
- Improving the level of information about positive examples and good practices 
and enabling follow-up activities. 
- Adhering to fiscal provisions of contracts and concluding the agreements in local 
currency. 
                                                 
308
 More specific recommendations can be find in discussion paper form group A and B 
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1. Short introduction 
 
The joint committee (JFC) for facilitating the cooperation between the World 
Bank and the civil society is a consultative group with the task to facilitate and find 
transparent and democratic mechanisms for more effective cooperation among civil 
society organizations and World Bank on global level. 
JFC believes that the strengthened cooperation between the World Bank and civil 
society organizations could lead to more effective poverty reduction. 
The aim of the Committee is to: 
- prepare a framework  and guidelines  for the cooperation  of World Bank and the 
civil society 
- to establish transparent, accountable and democratic mechanisms for future 
cooperation. 
In order to achieve the above mentioned aims, JFC has devoted itself to a more 
encompassing analysis of the previous experience of cooperation between the World 
Bank and the civil society organizations using a number of methods and techniques: 
national and regional consultations with organizations which cooperated with the 
World Bank; public opinion polling; analysis of existing documentation and strategies 
of the World Bank in cooperation with the civil society sector; individual interviews 
etc. This data will be presented at the Global Policy Forum to take place in 
Washington from 20 to 22.04.2005. 
The aims, of this Forum at which 160 representatives of civil society organizations, 
foundations, government institutions, leading World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund representatives will participate, are: 
• to promote an all-encompassing dialogue  between the World Bank and the 
civil society organizations regarding the strategies  for poverty reduction and 
other development issues of common interest; 
• to analyze the Bank and civil society organizations' experiences  on global 
level in the past years and to propose standards and mechanisms for 
improvement of these  relations; 
• to encourage increased understanding and cooperation between the World 
Bank and the civil society organizations. 
 
The Macedonian center for International cooperation (MCIC) was asked by CIVICUS 
(Global alliance for citizen participation in whose frameworks is the Secretariat of JFC) 
to organize the national consultations for cooperation between the World Bank – civil 
society in Republic of Macedonia.   
The workshop took place on 29.04.2005 in the Parliamentary club in Skopje, Republic of 
Macedonia. At it were present 38 participants representing a number of civil society 
organizations from Republic of Macedonia, which have had experience cooperating with 
the World Bank 
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2. Purpose of the workshop:  
National consultations for cooperation with the World Bank - civil society in Republic of Macedonia  
 
The aims of the national consultations are in close correlation with the goals on the 
global level and those are:  
• To determine the experiences of civil society organizations in the 
cooperation with the World Bank and 
• To extract specific recommendations regarding the ways in which the 
World Bank can be more transparent, accountable and responsive towards 
the needs of the civil society.  
 
 
3. Methodology of the workshop 
 
The methodology of the workshop was outlined in the Terms of reference 
provided to MCIC by CIVICUS. The workshop consisted of two plenary sessions, 
introductory and final as well as group work. 
At the introductory session a short overview of the events on global level was 
presented as well as introduction to the consultations and aims of the workshop. 
The aims of the session were explained to the participants in the working groups 
and these are: 
a) identifying the key challenges – experiences, issues and problems with co-
operation with the WB and 
b) offering recommendations for improving the transparency, accountability  and 
democratic decision-making of the WB  
c) Selecting a presenter for the Global Policy Forum – Washington. 
 
Then the methodology of work was explained which consisted of identifying the key 
challenges and offering recommendations with regards to 4 areas: policy, process, context 
and result in the co-operation of WB with CSOs. For each area a leading issue was 
defined in advance, for which the participants identified the key challenges by writing 
them individually on cards in order to enable all participants to state their position, then a 
discussion followed regarding them and in the end were given recommendations for each 
of the areas. In order to facilitate the discussion more effectively besides the leading 
question, which was written down, sub-questions for each area were posed verbally. 
 At the end of the discussion in the working group, each group was obliged to 
chose a representative that will participate on the Global Policy Forum in Washington 
D.C 
 The criteria under which the presenters should be chosen were: 
- Candidates present at the consultations. 
- Excellent knowledge of English language (written and spoken). 
- Experience in the work and cooperation with the World Bank. 
- Deepened understanding of the civil society sector, the Millennium 
Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
- Active participation at the discussions  
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Slavica Endzevska form FOSIM and Stojan Misev form Association for 
Emancipation, Solidarity and Equality of Women in RM (ESE) will represent this group 
at Global Policy Forum.  
The final plenary session was consisted of presenting the findings and 
recommendations of the work in groups. 
Introductory and closing plenary session were facilitated by Neda Maleska-
Sacmaroska, working groups was facilitated by Vesna Jovanova i Zarko Konevski.  
In the continuation of this report the discussions and recommendations of the 
work groups follow. 
 
 
4. Discussion paper, group A  
 
The work group A consisted of 15 members of civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in the Republic of Macedonia which had established cooperation with the World Bank 
(WB) in an indirect way, through associative grants, within the framework of the Project 
for Development of Municipalities through Culture and Micro Projects for Social 
Services.  
 
4.1 Policy 
 
Question:  Whether and how have the civil society organizations been 
involved in the creation of the general policy (strategy, goals, and 
programs) of the WB in Macedonia? 
 
Sub-question:  Have CSOs in some way succeeded to pressure or to influence the 
WB general policy creation? 
 
The responses given, and the discussion which developed, firstly pointed out the absence 
of the organizations in the general WB policy creation processes, and secondly the lack of 
knowledge on the ways (non-transparency of the process) in which WB determines its 
general policies and the possibilities for involving the organizations in the process. Only 
one involved organisation stressed that they were included in the consultations during the 
creation of policy for decrease of poverty.  
On the other hand, participants stressed that strategies are not created locally, but on a 
central level, in cooperation with the ministries. They talked about the need of 
establishing practice of involving the CSOs and the local governments (LG) as 
participants in this process, via presenting recommendations on the main priorities before 
preparing of the strategies. The existing local capacities, joint forms of civil society 
activity, such as the networks and the NGO Support Centres, should be used in the 
process.  
Additionally, the participants stressed the need for establishment of criteria for including 
the CSOs in this process, especially those who work on realisation of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Furthermore, they emphasised that creation of general policies 
should also include taking into consideration the experiences and evaluations of the 
projects realised by CSOs in the given area. 
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Recommendations regarding the policy: 
 
- Inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the evaluation of the needs 
before creation of the strategies; 
- Defining of criteria for inclusion of CSOs in the creation of WB strategies; 
- Using of established channels (joint forms of CSO) – NGO Support Centers, 
and local level networks.  
 
4.2 Process 
 
Question:  Whether and in what way have you been included in the process 
of preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the 
programs and projects in which you have participated? 
Sub-questions:  Have you been implementers only? 
Have you been in partnership relation with the WB? 
Have you received consultations from the WB? 
Is it possible to make concessions, that is, the project to 
undergo certain corrections in the period of implementation (if 
there is an objective reason for that)?  
Has the capacity building of the civil society organization been 
included? 
 
Participants provided various perspectives regarding the inclusion of the CSOs in the 
process of preparation of programs and projects.  
Namely, some of the organizations were involved in the definition of priorities of the 
respective municipalities (a process described as lengthy and quite complicated). 
Afterwards, after winning public tenders—process element based on the initial definition 
of priorities—those same organizations were involved in the implementation of the 
projects.  
The remaining organizations were not included in the initial definition of the priorities, 
since they were not included in the coordinative bodies formed by the LG for that 
purpose. Their comments pointed out that those priorities came out ill-defined because of 
the narrow interests of specific CSOs which participated in the need evaluations in certain 
municipalities through the coordinative bodies. For example, drug abuse was defined as a 
priority problem in a municipality which, according to the available data, lacks 
significant incidence of this kind. Furthermore, in another example, the women's issues 
were put as a priority, without prior consultation with the CSOs dealing with that area, 
and the coordinative body had no female members.  
In another sense, when referring to the basic problems during the definition of municipal 
priorities, some participants pointed out the lack of transparency of the whole process of 
establishing priorities within the municipalities, continuation of cases involving lack of 
prior connections between the CSOs and the municipality targeted with the 
implementation of the project (prior acquaintance and cooperation), and lack of clarity of 
the process of connecting of CSOs with the municipalities. In that direction, a proposal 
was put forth to strictly define the criteria for selection of CSOs which would participate 
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in defining the municipal priorities, while paying attention to the territorial and thematic 
connections of the CSOs which aspire to become implementers and the LG which has the 
appropriate priority defined.  
Organizations participating in the discussion had divided opinions on the issue whether 
the organizations chosen for the needs evaluation for particular municipalities should be 
denied the opportunity to become the implementers of project based on those needs, or 
the process should remain unchanged, namely LGs to invite CSOs to form coordinative 
body to define the priorities, and then those same CSOs to have equal right as other, 
noninvolved CSOs, to participate in public tenders.  
The view that the process of needs evaluation should maybe also include independent 
experts was countered with the response that it is still better to engage the local CSOs 
which have capacity for that in this process only, with adherence to the rules for 
prevention of conflict of interest.  
The discussion continued in the direction of connecting all key actors of the priority 
defining process, project implementation, and the process of monitoring and evaluation. 
The necessity for cooperation of the LGs, SCOs, WB and the relevant ministries was 
emphasized, in order to prevent overlapping and duplication of certain activities. This 
lead to highlighting the role of the LG, which should not be reduced to evaluation only, 
but should also include active participation and support of the CSOs in the process of 
project implementation.  
 
Recommendations regarding the process: 
 
- Cooperation and coordination of the SCOs, LGs, WB and the 
appropriate ministries; 
- Defining of criteria for selection of SCOs which would participate in 
the defining of priorities; 
- Connecting the municipalities and the SCOs which have experience in 
the municipalities based on territorial and thematic approach; 
- Forming of commission/body consisting of SCOs, LGs and the 
authorized ministries. 
 
4.3 Context 
 
Question: How and how much the local environment (political, economic, social) 
models your relations with the WB and how much the Ministries and local government 
influence your relations with the WB? 
 
The discussion regarding this question moved into direction of informing that the CSOs, 
which established cooperation with the WB indirectly, in fact have no direct contact with 
the WB, but proceed roundabout via the LGs and the ministries. Mediation by the 
ministries and the LGs in the communication between the CSOs and the WB is viewed as 
a flaw in the process of implementation of the activities. Therefore exists a need for 
creation for a form of straight communication between the NGOs and the WB in order to 
surpass the lack of transparency of the whole process. Direct communication is necessary 
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in cases when misunderstandings between the CSOs and the LGs arise during 
implementation phase. 
On the other hand, the participants pointed out that WB should improve the supervision 
of the work of project units, and to inform the CSOs about the finished evaluations, 
because of noted occurrences in which project units provided "apparent evaluation" for 
WB, with CSOs receiving no feedback about it. 
In regard to the environment, the CSOs from Eastern Macedonia indicated that they feel 
excluded and unattractive when compared with the crisis regions. Therefore they 
suggested that besides local priorities to define national priorities too, which would 
provide competitive conditions for all. 
 
Recommendations regarding the context:  
 
- Improving the supervision of the work of project units (control by 
WB) and feedback on the evaluation; 
- Including the WB in the monitoring, especially the relations of CSOs 
and LGs (when needed); 
- Including of all municipalities in the application – defining regional 
and national priorities.   
 
4.4 Results 
 
Question:  What are the results of your cooperation with the WB and how 
has the cooperation impacted the improvement of WB practices? 
Sub-questions:  Have any significant changes been achieved as a result of your 
cooperation with the WB?  
Which are the factors that brought to the success or failure of 
your cooperation with the WB? 
 
The discussion that developed regarding the results included the opinion that some of the 
organizations are still implementing projects, and the results would be available after 
their completion. Several organizations indicated positive experiences, and the fact that 
WB respected the recommendations by tender winners. Again, the lack of direct way to 
communicate between the WB and the CSOs, especially regarding sharing of 
experiences, was indicated as a weakness. Furthermore, all organizations emphasized that 
the period of 6 months for initiation and implementation of certain projects is not 
sufficient to produce significant results. This was especially relevant with projects 
intended to become responsibility of the local governments, without any form of 
agreement that the CSOs and LGs would continue the cooperation after the project 
completion. Therefore, remains a need to define long-term priorities supported by WB, in 
order to have increased influence, but also to enable closure of activities in one whole. 
Participants emphasized that this would strengthen the cooperation between the CSOs 
and LGs, also. This would also comprise the need of including the implementing NGOs 
in defining the subsequent activities. 
On the other hand, the discussion participants emphasized the need for adhering to the 
agreement provisions, especially the fiscal provisions, because the CSOs sometimes are 
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forced into situation of inability of fulfilling the obligations towards the implementers of 
certain activities, with existing contracts, due to tardiness of funds placement by WB. 
Another problem this area is due to the differences in currency exchange rates and the fall 
of the U.S. dollar, forcing the CSOs to mobilize funds from other sources in order to 
make up for the differences. Therefore, the participants recommended conclusion of 
future contracts in local currency. 
 
Recommendations regarding the results: 
 
- Increase of the time span for implementation and support of the 
micro-projects; 
- Including the implementing NGOs in defining of subsequent 
activities; 
- Defining long-term priorities supported by WB in order to increase 
influence; 
- Acceleration of fiscal provisions of the agreements; 
- Concluding agreements in local currency. 
   
5. Discussion paper, group B 
 
The work group B consisted of 16 members of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) in the Republic of Macedonia which had established contact with 
the World Bank (WB) in a direct way, through financing projects via the 
WB grant program. 
 
5.1 Policy 
 
Question:  Whether and how have the civil society organizations been 
involved in the creation of the general policy (strategy, goals, and 
programs) of the WB in Macedonia? 
 
Sub-question:  Have CSOs in some way succeeded to pressure or to influence the 
WB general policy creation? 
 
The responses given, and the discussion which developed, firstly pointed out the absence 
of the organizations in the general WB policy creation processes, and on the other side 
lack of knowledge on the ways (non-transparency of the process) in which WB 
determines its general policies and the possibilities for involving the organizations in the 
process. 
 
The experiences of the representatives in the discussion vary. Part of them point out 
examples whereby they had some part in influencing the WB programs, but  a large part 
state that they have never nor in any way been involved in the process of planning the 
general policy of the Bank (its strategy and goals). 
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There are experiences of consultations during program creation, but not for the WB 
strategy. According to the previous experience of FOSIM consultations have been made 
in relation to certain issues, on the global level and at national level, example: Roma 
strategy, Programs for education reform, when they were included in the process at an 
early stage. It was suggested that during the preparation of the Roma strategy made by 
FOSIM and WB they were supposed to involve also Roma experts or NGO 
representatives in the preparation of that strategy. It pointed that Roma organizations 
were involved in relation to the preparation of the initiative for the Roma inclusion 
decade, but not in the creation of the program of WB.  
According to the opinion of one organization there are experiences of direct contacts and 
visits form WB officials and consultations over certain issues for example regarding the 
issue of unemployment, but not participation in strategy creation. 
 
The experience and viewpoint of the Association of Unions of Macedonia is similar, 
there is no inclusion of the Union in the process of preparation of strategy of the WB. 
Suggestions have been given in relation to programs, via organized working sessions with 
the WB. The experience other organization is that there is not any information regarding 
the WB's need to collect the experiences and opinions of the civil society organizations. 
 
Besides FOSIM the other organizations have not participated in the creation of the 
general policies of the Bank. There do not exist publicly available official mechanisms 
for participating in policy creation. There is a lack of knowledge regarding the type of 
mechanisms the Bank uses while preparing the general policy, whether there are 
annual/three-year planning programs and how the information process flows. In addition, 
there is no follow-up information after the organizations have been involved in the 
cooperation with the WB, so that other organizations can find out about the ways for their 
future participation. One representative in the discussion pointed out that if they had not 
met at a meeting like this they would not know how the other civil society organizations 
cooperate with the World Bank. 
 
Recommendations regarding the policy: 
 
- increased possibility for influencing the creation of  WB policies. 
- increased transparency of the Bank and their informing for possible 
mechanisms of influence. 
- improved informing regarding the goals and objectives of WB in 
Republic of Macedonia.  
- in the creation of the programs it is necessary to enable the participation 
not only of the key actors of civil society but also smaller organizations. 
- investigating the needs at the local level through forms and direct 
participation and taking into consideration the regional needs and the 
needs of different groups. 
- Civil society sector participation during the creation of national 
programs to be one of the general principles of the Bank. 
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- To use the recommendations of the civil society organizations in 
creating the general strategies as well as from the monitoring of activities 
at the local level. 
- To take into consideration the gender concepts when creating the 
strategies and politics of the WB, especially at the local level. 
 
 
 
5.2 Process 
 
Question: Whether and in what way have you been included in the process of 
preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programs and projects 
in which you have participated? 
Sub-questions:  Have you been implementers only? 
Have you been in partnership relation with the WB? 
Have you received consultations from the WB? 
Is it possible to make concessions, that is, the project to 
undergo certain corrections in the period of implementation (if 
there is an objective reason for that)?  
Has the capacity building of the civil society organization been 
included? 
 
In the discussion on these questions the participants emphasized that there is general 
satisfaction from the involvement of representatives of civil society organizations in the 
consultations and information exchange. For example, there is inclusion and cooperation 
within the working groups for creation of local strategic action plans and determining 
priorities (via focus groups). The information and opinion exchange is most frequent at 
the level of specific projects, during which there is a possibility for influencing the 
process of project implementation from the side of the organizations. A positive 
assessment has been given to the WB in relation to its flexibility in order to meet the 
objective modifications which happened to the project in the period of implementation. 
Some participants in the discussion pointed out that there is involvement in the 
implementation process, monitoring and evaluation, but on the side of the WB 
Headquarters (without feedback). 
 
At national level, it was stated that there is a lack of transparency and accountability of 
the work of the Bank. In most cases, there is no feedback form the local office on the 
basis of the implemented project. There are experiences whereby projects which where 
submitted to the WB would be completely accepted without comments and without 
previous consultations, which were also absent after the start of project implementation. 
The representative form an organization pointed out that in the cooperation with the WB 
they were left with the feeling that there is no interest for the type and quality of the 
supported project nor was there feedback on the quality of the implemented project. 
There are experiences whereby the civil society organizations have not been included in 
the monitoring and assessment, and only rarely in follow-up activities. Thus, there are no 
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mechanisms or they are not made available with regards to the way in which to secure 
follow-up information. 
 
The representative from the Association of Unions in Macedonia pointed out that from 
their experience, the Bank often listens to the opinion of the workers and employers, but 
does not state the objectives for its visits and follow-up activities. WB appears with 
questions, without explaining what will happen in the future. The main direction is that 
this information should come from the Government. On the other hand, the Government, 
bases its excuses for the reforms on the recommendations from the World Bank, but with 
distorting the information, as if these are WB requests. In the three-party communication 
(among the Union, Government and the Bank) the cooperation of WB varies and mostly 
the Bank does not give information for the recommendations. 
 
Recommendations regarding the process: 
 
- More information from the WB on the goals and the programs which 
it creates when using information form relevant actors in the civil society 
sector. 
- Forming of a national consultative body with representatives from 
civil society organizations from different sectors, which would be 
consulted in relation to WB strategies and programs.   
- Increased participation of the WB in the preparation, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up activities of the 
programs and projects at the local level. 
- Increased control and monitoring over the implementation of local 
plans and programs (taking into consideration real priorities). 
- Increased participation of the civil society organizations in the 
creation of programs, monitoring and evaluation. 
- Increasing the capacity of the World Bank for informing on the 
processes in the Bank via improved public relations. 
- To respect the criteria established by the Bank itself during selection 
of project implementers. 
- Increasing the engagement of international experts in the evaluation 
of national programs and recommendations providing. 
 
5.3 Context 
 
Question: How and how much the local environment (political, economic, social) 
models your relations with the WB and how much the Ministries and local government 
influence your relations with the WB? 
 
In the discussion of this question half of the stated experiences state that the local 
environment and conditions help the direct approach to the Bank even without the 
mediation of the local government (LG). The environment and the events in the society 
positively impact the relations with the WB. Very often, the local political dynamics 
determines or not, the participation of certain organizations in the WB programs in 
Appendix C: Consultation Notes 
 120 
Macedonia. The cooperation among the NGO, LG, ministries and the business sector has 
had a positive influence for winning and implementation of projects. The WB name is 
prominent so for certain participants this has had a positive impact in the relations with 
the LG. 
 
In the discussion where also pointed out examples which stated that the LG and the 
Ministries have no impact on the relations of the organizations with the bank, but on the 
contrary, that the initiatives emerge from the WB and civil society organizations. 
 
Yet, very often the LG is an obstacle for the relations with the Bank. An example is the 
Ministry of culture and LG which have positioned themselves as a filter between certain 
NGOs and created a barrier. In that way, the Ministries and LG in several occasions can 
negatively influence the relations of the organizations with the WB. 
 
Recommendations regarding the context:  
 
- The criteria for cooperation established by the WB to be objective and to 
emerge from the conditions in society. 
- Increased transparency for the possible mechanisms to influence 
decisions (on the national and local level). 
- Forming a body that would consist of representatives from civil 
society organizations, business sector and government institutions and 
would participate in the project selection. 
- To increase the participation of the WB experts in the evaluation and 
recommendation for the projects. 
- Increasing the pressure of the WB over the Government in the 
ratification of international conventions.   
 
5.4 Results 
 
Question: What are the results of your cooperation with the WB and how has the 
cooperation impacted the improvement of WB practices? 
 
Sub-questions:  Have any significant changes been achieved as a result of your 
cooperation with the WB?  
Which are the factors that brought to the success or failure of 
your cooperation with the WB? 
 
The participants in the discussion pointed out that the cooperation with the Bank can be 
assessed as being on a satisfactory level, but that it cannot be perceived as having an 
impact over projects improvement. Certain discussants stated that as a result of the 
cooperation with the civil society organizations, the fund for NGO projects support has 
been increased, and more important, the level of trust on both sides has been increased, 
which creates the opportunity for increased influence over the Bank's practices. The 
discussants pointed out several examples of project activities results which were achieved 
as a direct outcome from the cooperation with the WB. Part of the examples include 
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increased municipal development, increased number of seasonal and permanent 
employed persons, created network of NGOs form the Bregalnica region etc. In this way 
the capacity of the civil society organizations has been increased and their image 
improved. 
Still, very often there is a lack of information from formal and informal sources on how 
the cooperation impacted the WB nor is it known whether the cooperation is improved. 
 
The participants laid out several ideas through their discussions as to how the Bank could 
work in the future. One idea is the WB to take upon itself the financial burden for the 
practical implementation of projects (in poorer countries). Another idea suggested the 
new programs to be created taking into consideration the positive experiences and lessons 
learned from the previous programs. 
 
Recommendations regarding the results: 
 
- Increased feed-back and presentation of the results from certain projects 
and programs to the funds' users. 
- Improved information and communication regarding the results. 
- Coordination and co-operation with the civil society sector in program 
creation and implementation. 
- Forming a body of CSO members with the function of evaluation service 
and feed-back providing. 
- Building upon positive results and establishing mechanisms for programs' 
sustainability (LG to take over financing of the programs). 
- Generally accepted experience from practice to be generally accepted and 
supported on the long-run. 
- Independent external evaluation of the programs and results which the 
World Bank is implementing. 
- Establishing practices for financing long-term and mid-term programs 
which would provide sustainable results. 
 
Additional recommendations: 
 
- More information regarding the services and conditions established by the 
World Bank 
- To use the local experiences and resources when creating new WB 
programs. 
- To take into account and avoid overlapping with similar and current 
programs and projects of other donors and development agencies and 
organisations. 
 
6. Instead of conclusion 
 
This report from the consultations conducted is a proposal form the civil society 
organizations present at the forum in the direction of improving the policy and practice of 
the World bank for cooperating with the civil society. At the same time it provides an 
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overview of the current relations between the World Bank and the non-governmental 
organizations and identifies some of the main issues and challenges in these relations. 
The document does not pledge to articulate an all-encompassing or unified "civil 
society standpoint" regarding the issues to be reviewed, but serves as a basis for further 
discussion in the direction of improving the cooperation of the World Bank and civil 
society.   
 
NMS/NMS  
Br. 10-201/2-2005 
Skopje, 01.04.2005 
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Annex 1. List of participants  
No. Representative Organization  Organization E-mail Telephone Municipality 
1 Zati Ramadanov ZG "Romano Bah" - Veles 
Association of Romany 
citizens "Romany Bah" of 
Veles 
romanibah@yahoo.com 043 223 827 070/639-106 Veles 
2 Katica Cadieva Op{tina Veles Municipality of Veles kcadieva@veles.gov.mk 043/227-409 Veles 
3 Nikola Brezev ZG "Amanet" C.C Amanet c.c.amanet@yahoo.com 
043/231-381       
043/233-833 
070/216-430 
Veles 
4 Lolita Ristova 
Gra|anski Centar za 
Preventiva i Resocijalizacija 
– Negotino 
Civil center for prevention 
and resocialization gcprneg@yahoo.com 070/722219 Negotino 
5 Zaklina Durmis Centar za obrazovna poddr{ka "Dendo Vas" 
Center for Educational 
Support of Roma Children 
and Youth “Dendo Vas” 
 dendovas@yahoo.com 02 2036 316      Skopje 
6 Zekir Abdulov HDZR "Kham" HCO "Sun" kham@sonet.com.mk 
070/707-726 
033/413-695 
033/413-105 
Delcevo 
7 Manoil Stefanovski 
Centar za kultura i informacii 
"Raven" 
Centar of culture and 
information "Raven" ckiraven@freemail.com.mk 
033 441-865 
070 686-233 Pehcevo 
8 Marija Kocarska ED "Kladenec" EA "Kladenec" edkp@mt.net.mk 033 441-445 070 222-445 Pehcevo 
9 Olgica Baseska Asocijacija na e`ni “Logos” – Prilep A.W. "Logos" ologos@mail.com.mk 070/454445 Prilep 
10 Gordana Trenkoska 
Sojuz na organizacii na e`ni 
na R. Makedonija - SO@M 
Union of Women's 
Organizations of the 
Republic of Macedonia 
sozm@mt.net.mk 02/3134-390 02/3220-570 Skopje 
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11 Svetlana Milenkova 
Sojuz na organizacii na e`ni 
na R. Makedonija - SO@M 
Union of Women's 
Organizations of the 
Republic of Macedonia 
sozm@mt.net.mk 02/3134-390 02/3220-571 Skopje 
12 Nikolina Lazarevska O@ Mavrovi Anovi  
Woman organization 
Mavrovi Anovi ozma@mt.net.mk 
070/341-331 
02/3222-158 
Mavrovi 
Anovi 
13 Savka Todorovska Sojuz na organizacii na e`ni 
na R. Makedonija - SO@M 
Union of Women's 
Organizations of the 
Republic of Macedonia 
sozm@mt.net.mk 02/3134-390 02/3220-572 Skopje 
14 Dragi Zmijanac  Prva detska ambasada vo 
svetot "Me|a{i" 
First Children’s Embassy in 
the World “Megjashi” 
megjashi@childrensembassy.or
g.mk 
02 465 316                    
02 463 900 Skopje 
15 Tena Zafirova ZG Stilijan 2002 – Strumica Union of citizens 
"Stilijan2002" veselaazbuka@mt.net.mk;   034/345455 Kuklis 
16 Eftim Strezovski Zdru e`nie na gra|ani "Nijazi Bej" AC "Nijazi Bej" info@neksad.org.mk 
047/455-335             
071/710-281 Resen 
17 Ljupco Krsteski  Zdru e`nie na gra|ani 
"Muzi~ka mladina" Musical Youth Resen muzmla_re@yahoo.com 
047/452-555 
070/688-856  Resen 
18 Ana Stoleska Detski parlament na Makedonija - Struga  
Children's parliament of 
Macedonia for Struga astole@mt.net.mk 
070/261-173 
046/788-454 Struga 
19 Dusko Hristov LPP "Polio Plus" "Polio Plus" - Movement Against Disability duskoh@polioplus.org.mk 
070/343-636 
02/298-327 
02/298-328 
Skopje 
20 Adrijana Trendova Fondacija institut otvoteno 
op{testvo Makedonija 
Foundation open society 
institute Macedonia atrend@soros.org.mk 070/340-013 Skopje 
21 Slavica Indeska Fondacija institut otvoteno 
op{testvo Makedonija 
Foundation open society 
institute Macedonia sindzev@soros.org.mk 070/246-743 Skopje 
22 Verica S. Trajkova 
Zdru e`nie za pomo{ i 
poddr{ka na semejstva i deca 
pod rizik “Sre}no Detstvo” – 
Skopje 
"For Happy Childhood" verica@freemail.com.mk        070/227289 Aracinovo 
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23 Trajko Petrovski ZG "Romani Ilo"  AC "Romano Ilo" trajkopetrovski@yahoo.com 070/854-036 Skopje 
24 Leonora Zhuta O@ “AUREOLA” Woman organization 
"Aureola" aureola_6@yahoo.com 
046/784-384 
070/676-457 Velesta 
25 Irina Pockova Gra|anska inicijativa na @enite Women citizen’s initiative irina_pockova@yahoo.com 
032/444-340; 
444-322; 442-
442 070/383-
402 
Sveti Nikole 
26 Valentina Arsova Gra|anska inicijativa na @enite Women citizen’s initiative irina_pockova@yahoo.com 
070/514-221 
032/444-322 Sveti Nikole 
27 Ermon Neziri Mladinsko ekolo{ki centar 
"Rekanskki biser" 
Youth ecologic center 
"Rekanski Biser" rostuse@sonet.com.mk 
042 470-170 
070 241-806 
070/567-019 
Rostuse 
28 Lidija Daniloska O@ Mavrovi Anovi  Woman organization Mavrovi Anovi lidija.d@freemail.com 070/567-019 
Mavrovi 
Anovi 
29 Dragan Ristovski Regionalna agencija za 
razvoj 
Regional Development 
Agency rarkp@yahoo.com 
 070/337-387 
031 375-356  Kriva Palanka 
30 Zaklina Stojkovska Humanitarno Zdru e`nie 
"Majka" 
Humanitarian association 
"Mother" 
vavku@freemail.com.mk 
zaklina74@yahoo.com  
075/702446                           
031/427450 Kumanovo 
31 Demir Shabani Informativen centar na 
zaednicite 
NGO Community 
Information Center  icrkumanovo@mt.net.mk 
031\425-490 
031\ 431-294 
070/645-669 
Kumanovo 
32 Nikola Glavince Detsko likovno studio Sv. Kiril i Metodij 
Children's art studio "St. 
Cyril and Methodist"  malbitmo@mt.net.mk 
047/235-184              
071/819-466 Bitola 
33 Milan Manovski Sojuz na sindikati na R. Makedonija  
Federation of Trade Unions 
of Macedonia   02/3238-302 Skopje 
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34 Stojan Mitev 
Zdru e`nie za Emancipacija 
Solidarnost i Ednakvost na 
e`nite na Republika 
Makedonija  ESE – Skopje 
Association for 
emancipation, solidarity and 
equality of women in R. 
Macedonia 
esem@unet.com.mk 02/3298295 Skopje 
35 Sabaheta Mersimi Sojuz na e`ni - @ito{e Union of Women Zitose szzit@freemail.com.mk 048/473098 Zitose 
36 Taki Petreski ED "Korija" EA "Korija" beta_ing@mt.net.mk 075/421-101             071 583-707 Krusevo 
37 Katerina Bogoeva  NPEC "Erina" JLEC "Erina" centarerina@hotmail.com 070/709-289 Skopje 
38 Zoran Ilieski Mladinski Sovet – Prilep Youth Council zorani@mt.net.mk youthcouncil@mt.net.mk 048/421070 Prilep 
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Report of the National Session: Civil Society  
on the Policy of the World Bank in Senegal 
 
See full text of original report in French below, following this summary English translation 
 
37 participants of a single day workshop, debated the current state of cooperation of the 
World Bank with Civil Society in Senegal, and presented recommendation on how to 
improve this collaboration. They represented the following groups within civil society: 
o women 
o youth 
o unions 
o NGOs 
o the disabled 
o researchers 
o artists 
 
The workshop assessed in frank discussions to what extent civil society’s voice had been 
taken into account in important policy discussions including that of the PRSP process, 
NEPAD, among others. 
 
It was noted that, although to a certain extent the Bank is to blame for a lack of clarity in 
dialogue, civil society also bears part of the blame for not proposing clear and viable 
alternatives. Many participants entertained criticism not exclusively towards the bank but also 
toward civil society themselves. Questions were raised concerning their credibility and the 
cooperation within the CS sector itself. Solutions that were pointed out to this effect include 
the need for capacity building of civil society actors to be able to discourse at the same level 
towards the WB. At the same time, the WB has to popularize and make more accessible their 
intervention mechanisms.   
 
Discussions also concentrated on the transparency and accountability of the World Bank’s 
interventions in Senegal.  
 
The civil society of only two countries across Africa (Senegal and South Africa) was 
consulted in this format on their opinions about their relationship with the World Bank. One 
participant noted that civil society could consider themselves less as partners and more as 
guests of the WB, since there is no formal and direct dialogue between themselves and the 
institution. Furthermore, CS is consistently not included when it comes to negotiations 
between the government and the WB. 
 
Group sessions: 
1) Dialogue mechanisms between CS – WB 
Through the logic of cooperation of current initiatives (NEPAD, Cotonou accords, PRSP) 
and in order to achieve the MDGs, an in depth reflection ad harmonization among non-
governmental actors is very much needed. 
 
Recommendations:  
- strengthen technical cooperation, harmonization and networking among CS, 
government and WB 
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- promote current initiatives that link CS to all project phases (from needs assessment 
to evaluation 
- Promote ethically managed projects/ transparency 
- Implement a strong CS coalition to act as ‘watchdog’ to monitor and evaluate WB 
projects and programmes 
 
2) Opinion of CS over WB policies in Senegal 
CS is not fully participating in the implementation of WB projects. These projects and 
policies have thus far not had positive social impact. 
(No recommendations made in Group 2 discussions) 
 
 
Overall Recommendations: 
Promote and develop the possibilities of participation and implementation of certain 
programmes in order for these to have a positive impact on the population, contribute to 
strengthen actors capacities, and ensure an improved management of funds for the public 
good/ 
 
Recommendations for an effective participation of CSOs 
- refuse to be co-opted (‘rubberstamping’) 
- capacity building 
- systematization of lessons learned 
- social impact evaluation of WBs policies, programmes and projects; participatory 
diagnostic of social impact 
- implementation of a dynamic operational framework for coordination 
- WB: Improvement of information dissemination and awareness raising of the general 
population 
- WB: increase transparency in the decision-making process 
- Effective participation of CS in the development of national policies and within 
programme monitoring 
 
 
Quotes: 
Mrs. Woré Seck: “How can we create a viable environment in order to facilitate a true 
partnership between the different partners working alongside the World Bank?” 
 
Mr. Amacodou Diouf: “We have to recognize that the Senegalese, African and Global civil 
society, although it entertains an unwavering discourse towards the World Bank, it has often 
failed to present viable alternatives.” 
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PLAN DU RAPPORT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Ouverture des travaux : mots d’ouverture 
2. Les travaux en plénière 
2.1. Exposé introductif 
2.2. Débats 
3. La restitution des travaux de groupe 
3.1. Les travaux du groupe 1 
3.2. Les travaux du groupe 2  
3.3. Les débats 
4. Clôture des travaux : les conclusions tirées et les recommandations 
 
Annexes  
1. Termes de référence de la journée 
2. Programme de la journée 
3. Liste des membres des groupes de travail 
4. Liste des participants 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Le 1er Avril 2005, s’est tenue au Centre Amadou Malick GAYE à Dakar, la journée de 
consultation nationale de la société civile sur les politiques et programmes de la Banque 
Mondiale au Sénégal. 
 
Cette journée initiée par le Conseil des Organisations Non gouvernementales d’Appui au 
Développement, dans la perspective de la rencontre prévue à Washington très 
prochainement , a regroupé bien des acteurs de la société civile nationale (voir liste en 
annexe)  venus de toutes les régions du Sénégal et du niveau national. 
- les femmes ; 
- les jeunes ; 
- les syndicats ; 
- les ONG ; 
- les handicapés ; 
- les chercheurs ; 
- les artistes. 
 
Les travaux présidés par Mme Woré SECK et M. Amadou DIOUF, Vice Présidents du 
CONGAD, en présence de la Direction Exécutive, se sont déroulés en plénière et en ateliers 
et ont permis d’enregistrer en une journée des résultats fort importants qui feront l’objet d’un 
suivi rigoureux dans la perspective de pouvoir mesurer les efforts qui seront déployés et les 
acquis qui seront enregistrés conséquemment. 
 
1. OUVERTURE DES TRAVAUX DE L’ATELIER : MOTS D’OUVERTURE 
 
A la suite de la mise en place des participants, Mme Woré SECK, Vice Présidente du 
CONGAD, après s’être félicitée de la présence effective de tous les acteurs de la société 
civile nationale ciblés pour cette rencontre, a tenu à rappeler le contexte de la dite journée. 
Selon Mme Wor   é SECK, il s’agit de débattre très largement et en profondeur  des 
politiques, projets/programmes mis en œuvre au Sénégal par la Banque Mondiale et de 
formuler des propositions concrètes et pertinentes allant dans le sens d’une meilleure prise en 
charge des préoccupations de la société civile par la Banque Mondiale. 
 
Mme Woré SECK n’a pas manqué dans ses propos préliminaires de fustiger la situation peu 
viable vécue présentement par les ONG contrairement aux Bureaux d’Etude plus privilégiés 
dans le cadre de la stratégie de faire-faire 
mise en œuvre à travers des projets/programmes financés par la Banque Mondiale ex : PNIR, 
AFDS, etc. 
 
A la suite de Mme Woré SECK, Mr Boubacar SECK, Responsable de la Communication, 
représentant le Directeur Exécutif (absent), a également rappelé qu’il s’agit d’un contexte 
particulier (la Banque Mondiale vient d’avoir un nouveau Directeur). En effet, pour M. 
SECK, la question à se poser est : comment réunir les conditions et possibilités d’un véritable 
partenariat avec les différents partenaires, en l’occurrence avec la Banque Mondiale ? 
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La réponse, selon lui, devrait surtout provenir de la capacité des participants à la journée à 
faire des propositions concrètes. 
 
A  la suite  des propos préliminaires, il y a eu un tour de table pour permettre une présentation 
individuelle des participants. Cela a permis de se connaître mutuellement et surtout de rendre 
plus chaleureux et plus amical le climat de travail. 
 
2. LES TRAVAUX EN PLENIERE 
 
2.1. Exposé introductif 
  
Après avoir adressé des remerciements aux participants et à l’équipe exécutive du CONGAD 
qui n’a ménagé aucun effort pour l’organisation de cette importante rencontre, Mr Amacodou 
DIOUF, Vice Président du CONGAD s’est arrêté sur l’absence de documentation de base 
pour préparer une telle rencontre. 
 
 Mais, néanmoins, selon Mr Amacodou DIOUF, « toute société civile africaine doit pouvoir 
se prononcer sur les activités de la Banque Mondiale ». Ensuite, il a rappelé l’existence du 
Comité ONG/BM, sa composition et la mission qui lui était assignée, à savoir « réfléchir sur 
les différentes politiques de la Banque Mondiale mises en application au Sénégal ». 
 
Mr DIOUF a par la suite insisté sur les objectifs de la rencontre qui consistent à examiner les 
expériences de la société civile dans ses relations avec la Banque Mondiale et de faire des 
propositions concrètes, mais aussi sur la notion de faire -faire introduite dans les mécanismes 
de participation des ONG à la mise en œuvre des programmes de la Banque Mondiale. 
 
Selon lui, la Banque Mondiale met en œuvre des programmes au Sénégal avec des 
financements minima de 8 millions de dollars (PDIS, PNIR, CNLS, PSAOP, Mobilité 
Urbaine, PST2, PAC/ADM, etc.). La Banque Mondiale a beaucoup insisté ces dernières 
années pour que la société civile soit impliquée dans la réflexion, l’exécution, le suivi, 
l’évaluation des projets/programmes. La question à se poser est de savoir « est-ce que cela est 
fait ou pas ? 
En effet, les discussions doivent tourner autour de cela. 
Mr DIOUF a salué l’émergence d’un lobby de jeunes spécialistes au sein de la Banque 
Mondiale ces dernières années, qui se bat pour l’introduction de nouvelles politiques à 
caractère social à la place des politiques orthodoxes qui ont montré partout leurs limites. 
 
La consultation nationale organisée au Sénégal est organisée également en Afrique du Sud, ce 
qui en fait une tâche lourde mais fascinante parce que ce sont les deux seuls pays en Afrique 
qui ont eu le privilège de préparer les documents en perspective de la rencontre de 
Washington. 
 
Par ailleurs, selon Mr DIOUF, il faut également saluer les consultations indirectes. 
(CONGAD/BM dans le cadre des missions d’évaluation des dix (10) ans de la Banque 
Mondiale) qui sont des mécanismes à appuyer dans le cadre du partenariat avec la Banque 
Mondiale. 
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Selon Mr DIOUF, même si on reconnaît qu’au sein du forum sénégalais, africain, mondial, la 
société civile a un discours tranchant vis-à-vis de la Banque Mondiale, il faut également 
reconnaître que l’une des faiblesses de cette société civile est son incapacité à faire des 
propositions alternatives pertinentes. 
 
La société civile nationale se doit de valoriser son implication dans des processus et 
s’efforcer à faire des propositions alternatives coordonnées et fort intéressantes : 
- processus DSRP ; 
- processus Convention de Cotonou avec Union Européenne/ACP ; 
- processus – politiques / programmes initiés par la Banque Mondiale ; 
- processus NEPAD ; 
- processus OMD ; 
- processus - concertation avec FMI ; 
- processus – Programme Lead Africa ; 
- processus MCA. 
 
Mr Amacodou DIOUF a poursuivi son exposé en se posant bien des questions. 
- est-ce que les programmes de la Banque Mondiale, les financements IDA doivent être 
conçus et exécutés tels que le gouvernement le veut ? ou doit-on tenir compte de la vision 
et des préoccupations de la société civile ? (fonds publics remboursables par le 
contribuable sénégalais) ; 
- doit-on travailler sur l’appui budgétaire ou sur l’appui programme (fonds mis dans un 
compte pour servir les populations à la base ? ; 
- comment la société civile peut influencer les politiques de la Banque Mondiale à travers 
le gouvernement  ? ; 
- la Banque Mondiale est-elle disposée à prendre en compte les observations de la société 
civile à l’endroit du DSRP ? ; 
- est-ce que la société civile nationale peut dire que les activités de la Banque Mondiale 
sont transparentes dans notre pays ? est-ce possible d’apprécier les pratiques à notre 
niveau ? ; 
- la Banque Mondiale doit-elle être comptable devant la société civile sénégalaise ? ; 
- sommes-nous capables d’interpréter les données fournies chaque année par la Banque 
Mondiale (publications annuelles de la Banque Mondiale) ?. 
 
Avant de terminer son exposé, Mr DIOUF a rappelé que le CONGAD a disposé ces deux 
dernières années d’un petit fonds de la Banque Mondiale pour financer deux à trois projets 
d’ONG/d’OCB, ce qui représente un élément de succès à souligner dans le cadre du 
partenariat. 
Par ailleurs, à la suite des interpellations sur la nécessité qui s’imposait d’organiser des 
ateliers régionaux avant la rencontre nationale, M. DIOUF a répondu qu’il s’est posé des 
problèmes de moyens et de temps mais que la pertinence des rencontres régionales est à 
reconnaître. 
 
Enfin, après avoir rappelé la rencontre tenue avec le Représentant résidant du FMI, en 
présence du Directeur des Opérations Afrique, il a souligné l’ouverture manifestée par cette 
institution réputée orthodoxe et l’impérieuse nécessité pour la société civile nationale de 
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poursuivre la concertation en dégageant des mécanismes de partenariat durables et en 
formulant des propositions concrètes dans ce sens. 
 
Mr DIOUF a, en outre, rappelé les résultats attendus de la journée. 
- indiquer les expériences sénégalaises en matière de partenariat entre la société civile et la 
Banque Mondiale ; 
- formuler des éléments de recommandations pour améliorer le dispositif de partenariat. 
 
2.2. Les débats 
 
A la suite de l’exposé introductif de Mr Amadou DIOUF, une liste est ouverte pour 
enregistrer les réactions. Plusieurs intervenants ont pris la parole et les débats ont surtout 
tourné autour des aspects suivants : 
- les remerciements à l’endroit des responsables du CONGAD pour avoir organisé une telle 
rencontre ; 
- la Banque Mondiale nous considère comme un partenaire crédible certes, mais est-ce que 
la société civile est méritante ? 
- la Banque Mondiale nous consulte, nous demande notre avis sur les programmes en 
exécution dans notre pays mais le problème c’est l’incapacité de la société civile à 
proposer des alternatives, à faire des critiques pertinentes et constructives. Il s’agit d’une 
lacune à corriger ; 
- la société civile sénégalaise en général, ne maîtrise pas tout le contenu du DSRP (seul une 
poignée d’individus est bien au fait des choses) ; 
- il fallait qu’il soit d’abord tenu des rencontres régionales avant la rencontre nationale ; 
- le feed-back (disponibilité du document) de la mission d’évaluation des dix (10) ans de la 
Banque Mondial ; 
- existe t - il un rapport à la suite de la rencontre nationale tenue sur l’impact des politiques 
de la Banque Mondiale ? ; 
- nous devons nous estimer heureux pour cette confiance de la Banque Mondiale et nous 
poser la question de savoir si la société civile sénégalaise a la même confiance et la même 
ouverture vis-à-vis de la Banque Mondiale ? ; 
- y a-t-il une synergie entre la consultation nationale organisée au Sénégal et celle 
organisée en Afrique du Sud ? ; 
- nous devons nous montrer très concrets pour pouvoir aboutir à des résultats satisfaisants ; 
- par rapport au DSRP, il y a une multitude d’acteurs de la société civile impliquée dans le 
processus, ce qui soulève des inquiétudes et des réserves. Il faut travailler à l’unité et pour 
cela avoir le courage de revoir les choses ; 
- il faut faire d’abord l’évaluation de l’action des acteurs de la société civile, en 
l’occurrence ceux impliqués dans la mise en œuvre des programmes de la Banque 
Mondiale . 
Des questions à se poser : « qu’est-ce que nous avons apporté à l’effort de santé » ? 
« qu’est-ce que le Réseau Santé, Sida et Population est devenu ? (créé en 1998 sur 
insistance de la Banque Mondiale). 
Le document de contractualisation existe dans le domaine de la santé :  « qu’est-ce que les 
ONG ont fait ou peuvent faire » ? 
Il faut réfléchir secteur par secteur et faire le bilan de l’action des ONG. Il  faut également 
reconnaître qu’il n’y a aucune capitalisation des interventions des acteurs de la société 
civile ; 
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- une importante masse d’argent est investie dans notre pays, il faut procéder à l’évaluation 
financière. Les dettes continuent d’augmenter  et à ce titre il faut manifester cette peur 
pour que les gens comprennent qu’on est entrain d’hypothéquer la vie des générations 
actuelles et futures ; 
- il faut faire attention à des propositions immatures. Il faut faire d’abord le point de ce qui 
est fait au Sénégal : projets porteurs, suivi et aboutissement des projets exécutés, projets 
envisagés, projets terminés ; 
- il faut se garder des propositions qui émanent de séminaires et non de la base : des 
rencontres de ce genre, on peut en organiser sans recourir à des moyens importants (tout 
juste une salle) ; 
- il y a une autocritique à faire pour extirper les tares et insuffisances qui font que nous 
sommes de moins en moins respectés par nos partenaires. Les coordonnateurs des projets, 
les agents d’exécution, ce sont les sénégalais. A terme, on risque de perdre toute 
crédibilité parce que souvent on donne l’impression de ne pas être soucieux de l’atteinte 
des résultats consignés dans les documents contractuels à travers la stratégie du faire-
faire. Par ailleurs, nous devons nous poser des questions sur : 
- les formats des projets ; 
- la façon dont les projets sont négociés ; 
- la façon dont les projets sont exécutés. 
    Une demi-journée est peu suffisante pour abattre tout le travail demandé ; 
- peut-on avoir un partenariat viable et durable avec la Banque Mondiale si on sait qu’au 
sein de la société civile le partenariat souhaité n’existe pas ? Dans la dynamique du 
DSRP, il y a une concurrence entre acteurs de la société civile ; 
- les pratiques de faire-faire et d’agence d’exécution sont à revoir ; 
- quel est le vrai discours à tenir vis-à-vis de la Banque Mondiale ? ; 
- la société civile sénégalaise doit être impliquée en amont et en aval dans la gestion des 
programmes de la Banque Mondiale ; 
- la politique définie par la Banque Mondiale dure dix (10) ans, ce qui démontre qu’elle 
n’est pas facilement changeable quelque soit le discours tenu ou la pression exercée ;  
- les financements de la Banque Mondiale, ce sont des prêts que le contribuable sénégalais 
doit rembourser ; 
- nous devons continuer à enregistrer des réactions vives de la part de la société civile pour 
que les attitudes de la Banque Mondiale et du FMI puissent changer à la faveur des 
orientations sociales souhaitées ; 
- les élus locaux et le secteur privé sont des acteurs de la société civile et à cet effet, il faut 
absolument arriver à les avoir à nos côtés dans le cadre de la poursuite de cette 
dynamique enclenchée. 
- dans le cadre des négociations gouvernement/Banque Mondiale, la société civile est 
toujours écartée, ce qui est à fustiger ; 
- il y a une société civile qui ne s’intéresse qu’à l’augmentation des salaires (cas des 
syndicats de travailleurs). Il faut aller dans le sens de dire voilà « comment il faut gérer ce 
pays ». Les préoccupations des populations sont-elle bien prises en compte ? Les ONG 
doivent jour le rôle de sentinelle et d’alerte ; 
- de par l’incompréhension du gouvernement, des projets sont souvent bloqués ex : projet 
de 15 milliards pour appuyer la musique au Sénégal ; 
- nous ne sommes pas des partenaires de la Banque Mondiale, sinon des invités. Il n’existe 
pas de cadre formel et direct de dialogue entre nous et la Banque Mondiale. 
A la suite des débats forts enrichissants, Mme Woré SECK a tenu à expliquer la non tenue de 
rencontres régionales par manque de temps et de moyens et a fait remarquer que sept cellules 
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régionales sont représentées et les personnes présentes sont bien au fait des programmes mis 
en œuvre la Banque Mondiale et du processus du DSRP. 
 
 Mr. Amacodou DIOUF a magnifié l’opportunité de la rencontre qui est une première au 
Sénégal offrant l’occasion de critiquer et de faire des propositions. 
 
 Il a en outre indiqué qu’il y a des secteurs essentiels au Sénégal et qui ne sont pas touchés 
par les crédits de la Banque Mondiale ex- la culture, la musique etc. 
 
Pour Mr DIOUF, il y a lieu de capaciter les acteurs de la société civile pour qu’ils soient en 
mesure de tenir le discours qu’il faut vis-à-vis de la Banque Mondiale, d’interpréter et de 
populariser les mécanismes d’intervention de la Banque Mondiale. 
 
Très souvent, pour la plupart des dynamiques et processus (OMD, DSRP, MCA, etc…), c’est 
seulement la superstructure qui comprend mais les autres ne comprennent rien , ne maîtrisent 
rien. 
 
Il est difficile de s’autocritiquer si l’on ne connaît pas le message qu’il faut développer pour 
cette autocritique. 
Si on est agence d’exécution technique de la Banque Mondiale, on accepte la politique de la 
Banque Mondiale et partant on devient un élément de plaidoyer de cette politique. 
 
En effet, selon Mr Amacodou DIOUF, l’intérêt est d’élargir le débat aux différents régions du 
Sénégal, aux différents sensibilités. 
 
Quant à la mission d’évaluation des dix (10) ans de la Banque Mondiale, c’est certain qu’un 
feed-back sera fait et si le document n’est pas volumineux (analyse pays) tout le monde en 
sera informé. 
 
Pour Mr DIOUF, des rencontres de ce genre intéressent également la BAD et en réponse à 
d’autres interpellations, il dira que : 
- il est tout à fait disposé à se rendre auprès du CNJS pour faire un exposé sur les 
mécanismes de la Banque Mondiale ; 
- le CONGAD a exigé une Assemblée Générale du RESSIP mais hélas. Les acteurs 
impliqués dans le RESSIP  doivent prendre leurs responsabilités pour que les choses 
marchent ; 
- il y a la pression mondiale pour amener la Banque Mondiale à changer de façon de faire ; 
- il ne s’agit pas non plus d’être nihiliste mais de pouvoir reconnaître que des progrès 
tangibles sont entrain d’être faits par la Banque Mondiale dans le sens de la promotion de 
programmes sociaux (Initiative PPTE) ; 
- le DSRP, ce n’est pas seulement la Banque Mondiale, il y a d’autres bailleurs de fonds. 
Par ailleurs, l’unité recherchée dépend de notre bonne volonté, nous acteurs de la société 
civile nationale. 
- il faut atténuer les critiques, car il y a des exercices participatifs quelques parts, ex : 
PDEF, DSRP etc. 
 
A la suite des débats et échanges en plénière, deux groupes de travail ne sont constitués et ont 
travaillé pendant au moins trois heures de temps en atelier 
 
3. LA RESTITUTION DES TRAVAUX DES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL 
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3.1. Les travaux du groupe 1-: thème : mécanismes société civile – Banque Mondiale 
(voir liste en annexe). 
 
AXE1 : synthèse du diagnostic 
 
L’atelier considère que dans la relation Banque Mondiale ONG, il existe plusieurs cadres de 
concertation et des mécanismes de collaboration  pouvant nous offrir l’opportunité d’un 
nouveau partenariat prenant en compte l’intérêt des populations et de nos structures. 
 
Concernant l’évaluation globale des mécanismes de la collaboration autour d’une vision et 
d’expériences vécues, l’atelier considère que le contexte de mise en œuvre de l'initiative 
PPTE avec différents processus comme le DSRP, le NEPAD, l’accord de Cotonou , etc. 
orientés vers la réalisation des OMD requiert une réflexion  approfondie et harmonisée du 
côté des acteurs non gouvernementaux en vue d’améliorer leur impact sur le développement 
national. 
 
L’atelier considère que le système de partenariat actuellement en vigueur marginalise les 
organisations de la société civile (OSC) qui occupent la positon d’exécutant. C’est pourquoi, 
les OSC doivent réinterroger leurs rôles et leurs places dans les mécanismes généraux de 
partenariat en vue d’inverser la tendance. Il y a eu des acquis et des insuffisances dont le 
premier diagnostic qui reste encore général mérite d’être approfondi à d’autres échéances.  
Les acquis enregistrés dans la gestion de la dimension sociale dans les programmes en cours, 
résultent de la pression des OSC.  
 
Il existe de nombreux possibilités d’agir pour infléchir les relents d’orthodoxie de la Banque 
Mondiale car la société civile est loin d’avoir épuisé sa capacité de proactivité comme force 
de proposition. 
D’autres acquis peuvent être comptabilisés en termes de participation aux différents exercices 
dans l’élaboration de documents stratégiques (PRN, PDEF…). 
  
Il faut relever par ailleurs les dysfonctionnements dans la démarche des OSC qui limitent les 
chances de mise en œuvre en vue d’un partenariat durable et dynamique : 
- problème d’éthique découlant de l’attitude concurrentielle des OSC ;  
- précipitation dans la soumission des offres techniques ; 
- attitudes peu ou faiblement critiques sur les positions du gouvernement lors des 
négociations portant sur les mécanismes de financement et le cadrage des politiques ; 
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- les faiblesses en suivi / évaluation  
- faiblesses en renforcement des capacités  
 
AXE 2 : recommandations 
 
- renforcer la coopération technique, la concertation et la mise en réseau pour harmoniser 
l’intervention dans les rapports de coopération avec le gouvernement et la Banque 
Mondiale ; 
- assurer le suivi en termes de gestion de l’existant (plan d’action, plates-formes de la 
société civile ONG) concernant les différents projets de partenariat entre société civile – 
Gouvernement – Banque Mondiale ; 
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- promouvoir des programmes indicatifs nationaux et des projets qui associent la société 
civile à toutes les phases : identification des besoins ou  conception, mise en œuvre et 
suivi – évaluation ; 
- promouvoir l’éthique et la déontologie dans la gestion des projets et programmes, 
l’utilisation des fonds et l’évaluation contradictoire des projets et programmes ; 
- mettre en place une coalition forte de la société civile chargée de suivre et d’évaluer 
spécifiquement les projets et programmes de la  Banque Mondiale. 
 
3.2. Les travaux du groupe 2 : position de la société civile sur les politiques / 
programmes / projets de la Banque Mondiale  au Sénégal 
 
1. Constats : 
- les OSC ne cautionnent pas la plupart des politiques passées de la Banque 
Mondiale ; 
- pas d’impacts sociaux positifs des politiques, programmes et projets de la Banque 
Mondiale ; 
- la société civile ne participe pas de façon pleine et effective à l’élaboration des 
politiques, programmes et projets. 
 
2. Recommandations générales 
Promouvoir et développer des possibilités de participation à la mise en œuvre de certains 
programmes : 
- qui seraient plus bénéfiques aux populations ; 
- qui contribueraient à renforcer les capacités des acteurs ; 
- qui permettraient de veiller à une meilleure utilisation des fonds par les pouvoirs publics. 
  
3. Recommandations pour une participation efficace des OSC. 
- refus de servir de faire-valoir ; 
- renforcement des capacités ; 
- systématisation et capitalisation des expériences (OSC) ; 
- évaluation de l’impact social des politiques, programmes, projets de la Banque Mondiale ; 
- mise en place d’un cadre opérationnel et dynamique de concertation au sein du 
CONGAD ; 
- diagnostic participatif de l’impact social des politiques et programmes de la Banque 
Mondiale au Sénégal ; 
-  meilleure prise en charge de l’information et de la sensibilisation des populations par la 
Banque Mondiale ;  
- transparence dans la prise des décisions ;  
- participation effective en amont (élaboration des politiques nationales) et en aval 
(contrôle) ;  
- meilleur positionnement des OSC en tant que interlocutrices de la Banque Mondiale. 
 
3.3.  Les débats 
A la suite des restitutions des travaux de groupes, quelques réactions sont enregistrées et ont 
surtout porté sur : 
- les recoupements existant s entre les deux groupes ;  
- la nécessité d’atténuer certains critiques et de revoir certains termes utilisés ex « refus de 
servir de faire-valoir » ; 
- le fait de reconnaître que les OSC sont victimes de leur diversité : source des difficultés 
pour enclencher des dynamiques unitaires ;  
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- la nécessité de formaliser le cadre de suivi des recommandations formulées (comment le 
rapport va parvenir aux uns et aux autres ? comment le rapport va être suivi ? comment 
les OSC doivent se comporter dans l’avenir ?) ; 
- le nécessité d’ajouter dans le cadre de la meilleure prise en compte de l’impact social , 
« le respect des normes fondamentales de travail » ; 
- le fait qu’une communauté ne peut pas se développer si elle ne fonde pas sur des 
exigences (remembrement) ; 
- le fait qu’il y a plus de questions posées que de réponses concrètes apportées . 
 
 
4. CLOTURE DES TRAVAUX : CONCLUSIONS TIREES ET 
RECOMMANDATIONS 
 
En clôturant les travaux, Mr Amacodou DIOUF a tenu à présenter d’abord les excuses de 
Woré SECK empêchée, avant de souligner que l’exercice de la journée est une façon de tester 
la rapidité de réaction de la société civile sénégalaise. 
 
Pour lui, les résultats enregistrés sont très importants, traduisent la position de la société 
civile sénégalaise et peuvent être brandis partout. 
 
La consultation d’aujourd’hui n’est pas du tout peine perdre et que tous les éléments 
ressortis des ateliers et des travaux en plénière sont à perdre en compte. Ils vont servir 
de situation de référence (aspect pédagogique de la chose). 
 
Un cadre permanent de réflexion autour des politiques/programmes/projets de la Banque 
Mondiale est créé et il va constituer une force de propositions.  
 
Autres aspects soulignés, c’est que si le gouvernement parle de faire-faire et les OSC parlent 
de faire valoir, cela veut dire qu’il y a une autre bataille qui est nationale. 
 
Après avoir fustigé les facteurs suggestifs qui concourent  souvent à l’élimination de certains 
ONG dans l’exécution des programmes de la Banque Mondiale, Mr Amacodou DIOUF a 
préconisé la création d’un véritable comité de liaison pour faciliter les relations Banque 
Mondiale / Société Civile. 
Selon Mr Amacodou DIOUF, faute de moyens, la société civile sénégalaise n’est pas certaine 
d’être représentée à la rencontre de Washington mais des initiatives seront prises dans ce 
sens. 
 
En outre, les relations secteur privé / société civile doivent être promues et développées , 
selon Mr DIOUF. 
 
Après avoir exprimé toute sa satisfaction par rapport aux résultats atteints, Mr DIOUF a 
remercié les participants au nom du Conseil d’Administration et de la Direction Exécutive du 
CONGAD pour les efforts qui ont été déployés. 
Il a invité les participants à développer des initiatives pareilles en direction d’autres 
partenaires et d’autres programmes (OMD, NEPAD, Lead Africa, MCA). 
En ces termes, il a déclaré clos les travaux de la journée de consultation nationale sur les 
politiques et programmes de la Banque Mondiale au Sénégal. 
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CONTEXTE ET JUSTIFICATION 
 
Depuis plusieurs décennies, la Banque Mondiale apporte son concours multiforme dans le 
financement du développement de notre pays. Les actions de la Banque ont suscité plusieurs 
réactions des populations, de la société civile en général ainsi que de secteurs importants du 
gouvernement en place. 
 
 Les différentes politiques initiées par la Banque ont été à l’origine de nombreuses critiques 
parce que dépouillées d’une dimension sociale dans leur mise en œuvre, voire dans leur 
conceptualisation. 
 
Les relations entre la Banque et les ONG ont connu des frottements sincères afin d’aboutir à 
une collaboration constructive et à un partage d’idées riches partant d’un souci commun de 
développement du pays. 
 
Ainsi, plusieurs mécanismes de collaboration et de travail ont été pensés afin de trouver un 
cadre adéquat d’échanges avec les fonctionnaires et autres autorités de la Banque Mondiale 
dans le but de rendre régulières les consultations et discussions avec les acteurs de 
développement national autour des politiques de cette dernière. 
 
Plusieurs rencontres avec des missions de la Banque ont été tenues dans le cadre de la revue 
des programmes et dans le cadre des évaluations. 
 
Ce phénomène s’est accentué depuis que le gouvernement de la République du Sénégal a 
initié une stratégie nationale de lutte contre la pauvreté en se fondant sur des mécanismes 
nationaux de création de richesse, de renforcement des capacités, de la promotion des 
services sociaux de base et de l’amélioration des conditions de vie des groupes vulnérables.  
  
Mais en même temps, en rapport avec la communauté internationale, le Sénégal développe 
des partenariats afin de réaliser les objectifs définis par le NEPAD, le PNUD à travers les 
Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire (OMD), et les autres Partenaires de la coopération 
bilatérale. 
 
Ces initiatives requièrent une réflexion approfondie et harmonisée du côté des acteurs non 
gouvernementaux afin d’améliorer leur impact sur le développement national. Cela justifie la 
mise en place d’un cadre national « Société Civile » disposant d’une force d’analyse et de 
proposition vis-à-vis des politiques de la Banque au Sénégal afin d’améliorer le niveau de 
notre participation lors de l’examen des orientations de la Banque Mondiale en direction de 
notre pays. 
 
TERMES DE REFERENCES 
DE LA JOURNEE DE CONSULTATION NATIONALE DE LA SOCIETE 
CIVILE SUR LES ACTIVITES DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE 
AU SENEGAL 
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L’organisation de la journée de consultation nationale autour des politiques et programmes de 
la Banque Mondiale au Sénégal complète les mécanismes de concertation existants entre la 
Banque et les ONG, mais aussi permet à la Société civile nationale de joindre celle des autres 
pays africains dans la cadre d’un dialogue mondial « Banque Mondiale – Société civile / 
ONG ». 
 
La présente Journée de consultation nationale de la Société civile, notamment des ONG, 
porte sur un examen détaillé des activités de la Banque Mondiale au Sénégal dans une 
perspective de propositions de politiques vis-à-vis  des populations, des gouvernements et des 
organisations de la société civile. Elle entre dans le cadre de la préparation de la rencontre 
périodique mondiale entre « la banque Mondiale et les ONG ». 
 
OBJECTIFS DE LA CONSULTATION 
 
L’objectif principal de la journée de consultation nationale porte sur la production d’un 
large point de vue de la société nationale sur les politiques de la Banque Mondiale au 
Sénégal. 
 
Les objectifs spécifiques visés portent sur : 
a- échanger autour des politiques et programmes financés par la Banque Mondiale au 
Sénégal ; 
b- donner un point de vue de la société civile nationale sur les politiques de la Banque 
Mondiale dans le pays ; 
c- proposer des recommandations, critiques et suggestions dans un rapport national issu de 
cette consultation. 
DESCRIPTION DE LA JOURNEE 
 
La consultation nationale porte essentiellement sur la réunion de toutes les composantes de la 
société civile nationale (ONG, Syndicats, OCB, etc.) pour formuler un point de vue sur les 
activités de la Banque Mondiale au Sénégal et ses relations vis-à-vis de la société civile et 
particulièrement des ONG. 
 
Types d’activités : 
 
Les activités prévues à cet effet porte sur : 
a- la tenue d’une journée nationale de consultation de la société civile autour des politiques 
de la Banque Mondiale au Sénégal ; 
b- la production du rapport national de la société civile sur les politiques de la Banque 
Mondiale au Sénégal . 
 
Cibles : 
Les représentants de la Société Civile Nationale (ONG, Syndicats, OCB) 
 
Lieu : 
 
Centre Amadou Malick GAYE (Ex Centre de Bopp Dakar-Quartier de Bopp) Dakar
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CONSULTATIONALE DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE SUR LES POLITIQUES ET 
PROGRAMMES DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE AU SENEGAL  
 
Centre Amadou Malick GAYE, 1er Avril 2005 
 
 
PROGRAMME 
 
9 H 00 – 9 H 30  : Mise en place des participants (tes) 
 
9 H 30 – 9 H 40  : Mot d’ouverture des représentants du CONGAD 
 
9 H 40 – 9 H 55  : Présentation des participants (tes) 
 
9 H 55 – 10 H 25  : Exposé introductif  
par Amacodou DIOUF 
 
 
10 H 25 – 10 H 45 : Discussions/échanges 
 
10 H 45 – 11 H 00 :  Pause – café 
 
11 H 00 – 14 h 00 :  Travaux de groupes 
 
14 H 00 – 15 H 30 :  Pause – Déjeuner 
 
15 H 30 – 16 H 30 :  Restitution des travaux de groupes 
 
16 H 30 – 17 H:           Synthèse et clôture de la rencontre 
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GROUPES DE TRAVAIL 
 
Atelier 1 :  Mécanismes de partenariat Société Civile et Banque Mondiale 
 
Atelier 2 :  Position de la Société Civile sur les politiques et programmes de la Banque 
Mondiale au Sénégal 
 
 
ATELIER 1 
 
Mécanismes de partenariat 
Société civile et Banque Mondiale 
 
LISTE DES MEMBRE ATELIER I 
 
PRENOMS / NOM STRUCTURES 
Hady     GUEYE 
Abdou Aziz   DIALLO 
Fatou Kiné   NIANG 
Raky Chaupin  MANGOU 
Mohamed Habib  SARR 
Samba   THIABE  
Sarrany    BODIAN 
Guissé   PENE 
 
Cheikh Tidiane   ATHIE 
Moussa    MBALLO 
Oumar    DIOP 
Hamidou Aboubacry DIALLO 
Cheikh Tidiane  SARR 
UNSAS 
CSA 
CRJS Kaolack 
Réseau Siggil Jigeen  
Conseil National de la Jeunesse 
ADEF/AFRIQUE  
CCF SENEGAL 
Association des Métiers de la Musique du 
Sénégal (A.M.S) 
ACDEV 
ONG « 7a » Maarewu Kolda  
Handicap Form Educ  
CERFLA 
Enda TM / Ecopop 
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LISTE DES MEMBRES ATELIER II 
 
PRENOMS   NOM STRUCTURE EMAIL/TEL. 
1- BIRAME   DIOUF  
2- Thierno Ismaïla  GOUDIABY 
3- Ousmane   BASSE 
4- El Hadji   GAYE 
5- Abdoulaye  GAYE 
6- Ousmane   NDOUR 
7- Mariane   COULIBALY 
8- Bassirou   DIALLO 
9- Cheikh T.   ATHIE 
10- El Saïd   BOCOUM 
11- Mâr Cathy  DIENG 
12- MAMOUR  NDIAYE 
13- Papa Samba  MBENGUE 
14- Moussa   MBALLO 
15- Abdoulaye  SENE 
16- Landing   BADJI 
17- Alassane   DIALLO 
18- Ndèye Maly  NDOYE 
19- Demba Moussa  DEMBELE 
RED/CONGAD 
FAFS 
CARAF  
FAFD 
UDEN / DSRP/ UNCA 
Cellule régionale FK 
RADI 
ACAPES/Sénégal 
ACDEV  
CR / Diourbel  
CRES 
Radi Kaolack (Congad) 
Cellule Régionale de Louga 
Cellule Régional de Kolda  
UNSAS 
FONGS / C. Rég. Congad Zig. 
CR / Thiès 
USE 
bdioufbay@yahoofr 
fafsnationale@yyahoo.fr 
caraf@sentoosn  
Tél. : 966.92.40 
blgaye@yahoo.fr 
ondour2000@yahoo.fr 
radi@sentoo.sn contact@radi-africaine.org 
acapus@sentoo.sn 
acdev@sentoo.sn 
apdj@sentoo.sn 
macassy@yahoo.fr 
 
mourndiaye2005@yahoo.fr 961.32.95-
518.94.95 
 
967.45.07 / 652.61.26 acacia-
louga@sentoo.sn 
572.04.73 / 997.10.83 
ablayesene@yahoo.fr 824.26.30 – 
693.38.62 
fondszig@sentoo.sn 991.25.37/512.02.40 
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FSS 591.20.60 assanediallofr@yahoo.fr 
use@sentoo.sn 
forumafricain@yahoo.fr  
 
FEUILLE  DE  PRESENCE 
 
N° NOM ET PRENOM ORGANISATION ADRESSE TEL. EMAIL 
1 Mariane COULIBALY RADI BP 12 085 / Colobane Dakar 825.75.33  824.28.57 
radi@sentoo.sn 
contact@radi-
afrique.org 
2 Woré  SECK GREEN Sénégal BP 119 Thiès 951.68.30 Greensénégalsentoo.sn 
3 Fatou Kiné NIANG CRSS BP 1413 Kaolack 590.68.46 fatanore@yahoo.fr 
4 Mamour  NGALANE Consultant / RED Liberté 5 A Villa 5345 L 659.16.19 mngalane@hotmail.co
m 
5 Sarrany  BODIAN CCF – Sénégal Villa 3081, Sicap Amitié I Avenue Bourguiba 
865.20.21 
865.20.48 
ccfdakar@sentoo.sn 
srsen.ccf@sentoo.sn 
6 Raky Chaupin  MANGOU Réseau Siggil Jigeen Castors / Derklé  Cité Asecna N° 16 
825.00.56 
505.05.40 
sjigeen@sentoo.sn 
rakyc@yahoo.fr 
7 Mohamed Habib SARR Conseil National de la Jeunesse du Sénégal 
CCNJS 
BP 21 876 590.68.46 
mohabib20012000@ya
hoo.fr 
8 Samba   THIARE ADEF/Afrique Liberté I 682.21.49 824.90.91  
9 Ndèye Maly NDOYE USE Centre Ahmadou Malick GAYE (ex centre de Bopp) 824.67.96 use@sentoo.sn 
10 Guissé  PENE A.M.S 
Villa n° 210 HLM Fass ou 
Manooré FM Sicap Liberté 3 
Dakar 
515.00.68 spene1@hotmail.com 
11 Cheikh Tidiane ATHIE ACDEY CR, Cité Lobatt Fall Pikine,  BP K 5049 834.65.98 acdev@sentoo.sn 
Appendix C: Consultation Notes 
 146 
12 Bassirou  DIALLO ACDPED / Sénégal PAV 20 BP 3432 879.20.20 835.10.66 Acapes@sentoo.sn 
13 Moussa  MBALLO ONG « 7a » Maarewu Kolda 
996.10.83 
572.04.73 Sikilo Kolda  572.04.73 mballo_spapryahoo.fr 
14 Papa Samba  MBENGUE Cellule Régionale CONGAD / Louga  
Quartier Montagne Nord à 
Louga BP 455  
967.45.07 
652.61.26 acacia-louga@sentoo.sn 
15 Alassane  DIALLO Cellule Régionale du CONGAD / Thiès  
GREEN / Sénégal  
HLM Qté de Dakar-Thiès  
591.20.60 
951.68.30 
assanediallo.fr@yahoo.
fr 
greensenegal@sentoo.s
n 
16 Thierno Ismaïla GOUDIABY FAFS Sicap Ryland Sacré Cœur 3 VDN Cité Bakary 2 
827.22.54 
542.01.10 fafsnationale@yahoo.fr 
17 Abdoulaye  SENE UNSAS Derklé ex : Clinique Ablaye SECK 
824.26.30 
693.38.62 ablayesene@yahoo.fr 
18 Landing  BADJI 
Cellule Régionale 
CONGAD-FONDS 
Ziguinchor  
BP 920 Ziguinchor 991.25.37 512.02.40 fongszig@sentoo.sn 
19 Abdoulaye  GAYE Collectif / DSRP  Basé au CONGAD 
Derklé Villa N° 2 
Rue  13 x Q 
825.32.61 
554.49.92 
udem@sentoo.sn 
blgaye@yahoo.fr 
20 El Hadji Djiby  GAYE FAFD Agnam Thiodaye  Région de Matam 966.92.40  
21 El Hadji Saïd  BOCOUM
  
CR / Diourbel Thierno Kandji BP 111 Diourbel 
971.17.16 
652.07.23 
apdj@sentoo.sn 
elsaidbocum@yahoo.fr 
22 Ousmane  NDOUR  Cellule Régionale Fatick Qt Darou Salam BP 97 Fatick 949.13.58 641.36.22 
ondour2000@yahoo.fr 
feres.org@voilà.fr 
23 Mamour NDIAYE RADI Kaolack BP 365 Kaolack 941.32.95 518.94.95 
mourndiaye2005@yaho
o.fr 
24 Mâr Cathy (Mme) DIENG 
CRES Centre de 
Recherche Economiques & 
Sociales 
Annexe Im. ITECOM,    
Gueule Tapée – Dakar Sénégal 
Tél/ 
fax : 42.85.94 
(Bureau) 
macassy@yahoo.fr 
25 Boubacar  SECK CONGAD    
26 Yaya   NDIAYE Ajed / CONGAD 8 BP 12 035 Dakar 835.03.20 Ajed@sentoo.sn 
27 Hady   GUEYE UNSAS Derklé villa n° 2 Rue 13 x Q 694.21.05 ouden@sentoo.sn 
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28 Ousmane  BASSE CARAF Cité Nations Unies – Villa      
n° 225 
835.06.61 
588.50.10 
531.72.13 
caraf@sentoo.sn 
ongcaraf@hotmail.com 
oussoubass@yahoo.fr 
29 Oumar   DIOP Handicap Formeduc Sicap Liberté 6 – Villa n° 6018 867.17.05 687.64.11 
oumoudioplife@yahoo.
fr 
30 Birame  DIOUF RED / CONGAD Sacré Cœur III 824.41.16 528.75.59 bdioufbay@yahoo.fr 
31 Cheikh Tidiane SARR Enda TM / Ecopop Sacré Cœur II Villa n° 8609 D 644.82.81 632.10.21 
ecopop@enda.sn 
cheikhsarr@hotmail.co
m 
32 Mamadou NIANG RADI RADDHO 694.55.68  
33 Mignane DIOUF FSS Senegalfocumeyahoo.fr s/com GAD 632.67.80 senegalfoum@yahoo.fr 
34 Mme DIALLO Ndèye Fatou CONGAD Sicap Sacré Cœur III  Villa n° 114 824.41.10  
35 Ibrahima  KANE CONGAD CONGAD   
36 Hamidou Aboubacry DIALLO CERFLA  Résidence Les Dunes N° 1414 832.27.86  605.02.50 cerfla@sentoo.sn 
37 Abdoul Aziz DIALLO CSA Cité SOPRIM 835.09.51 681.21.32 dialazz@yahoo.fr 
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Ugandan CSOs Consult on World Bank- Civil Society Engagement  
 
1st March 2005 
 
 
Background 
 
Uganda National NGO Forum convened a Civil Society consultation on the 1st March 2005 to 
discuss the extent to which civil society has found the World Bank consultative processes 
meaningful, worthwhile and effective in influencing World Bank’s policies, operations and its 
governance structure. Participants were selected from a wide range of experiences of their 
organisations in past or present engagements with the World Bank. Some of this engagement 
has been direct and some has been indirect as those which work on poverty-related policies and 
monitoring issues inevitably have to confront World Bank related policies. A cross section of the 
CSOs which attended the consultation reveals the following spread; 
o Sectoral - health (Uganda National Heath Consumers Organisation [UNHCO] ) 
o Environment (Advocates Coalition for Environment and Development [ACODE], 
Uganda Environment Education Forum [UEEF], Environmental Alert, Uganda Coalition 
for Sustainable Development [UCSD] etc) 
o Children and youth (Uganda Child Rights NGO Network [UCRNN] and Save the 
Children in Uganda) 
o Disability (National Union of Disabled People of Uganda [NUDIPU]) 
o Debt Relief Campaigns (Uganda Debt Network) 
o District CSO representatives (Gulu NGO Forum, NGO Forum – Kayunga, and Life 
Concern Nebbi) 
o International NGOs (Concern World Wide and Save the Children in Uganda ) 
o Trade Unions (National Organisation of Trade Unions [NOTU]) 
o Civil Society apex/network organisations (Uganda National NGO Forum) 
o Civil society think tanks and Research Organisations (Development Research and 
Training [DRT], Advocates Coalition for Environment and Development [ACODE], 
Kabarole Research Centre [KRC].) 
 
The following are the outcomes of the consultation which are to inform a Joint Facilitation 
Committee’s report at the forth-coming World Bank-Civil Society Global Policy Forum 
scheduled for April 2005.  
 
Previous and Ongoing Processes of Civil Society Engagement with the World Bank 
Most of the experience of Ugandan CSOs fall under the rubrics of critical engagement (such as 
on debt, independent evaluations of World Bank supported projects etc.) and ‘full engagement’ 
(Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers [PRSPs], participation in the World Bank Funded Northern 
Uganda Social Action Fund [NUSAF], SAPRI, and other World Bank supported projects and 
initiatives). 
 
Issues Arising from CSO Engagement with the WB 
 
A. POSITIVE EXPERIENCES 
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1) Changing for the Better 
CSOs at the consultation feel that there have been positive changes in the way the Bank 
relates with CSOs and much of this can be traced from the coming into office of James 
Wolfenson as President of the Bank, and the launching of the Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) as well as introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) 
as frameworks for macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote 
growth and reduce poverty. CSOs recalled how in his first visit to Uganda, Mr. Wolfenson 
sought out and met with CSO representatives and was perceived as being very keen to 
listen to what they had to say.  When told that time was up and he had to go to meet the 
Minister of Finance, he is reported to have said that “I have to listen to CSOs have to say 
and I will not leave until they are done”.  
 
2) The Role of Individual Bank Staff 
One of the Bank’s assets identified by CSOs is a team of well informed and professional staff 
who at a personal level are highly appreciative of civil society contribution. This is 
particularly in reference the Participation and Civic Engagement Group at the Bank 
Headquarters in Washington and the Social Development Advisors/NGO Liaison Officers 
and some Country Directors at the Country Offices. In particular, James Adams in his 
tenure as the Bank’s Country Director for Uganda and Tanzania (1998-2002) played a key 
role in improving the relationship between the Bank, civil society and the Uganda 
government.  At least CSOs at the consultative meeting indicated that their engagement was 
motivated and facilitated by personal contacts with influential Bank staff, both at Country 
Offices and in Washington who knew what their organisations are capable of. 
 
3) The Bank and Participation 
The World Bank’s adoption of key concepts propounded by civil society, including the very 
concept of participation/civic engagement, in particular its support for Participatory 
Poverty Assessments (PPAs) and other participation aspects of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
papers (PRSPs) have gone a long way in building confidence and trust between the Bank 
and civil society. The support for CSOs to participate in key national policy forums such as 
the donor-Government annual meetings (the Consultative (CG) meetings), Public 
Expenditure Reviews, and invitations to annual meetings of the World Bank B as well as 
special events usually around PRSPs were considered positively by CSOs. So was the 
publication of WB documents on the internet and the InfoShop. While CSOs recognised that 
this is not accessible to as many CSOs as they would like, it is a good first step towards 
getting key WB documents into the public domain. 
 
4) From Ostracisation to Full Engagement – The NOTU Experience 
The National Organisation of Trade Unions in Uganda (NOTU) shared its experience of a 
journey that has moved from  ostracisation where the organisation would not be invited to 
any official discussions either by the Bank or the Government of Uganda particularly at the 
at the height of the much hated austere economic reform processes of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s that focused on all the things that trade unions stand against i.e. privatisation, 
retrenchment, anti-collective bargaining all of which resulted in many workers’ rights being 
violated i.e. no discussion on minimum wages was allowed, to tentative engagement and 
now to full engagement (see text box below). 
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5) The Bank Appoints an Advisor on Disability 
Persons with disabilities highlighted the fact the Bank since 2002 has appointed a special 
Advisor on Disability which has started the process of mainstreaming disability into Bank 
operations.  
 
B. KEY CHALLENGES 
 
1) Fusion that has led to Confusion  
CSOs reported how they are sometimes baffled when they are dealing with the Bank and when 
the Government of Uganda. Even when they know Government sometimes holds different 
views from those of the Bank; officially these views are fused with those of the Bank to the 
extent that it becomes impossible to distinguish what is the Government’s position and what is 
the Bank’s position. It was also noted that on several occasions the Bank avoids taking a public 
stand by hiding behind the Government on issues that CSOs think it should own up and take 
responsibility. By knowing the power dynamics, it is not difficult to tell whose positions these 
official statements reflect. For example, civil society has found it very difficult to get any 
opinion and also access information from the Bank regarding the successor to the Nutrition and 
Early Child Hood Development Project. The Bank keeps on referring civil society to the 
Government. Given that the Bank is a key stakeholder in all Bank-funded projects, CSOs asked 
‘who is fooling who’? 
 
2) Closed Spaces  and Secret Dealings  
Civil society organisations noted that despite the apparent opening up to civil society by the 
Bank, there are spaces that are still considered a ‘no-go’ area for civil society. It is not clear for 
example why the World Bank is very reluctant to invite civil society to participate and engage 
fully in key bank policy processes such as the Country Assistance Strategies despite the rhetoric 
suggesting the opposite. It was also noted when dealing with civil society, the Bank sometimes 
uses delaying tactics until such a time when the Bank says ‘we have moved on’ because the 
issue is no longer relevant and has been overtaken by events. A case in point is the highly-billed 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) process that started as a tripartite 
one between Government, civil society and the Bank. Once it became clear that the findings 
Tracing the Evolution of NOTU’s Engagement with the World Bank 
NOTU’s main focus is on implementing ILO Conventions, promoting social security and 
advocating on areas that affect labour. Prior to 1996, the World Bank and therefore the 
Government of Uganda did not believe in the fact that privatisation was causing a lot of damage 
to workers in Uganda and in Africa. However, this begun to change when at a meeting in 
Washington in 1000 the Bank accepted that indeed this was the case. Whereas NOTU had been 
ostracised by both the Bank and the Government, in 2000 the process of tripartite dialogue begun. 
In 2003, an economist with NOTU was hired to work at the World Bank for one year, and as he 
made a lot of worker-related input onto the PRSP, this proved to be a big turning point for 
NOTU-Government-Bank relations. Since then, the Bank and the Government have been working 
closely with labour unions whose issues had been forgotten. The International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions to which NOTU is affiliated has opened an office in Washington which 
facilitates Bank and trade union engagement. NOTU feels that it’s better accepted by the Bank’s 
Country Office than by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. 
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would not portray the Bank in good light, it played delaying tactics, and thereby nullifying the 
initiative.   
 
3) Fragmented and Inconsistent Dealings with Civil Society 
The meeting noted that the Bank’s approach regarding civil society engagement is both 
fragmented and inconsistent. It has been very difficult to predict the Bank’s behaviour 
regarding its interaction with civil society. The evidence of this is that there hasn’t been any 
attempt to initiate a clear forum or mechanism for engagement with CSOs in a consistent 
manner. At country level there is no institutionalised mechanism for CSO-Bank engagement. It 
looks like the Bank basically perceives Government as its key development partner while 
viewing CSOs as peripheral stakeholders to be involved only as and when it suits the Bank. 
Despite the establishment of the portfolios of Social Development Advisors at country World 
Bank offices, civil society is yet to see this translated into an effective channel for regular civil 
society engagement.   
4) Twisting Civil Society Concepts and Terminology 
While the World Bank has adopted many development concepts espoused by CSOs, civil 
society sometimes finds it difficult to understand meanings given to these concepts by the 
World Bank i.e. ‘pro-poor growth’, ‘participation’ etc. The coining of terms such as 
‘retrenchment’, ‘down sizing’ to ‘right sizing’ attests to a fundamental problem of trying to hide 
reality by clothing it in sweet sounding terminology.  
 
5) Engagement on World Bank Terms – Choosing from a Set Menu 
The Bank’s attempt at engagement with civil society is based on the Bank’s set terms and 
guidelines (it sets the agenda, invites civil society, chairs the meetings, etc) which contradict the 
very essence of partnership. These terms as well as the real agendas in most cases are unknown 
to civil society. This is by all intents and purposes participation of the un-equals. As far as civil 
society is concerned, “the World Bank is too powerful” to engage meaningfully. Where the 
Bank initiates engagement, there is a semblance of ‘success’. Where CSOs take the initiative or 
lead the process as in SAPRI, things don’t always work out to their expectations. CSOs repeated 
instances when the World Bank President told them that “I am doing you a favour by dealing 
with you. I am under pressure from my shareholders not to give voice to unelected, self 
appointed groups that have no legitimacy. They say that they are the elected representatives of 
the people and it is they who should be listened to”.  
 
6) Lack of Willingness to Accept and Learn from Mistakes  
CSOs noted that the Bank refuses to accept failure even when civil society has researched 
information and constructive criticism. Civil society’s view therefore is that the Bank is not 
predisposed as a learning organisation.  
Closed Spaces on Workers’ Issues during the Privatisation Process 
Another example is the NOTU engagement with the Bank on issues related to SAPs, i.e. 
privatisation. NOTU was totally blocked from participating in any official discussions with the Bank 
and the Government regarding the economic reform measures embodied in the dreaded Economic 
Reform Programme (ERP) based on market liberalization paradigm. NOTU was concerned with the 
high costs associated with implementation of the adjustment reforms, especially retrenchment, anti-
collective bargaining which resulted in many workers being inadequately remunerated (minimum 
wages), issues that were not considered worth discussing with NOTU by the Bank until after the 
effects of the reforms had been dulled by time. 
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Participants also cited the case of Bujagali Hydro Electric Power Project where ACODE 
undertook an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the project assessing the extent to 
which World Bank EIA guidelines had been complied with. While CSOs have concluded that in 
its current design the project is not viable, the best that the Bank has done was to call for more 
EIAs to be undertaken.   
 
Some participants raised a curious phenomenon where constructive criticism has been received 
with negative and personalised reactions. One participant cited a case where he reported 
findings of Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP) which indicated that ‘the rich 
were getting ricer and the poor poorer’. For two years, the then Country Director would not talk 
to this civil society researcher. The same was true for an NGO Forum representative after he 
had co-authored a report that was highly critical of the Bank’s programmes in Uganda. 
 
7) Communication Deficiencies 
CSOs noted that there is sometimes lack of effective coordination of initiatives involving civil 
society and World Bank Headquarters in with the Bank’s Country Offices. For example, 
attempts to have the local World Bank staff get involved in World Bank Head Quarters 
supported study carried out by DRT study called “Gender and Social Dimension on HIV 
transmission among refugees and IDPs in the Great Lakes region” were unsuccessful. ”It has 
taken me a year to secure an appointment, and I still haven’t got it yet” said a DRT 
representative. ACODE also cited a similar case with its initiative with the World Bank on 
Partnership for Principle 10 on Access to Information and Justice. It has proved to be very difficult 
sometimes for CSOs to access vital information that would enable them constructively engage 
with the Bank at country level. Cases were cited where initiatives between the Bank and CSOs 
stalled but the Bank provided no written explanation. One example was the discussions to 
institute a Community Score Card. The other example where the component of civil society in 
the LVMEP turned out to be empty promises and no explanation was given.  
 
Save the Children and the World Bank Disagree on how to Use NECDP Evaluations 
The Nutrition and Early Child Hood Development Project is a loan which was approved in 1998 but 
implementation did not begin until 2001. By the time the project ended, only 13% of the children had been 
reached and 60% of the Community Action Plans had been partially funded, yet the project had spent $ 36.5 
million. The World Bank had itself commissioned a number monitoring and evaluation studies for the 
project and Save the Children undertook an analysis of these evaluations producing a report entitled “Thin 
on the Ground”. Its main conclusions were that resources were being wasted on such a large-scale 
community nutrition project because it had major design and implementation limitations. That in spite of 
these problems having been identified by the official evaluations, the project implementation had improved 
over time because project development processes and monitoring and evaluation were inadequate. The 
analysis questioned the added value of the project in its current form to the people and children of Uganda. 
Save the Children therefore recommended that the project should not be replicated before reviewing all the 
recommendations and plugging the information gaps. However, the Bank and the Government of Uganda 
have secretly gone ahead to design a new programme without involving civil society. The Ministry of 
Health and Project officials protested Save the Children findings and it is not clear that the concerns raised 
have been adequately addressed. 
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8) Strong Rhetoric not Matched by Practice 
The WB is strong on the rhetoric and weak on practice. The engagement of civil society in the 
design of WB projects raises further questions as to the intentions of the WB’s commitment to 
civil society engagement. There is failure on part of the Bank to make a deliberate effort to get 
beneficiary input. For example, there is apparently limited participation of civil society in the 
design of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), the Lake Victoria Environmental 
management Project (LVEMP) and the Nutrition and Early Childhood Development (NECDP) 
projects. World Bank Missions are fond of promising civil society good working relations which 
never materialise. As one participant observed, “The World Bank does nice things about 
participation but doesn’t implement them through their economic programmes.”  
 
Despite the rhetoric that CSOs are important players in the bank’s processes, it has not 
deliberately undertaken activities to build their capacity. In most project designs for World 
Bank projects, no resources are put aside for capacity building for CSOs. All project resources 
are normally channelled through Local Governments whereas CSOs have their own structures. 
Consequently, there is no empowerment of the people. 
 
 
 
9) The World Bank, Transparency and Accountability 
Participants felt very strongly about the World Bank and accountability. As one participant put 
it, “There are things we cannot fool ourselves about. Can we really talk about accountability in 
respect of the Bank? I don’t think the Bank believes in it.” “Democracy is tilted. Shareholding is 
not by members buy by shares, where the rich members have the greatest influence” 
C Recommendations for improving World Bank Transparency, Accountability & 
Responsiveness to Civil Society Concerns. 
 
CSO representatives attending the consultation made the following recommendations;  
 
1) The World Bank builds on the positive experiences for example, it should sustain and 
advance the initiatives started under Mr. Wolfenson’s presidency in trying to bridge the gap 
between the Bank and CSOs. The Bank should institutionalise the positive role played by 
individual staff.  
NUDIPU’s Engagement with the World Bank 
A case in point was the efforts by the National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU) 
which negotiated for the Bank to provide computer technology for the blind. These computers were 
actually purchased but the Bank put too many qualifiers for implementing partners, i.e. they were to 
have 10 years experience working with that technology which they knew was not available in 
Uganda. As a result, to date, those computers are still at the World Bank Offices in Kampala. In the 
NUSAF, NUDIPU has been engaging the Bank to ensure that the project design caters for people 
with disabilities as beneficiaries. However, Bank staff have misperceptions about disability, such as 
the disabled not being adequately educated, not being mobile and therefore no groups of disabled 
have been formed to benefit from community action projects, whereas NUSAF itself is supposedly 
designed to benefit vulnerable groups. Since then, NUDIPU has actually gone ahead and formed the 
groups as well as informing the Bank of their existence. 
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2) The website and the idea of the InfoShop should be extended to make it more encompassing 
for the wider civil society. Outlets through civil society channels should be explored and 
increased.  
 
3) Experiences such as that of NOTU should be give serious consideration in ensuring that a 
wide cross section of CSOs are included in Bank supported participation as early and accept 
and learn from constructive criticism.  
 
4) The Bank should be more willing to take its responsibility for its policy advice and actions 
rather than hiding behind the Government on issues that CSOs ascribe responsibility to the 
Bank  
 
5) In designing programmes and projects, the Bank should ensure that no space is closed to 
civil society. Trust should be built so that civil society uses those spaces more responsibly. 
 
6) The Bank should articulate and share the objectives, guidelines and outcomes for 
engagement, plus defining the engagement mechanisms with civil society at country level.  
 
7) The office of those with portfolios for linking with civil society (Social Development 
Advisors) should be strengthened to be the focal point for civil society engagement at 
country level. 
 
8) Improve communication between Washington and Country Offices so that there is one Bank 
rather than two Banks.  
 
9) The Bank should contribute more resources towards the building capacity for CSOs in a 
way that is civil society-driven. 
 
10) The Bank should do more to close the credibility gap regarding its accountability and 
democratic credentials.  
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NATIONAL CONSULTATION ON WORLD BANK – CIVIL 
SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT 
  
 
ZAMBIAN REPORT 
 
“We are not government but if we are partners in development, we demand 
consultation from conceptualization to implementation” 
 
Introduction: The level of engagement between the World Bank and the Civil Society has been 
described by many civil society actors as a space that exists on the frontier of risk and 
opportunity. The consultation has been described by many as being long overdue. The high 
poverty levels in the nation where over 73% of the population is surviving on less than a dollar a 
day compounded by the huge debt that the country services is a clear indication of the need to 
have an effective world bank – civil society engagement. Henry Malumo from the Civil Society 
Trade of Zambia who is also the National Civil Society MDG Campaign Coordinator carried out 
a few discussions with a number of strategic individuals and organisations. Among the 
organisations were the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), Foundation for 
Democratic Process (FODEP), Zambia Alliance of Women (Z.A.W), Peasant Farmers 
Association of Zambia and the Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia (CSTNZ). 
 
Findings: a discussion with Jack Jones Zulu, the Policy Analyst at the JCTR, said that the 
process can be described in two ways. Firstly, there has been situation where government and the 
World Bank have met to make important decisions and the civil society was invited at the last 
minute to comment and not change anything. Secondly, the Bank would meet with government 
and later on call on the civil society to legitimize their document. The question that Jack put 
across was whether the civil societies were being consulted and whether they were part of the 
process?  
 
The civil society is willing to work with government and the bank to bringing about the needed 
change in the lives of many Zambians. The privatization of the mines and other government 
parastatals   is one area where civil society engagement was totally sidelined. Recent World 
Bank consultations have shown an increasing interest in broad based consultations among all the 
stakeholders and the civil society. The Bank has further realized that policies that exclude the 
broader participation of the civil society are rarely accepted by the people. The PRSP and the 
HIPC processes are some of the examples where there has been government, civil society and 
World Bank consultations. The only unfortunate aspect in the PRSP and HIPC consultations is 
that 20% of the civil society recommendations were rejected. The rejected recommendations 
were the key issues that the civil society team proposed. The issues were addressing the 
component of macro –economics. The continued pressure by the Bank to finance the social 
sector with the exclusion of the productive sector is a wrong approach. The lack of consultation 
form conceptualization had led to the circumstance. 
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The consultations surrounding the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) are yet another 
clear programme that has been developed at the total exclusion of the civil society. The civil 
society has constantly requested for a broader stakeholder consultation but government and the 
cooperating partners have not listened. The divided voice in the area of debt has widened the gap 
between government and the civil society in its to the World bank. President Mwanawasa has 
joined the civil society in calling for total debt cancellation while the Minister of Finance has 
gone round saying that Zambia has the capacity to pay the debt. 
 
The sector advisory group of micro-economics frame work for Zambia has only two civil society 
representation while government and the cooperating partners have more than five each. If 
decisions are about numbers, the n the civil society is at a disadvantage because when it comes to 
voting, we are out numbered. 
 
Stephen Muyakwa, National Coordinator for the Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia on 
the other hand has bemoaned the lack of capacity among the civil society actors which is 
worsened by the rushed consultations between the Bank and the civil society. From a very long 
time the Bank has been identified with rushed decisions concerning many cardinal issues. The 
speedy consultations have not worked to the interest of the poor whom they claim to help or 
support as the most civil society players are often not adequately prepared for the high level and 
technical discussions that are held. Lack of access to relevant information from government and 
donor agencies has disadvantaged the civil society from effective engagement. It is the hope of 
many Zambians that the Freedom of Information Bill that is currently in parliament will receive 
a positive response. 
 
Patrick Kaumba, Programme Officer for the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), 
the current scenario in Zambia is that government together with the World bank have continued 
to impose programmes on the people of Zambia at the exclusion of the civil society. This led to 
lose of confidence in the World Bank and the government by most civil society actors. As a 
nation we need to develop home grown programmes that respond to the challenges of the 
Zambian people. 
 
Mundia Matongo, Programme Officer for the Zambia Alliance of Women (ZAW), some of 
the benchmarks agreed by the World Bank and the government were done at the exclusion of the 
civil society.  
 
Hachiinda Jones Muleya, President for the Peasant farmers Association of Zambia, the level of 
engagement between the civil society and the Bank has not yielded any meaningful development. 
The privitisation of the mines, the current crisis in the education sector where close to 1,000 
teachers could not be employed due to the HIPC conditionalities is a clear incidence of poor civil 
society and World Bank engagement.  
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Challenges 
 
I. One of the major challenges being faced by the broader civil society family in the 
process of engagement is the lack of capacity to negotiate. 
II. Lack of access to classified information that relates to policy formulation. 
III. The need for Zambian driven programmes. 
IV. Direction of resources at the social sector with the exclusion of the productive sector 
   
 
Conclusion: The recent World Bank consultations have shown a window of hope for civil 
society engagement. One concrete example is when the President of the World Bank and the 
Director of the IMF had a direct interface with the civil society, which has not been the culture in 
the past. The Zambian civil society is ready to have an effective engagement with the World 
bank that is holistic. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. We want to be part of the agenda setting and agenda implementing process. 
2. The World Bank should support capacity building programs for the civil society. 
3. The role of the civil society in the consultations should not be perceived as a favour but as 
an important role that should be institionalised. 
4. Programmes that do not include civil society participation from conceptualization to 
implementation should not be legitimized. 
5. There should be equal representation at major consultations, government should facilitate 
the participation of the civil society at these events. 
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Women’s Rights and Gender Equality at the 
World Bank: Experiences of Engagement 
 
Submission to the JFC Discussion Paper on 
World Bank – Civil Society Engagement 
March 2005 
 
 
 
 
The following paper has been prepared as a Constituency Perspective 
contribution to the World Bank – Civil Society Engagement Discussion 
Paper being prepared by the civil society members of the JFC.  It is 
based on consultations and discussions with our members and partners 
in recent years, and in particular on a survey conducted of a sample of 
our members with specific World Bank engagement experiences.  Any 
comments or questions should be directed to Joanna Kerr, AWID 
Executive Director:  jkerr@awid.org, + (416) 594-3773. 
 
 
 
1.  The Constituency: 
  
Advocates for and experts in women’s rights and gender equality, including 
representatives of women’s organizations from both the global South and the North, 
have engaged with World Bank processes in various ways such as participating in 
consultations, presenting submissions, lobbying and protesting over the past ten years.  
Since the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, several distinct 
mechanisms for engagement, research and advocacy have emerged (including several 
NGOs: Women’s Eyes on the World Bank, Women’s Edge, and Gender Action, 
among others; and two World Bank mechanisms: the External Gender Consultative 
Group, the Consultative Council on Gender for the Middle East and North Africa) in 
addition to the numerous engagements by women’s organization at the national level.  
As noted by Carolyn Long,  
 
Although at present there is no way to systematically catalogue or 
analyze advocacy done by women’s organizations at the national level, 
Southern women’s groups have been promoting gender concerns to the 
Bank for many years.  Southern women’s groups have long been 
among those civil society organizations working to convince the Bank 
to end or significantly alter structural adjustment policies imposed on 
their countries.  They have also been at the forefront of groups urging 
an end to user fees in health, water and education, which governments 
have imposed as conditions on certain World Bank lending.  ISAAF 
International in India and the Tanzania Gender Networking Program 
are two of many women’s organizations advocating these change.  In 
many instances, women’s groups have been included in the 
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consultative processes with civil society conducted for the formulation 
of the CAS in borrower countries.309 
 
The Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) is an international 
membership organization with close to 6000 members in approximately 120 
countries, approximately half of whom are based in the global South.  AWID’s 
members include a diverse group of practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, funders, 
students and others working to advance women’s rights and gender equality in 
development processes.  In our work, we have heard of many different engagement 
experiences with the World Bank and we have participated on the JFC in the hopes of 
contributing to the formulation of more democratic, accountable, transparent, and 
responsive civil society engagement processes.  From our perspective, proof of the 
effectiveness of engagement by women’s rights and gender equality advocates would 
be an engendered set of Bank policies and an investment portfolio that promotes 
women’s rights and gender equality. 
 
Overall, it is clear that in order to promote gender equality and women’s rights, the 
World Bank needs to take civil society engagement much more seriously, increasing 
transparency, democratic practices and the effectiveness of engagements.  We have 
seen the Bank change its public discourse and rhetoric over the years, but the 
underlying economic model and their approach to loans and projects has remained 
constant.   
 
The problem, from our perspective as an organization that works to improve the lives 
and women and girls globally, is that the World Bank’s activities actually have 
harmful impacts on women and regress women’s rights and gender equality, not 
simply that they ignore gender issues.  We believe this to be unacceptable for any 
international institution and improving civil society engagement mechanisms could 
represent one step towards increasing accountability and human rights compliance of 
the Bank.     
 
While progress had been made to improve gender-sensitivity at the Bank, particularly 
around the time of the 4th World Conference on Women in 1995, we have seen back-
sliding in recent years.  Today, there continues to be a lack of understanding by Bank 
staff of gender issues and policies within the institution.310  Moreover in terms of 
engagement and consultation, the Bank has relied on mechanisms such as the External 
Gender Consultative Group (EGCG) in order to say that it has conferred with 
women’s groups, while the poor women all over the world who are directly impacted 
by the Bank’s policies are given scant opportunity to meaningfully input into the 
Bank’s decision-making processes.311      
                                                 
309
 C. Long, The Advocate’s Guide to Promoting Gender Equality at the World Bank, 
Women’s Edge, 2003. 
310
 See Zuckerman, E., and W. Qing, “Reforming the World Bank: Will the New 
Gender Strategy Make A Difference?” (Heinrich Boll Foundation and Gender Action, 
2003) [Updated version forthcoming in 2005)]. 
311
 While the External Gender Consultative Group (EGCG) was a positive 
development, bringing the expertise of some excellent gender advocates to the Bank, 
their impact was very limited.  For example, they were influential with respect to the 
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Members strongly urge the Bank to implement its own research and rhetoric on 
gender issues and women’s rights.  The Bank’s own insights into the gendered 
impacts of poverty and debt as well as their recommendations for improving gender 
equality and women’s rights are not implemented at all in their actual investments.  
The gap between Bank rhetoric and bank reality remains massive.   
 
 
2.  Experiences of Select AWID Members: 
 
During January and February 2005, we surveyed several of our members who 
responded to a request we issued to our membership for participants and who 
indicated that they had specific experiences engaging with the World Bank.  As such, 
we did not select the respondents to represent specific views or experiences.  In fact, 
the respondents included NGO representatives, campaigners and people who had 
worked as paid consultants for the World Bank, all of whom have different 
experiences, interests and perspectives on World Bank engagement.   
 
The survey included 22 questions, administered by email or through a telephone 
conversation.  The survey results, while far from comprehensive, do provide insight 
into the engagement experiences of gender advocates and gender experts and are 
useful for reflecting on and critically analysing the experiences of women’s groups 
and gender equality advocates in World Bank-civil society engagement processes.   
 
The members that we spoke with included two from Nigeria, one from Ethiopia, one 
from Senegal, one from Indonesia, one from Bulgaria, one from Cameroon, one from 
Mexico, two from Canada and two from the USA.  They had engaged with the World 
Bank during various periods between 1986 and the present, one for as long as 
eighteen years with the others averaging around two years.  Three had participated in 
SAPRI consultations and three in HIPC consultations; six had participated in PRSP 
consultations and four in CAS consultations.  Eight had participated in project-level 
consultations around specific projects or programs, including: research projects on the 
gender aspects of poverty and inequality in Bulgaria; the Kecamapan Development 
Project; a conference on sport in Morocco (participation sponsored by the WB); 
monitoring World Bank sectoral reform projects in Latin America; impact evaluation 
of SAPs; Assessment of FCFA Devaluation; local consultation and social analysis on 
potable water supply; a background study for the dispersement of a large loan; gender 
assessment of WB supported Chad and Cameroon Oil Pipeline; gender assessment of 
Structural Adjustment in HIPC post-conflict countries; assessment of transparency 
and independence of SB inspection panel; and as a subject matter analyst in National 
Agricultural Extension Project, among others.  One of the people we surveyed had 
also been involved in a worldwide campaign for the cancellation of debt to HIPCs and 
two had been involved in various international campaigns and advocacy efforts to 
improve the effectiveness, gender sensitivity and accountability of World Bank 
operations as well as monitoring of World Bank projects and policies.  One is also 
involved in work on the World Bank and the Millennium Development Goals.      
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Bank’s research studies on women but they had little influence in terms of investment 
and policy decisions.  
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What follows is a compilation of the respondents’ answers to our survey questions. 
 
How do World Bank policies or practices impact on the interests of your 
organization or group? 
 
Positively: Two respondents felt that World Bank policies and practices had a positive 
impact on their organizations.  
 
Negatively: One respondent felt that their policy of disbursing funds through the 
government impacted negatively on his organization. He also felt that their failure to 
consider the local culture led to conflict. Two respondents felt that the needs of the 
poor were not addressed by the World Bank, with one of them being of the view that 
the World Bank caters to upper and middle income groups, and is not interested in 
women. One respondent felt that they were not friendly to small business concerns 
and this had a gendered impact.  
 
In addition, one respondent provided the following list of negative impacts: 
a) It violated women’s human right – shrinking government revenues, leading 
to cuts in social programs that could promote gender equality. 
b) Because of its power, the Bank can pressure governments making them 
more accountable to the Bank than to their own citizens. 
c) The World Bank gets into business that it should not be involved in.  It now 
puts its nose in all aspects of life that impact on women and social justice, 
from NGO status to justice systems, union organizing to worker’s rights, arts 
and culture, etc. 
d) World Bank programs divide civil society organizations because they 
confuse those weak on economic policy and sideline human rights activists. 
e) The Bank corrupts the notion of good governance and economic 
performance, and countries can get away with all sorts of human rights 
violations as long as they have good track recordings of implementing World 
Bank-IMF reforms. 
f) The Bank corrupts economic analysis by continuing to use its power to 
sustain the long rejected notion that poverty can be measured simply based 
income and consumption. 
g) The Bank maintains the debt crisis because debt management is a tool of 
control.     
 
Why did you choose to engage with the World Bank or focus on the World Bank as 
an object of campaigning?  What did you aim to achieve? 
 
Three of the respondents chose to engage with the World Bank because they view it 
as having a lot of influential global and local power. One of these said that the World 
Bank is crucial as his country is dependent on aid and the World Bank is one of the 
few agencies with the ability to provide large amounts of development assistance. He 
hoped to achieve change by ensuring that rural voices were heard.  
 
One respondent indicated that she had chosen to engage with the World Bank in order 
to challenge it and show that it holds and important responsibility for poverty 
escalation in the last 25 years.  She also chose to engage in order to show that the 
World Bank contributes to human rights and environmental violations, she wanted to 
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expose the Bank showing how it had never actually changed its approach (only its 
public discourse had changed).  She wanted to show that it was truly on the side of 
corporations at the expense of the social welfare of poor people.  And she wanted to 
support the voices of those who are calling for the Bank to “close their shop”.   
 
Another explained how in 1995, the feminist movement had empirical evidence that 
the World Bank and IMF designed and carried out policies and projects with the same 
patterns for different countries with different needs, i.e. structural adjustment and 
reform projects.  These loans featured imposed conditionality which had negative 
impacts on women.  They therefore chose to launch a campaign which demanded: an 
increase in civil society’s (particularly women’s) participation in World Bank policies 
and projects; the institutionalization of a gender perspective in World Bank policies, 
projects and programs; an increase in World Bank investments in women; and an 
increase in the number of women in high level positions at the Bank.   
 
Two of the respondents had responded to tender invitations put out by the World 
Bank for projects that they were running. One of these two felt that as the World Bank 
project was large, it would have a greater impact in their area of work. Another 
respondent recognized the World Bank as having great influence and believes that by 
engaging with the World Bank the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved 
and the global economic imbalances remedied.  
 
One respondent said she was attracted by World Bank materials on gender, 
economics, education and politics.  
 
One respondent said she was hired as field researcher. Another one was hired as a 
consultant and hoped to bring a change in the lives of the women targeted by her 
project.  
 
How did you think that your campaign or engagement would bring about change? 
 
Four of the respondents hoped that the World Bank would change its policies and 
practices after hearing the views of stakeholders. They therefore endeavoured to make 
the voices of disadvantaged stakeholders heard. Two other respondents said that their 
engagement made a practical change in the lives of their stakeholders as they were 
involved in the implementation of specific World Bank projects. Another respondent 
teaches research on gender and social science and she felt that her teaching impacted 
her students who engaged with the World Bank, while two of the respondents who 
had been consultants for the WB felt that the question was not applicable in their 
particular context. 
 
Another explained that at the Beijing Conference (1995), it was decided that pressure 
needed to be applied on the Bank through a campaign(s) or else the World Bank 
would not become more inclusive nor would it change its operations in order that they 
be supportive of women’s rights and gender equality.  By closely monitoring the 
Bank’s activities and applying pressure through a campaign, they had hoped to bring 
about positive change for women. 
 
Another respondent indicated that because the World Bank is very concerned about its 
image given the global outcry about its malpractice, therefore if the Bank could be 
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forced to respond, change could result.  Moreover, by conducting economic 
education, the real face of the World Bank is revealed and more people join the ranks 
organizing against international financial institutions.  Constituency-building is a 
slow, but important process, and giving more courage and language is local activists 
is part of the change process.   
 
Did you originally view the World Bank has an impediment to or lever for positive 
change?  Has your view changed? 
 
One respondent had viewed the World Bank as a “blind institution”, as it did not 
consider gender issues in its agenda, yet its operations were causing direct damage to 
women.  Through their work they learnt that the World Bank played a crucial role and 
could be used strategically to promote gender equality, however it became evident 
constant pressure was necessary in order to sustain gains made.  
 
Six respondents originally viewed the World Bank as a lever for positive change, and 
still think of it as such. One of them said that her organization supports institutional 
change and believes that ‘insider and outsider’ strategies can be used in institutional 
change. Her organization believes in working from the inside and therefore sees the 
World Bank as a vehicle for positive change. Another respondent was impressed by 
the expertise of World Bank professionals whom she found to be ‘precise and a 
pleasure to work with.’  
 
Two respondents thought that the World Bank was an impediment in some ways, and 
a lever in others. They said that World Bank projects are good and therefore it is 
potentially a lever for positive change. They said that on the other hand, it is an 
impediment in that it works with and supports governments, which may be corrupt 
and poorly run, rather than funding civil society directly. In this way, the intended 
beneficiaries do not properly benefit from World Bank programmes. One respondent 
also said that a few World Bank projects are ‘white elephants.’  
 
Three respondents viewed the World Bank as an impediment to positive change. One 
said that at first she was not sure but now she is certain that it is an impediment. 
Another respondent said that the World Bank is an impediment due to the mode and 
structure of its governance and its affiliation to rich countries at the expense of poor 
ones.  Another noted that given its ideological basis, the World Bank is unable to 
change without changing its underlying framework and vision.  
 
 
What strategies did you use? 
 
Four respondents collected information from stakeholders and relayed it to the World 
Bank, three by way of reports and one by writing letters. One of these respondents 
said she endeavoured to frame the issues in a way that they would be taken into 
account by the World Bank. Another one said that she used personal advocacy by 
talking to the World Bank official in charge of her project. One respondent used the 
strategy of referring to materials and using practical involvement. Several respondents 
said that they used training and awareness raising.   
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Several indicated that they used a combination of strategies, including one who 
indicated that she used: strategic planning and capacity-building of women’s 
organizations at the national level in order that they better understand, monitor and 
interact with the World Bank; coordination and alliance-building to ensure that their 
recommendations were implemented and that other social movements incorporated 
gender into their work; project follow-up and implementation on the ground, 
including follow-up on the commitments made y the World Bank at the 4th World 
Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995); and information dissemination and education, 
both to women’s organization and to the press throughout their region.  Another 
respondent listed the following set of strategies used:  policy analysis, assessment, 
participatory appraisals, policy debate, economic literacy, media, internet campaign, 
network creation, community-based organizing, and interviews.   
 
If consultations were used, how were they structured?  Were they inclusive, 
transparent and meaningful? 
 
One respondent said that their organization was invited to a forum to give views on 
Country Assistance Strategy. Two respondents said that consultations were by face-
to-face interviews and meetings. (Three did not indicate how they were structured.) 
 
Six respondents said that they were inclusive and transparent. Five said that they were 
meaningful, while one said that the outcome of the CAS report would reveal whether 
the consultations were meaningful. 
 
Did the engagement meet your expectations?  What was achieved? 
 
Four respondents said that their expectations were met. One respondent said that her 
engagement usually met her expectations because her most of her recommendations 
were acted upon, but it failed to meet her expectations when some of her 
recommendations were not implemented. Her work resulted in villages getting piped 
water near their homes, and in one particular village into their homes. However, she 
had recommended that women be encouraged and allowed into non-traditional roles 
like being water pump operators, but this did not happen. One respondent said that 
awareness was raised and attitudes were changed, while another said that she did not 
expect immediate results, but is confident of gradual change. 
 
One respondent said that it met her expectations in that nothing much was achieved 
because the project was managed by a governmental body 
 
Three said that their expectations were not met. One of them said that she was under-
utilized and felt at odds with her role. Another, although she said that it did not meet 
her expectations, did admit that they learnt some things such as monitoring and 
evaluation systems, how to compare research and how to look at the project in terms 
of ‘the bigger picture.’ 
 
Did the engagement help your group gain leverage in your domestic political 
context? 
 
Four of the respondents said that their group had gained leverage, while four said that 
their group did not gain leverage. 
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What factors do you believe led to the success or failure of your endeavours?        
 
Success: 
• The World Bank’s use of experts. 
• Telling the truth and presenting the reality on the ground. 
• Careful data collection and analysis as ‘the World Bank likes numbers.’ 
• Involvement of stakeholders in project development. 
• Using empirical studies to strengthen advocacy. 
• Information, financial support and planning. 
• The awareness raised about the World Bank. 
• Being consistent; sticking to the rigor of the analysis and human rights 
principles. 
• Respecting the local constituency. 
• Being humble, recognizing that development is a learning process. 
 
Failure: 
• Lack of finance and of co-operation from holders of political office.  
• World Bank was more interested in what financial experts and economists had 
to say than what the respondent had to say. 
• The fact that their group is a young organization in the midst of thousands of 
NGOs in her country. 
• Limited resources/funds to continue the work. 
 
What skills or capacities do women’s organizations and gender equality advocates 
need in order to critically engage the World Bank? 
 
• Better coordination, networking and collaboration.  
• Knowledge of how the Bank is constituted, the organization, decision-making, 
funding, policies and projects. 
• Very strong economic knowledge and evidence-based research. 
• Understanding of World Bank policies and projects, and the way they impact 
current social, economic and political paradigms. 
• Strong capacity in presenting local realities.  
• Understanding of importance of monitoring Bank activities.  Design proper 
methodology to monitor Bank policies. 
• More financial support. Ability to generate resources needed. 
• Micro-credit. 
• Solid advocacy skills and experience; ability to present realities in a simple 
and clear manner.  
• Economic literacy. They must know ‘bank speak’ and be able to package 
themselves so as to market their project. Must be able to use World Bank 
systems and structures. They need to perceive the World Bank as a partner or 
ally who is going to help and engage with it accordingly. 
• They need to realize that they are fighting uphill struggle, need to use 
whatever knowledge they have to ‘manipulate’ people, need to recognize their 
limitations within World Bank. 
• Advocacy and campaigning skills. 
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• Strong ability to make links between policies, projects and programs, and local 
realities. 
• Gender impact analysis skills. 
• Management skills, political involvement and leadership skills, theoretical and 
practical gender mainstreaming skills. 
• Capacity building training, development studies training. 
 
How does the local political context impact on consultations or other engagements 
with the World Bank? 
 
One respondent said that the local political context impacted positively because the 
local governance structures co-operated with her group. Two people said that the local 
political context did not have an impact on their engagement. One person said that she 
experienced a little pressure as to which assistants to hire, but generally did not regard 
the local political context as having any impact on her consultations. She had 
anticipated that she may experience some hindrances as a woman working in an 
Islamic country, but she did not experience any.  
 
Three respondents said that the lack of democracy, the poor governance and 
corruption in their country impacted negatively on their engagement with the World 
Bank. They felt that funds were diverted and World Bank assistance did not therefore 
reach those in real need of it.  Another noted that difficulties resulting from the World 
Bank and IMF praising a country for keeping inflation down and sustaining a 
respectable growth rate, while that government is violating human rights, women’s 
lives are in jeopardy, and poverty and corruption are increasing.   
 
One respondent saw three different factors that practically impact on consultations 
and engagements:  
a) the power that the World Bank has over the government, for example it has 
more power in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Bolivia than it has in Mexico, 
Argentina or Brazil.   
b) the nature of the government, such that if the government is more open to 
transparency, participation and accountability, then the Bank will be too, and 
vis versa.   
c) the level of awareness at the local level, and the expectations and demands 
of participants, for example where participants have little information about 
the Bank, its impacts and the country’s economic situation, the consultations 
tend to be easier for the Bank, but where participants are well-informed, then 
the consultations tend to be more conflictive and difficult.    
 
Has information disclosure concerning World Bank meetings, documents and 
negotiations in your country been adequate?  Has information been accessible? 
 
Seven of the respondents felt that information disclosure was inadequate and 
information was inaccessible. One of these respondents was of the view that it did not 
make sense not to avail information, especially the social data gathered. Another 
respondent said although it was difficult to access information from both the World 
Bank and the government, it was much more difficult to access it from the 
government.  
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Three said that the information was adequate and accessible. One of them who had 
been a consultant said that they had transparent systems, lots of staff meetings even 
with short-term consultants and accessible annual reports. Another said that they were 
good and open while another said that information was freely available in government 
regional offices and libraries. 
 
One respondent noted that the availability of information depended on factors such as 
the influence/power of the World Bank in the given country, the willingness of the 
government to disclose information, and the level of awareness of civil society.  
Another noted that many documents are available, such as research reports and 
briefings, but sensitive document are seldom available.  She characterised it as a “cat 
and mouse game”, where the World Bank and IMF say “yes, we are supposed to 
disclose agreement but you have to understand that the document belong to 
governments and we can not release them without their permission.  Go see your 
government.”   
 
Are you satisfied with the World Bank’s response or follow-through after the 
engagement? 
 
Five respondents said that they were satisfied. One of them said that the World Bank 
was excellent, holding press conferences for dissemination of results, and providing 
continued support. Another said that she was very satisfied with the monitoring and 
evaluation process which gave rise to new projects. Of the five, one said that he was 
satisfied ‘to some extent’ while another said she was ‘somewhat’ satisfied. 
 
Five people said they were not satisfied, with one saying that her suggestions were not 
implemented, and another saying that it was very hard to get a hold of people as they 
are ‘always busy.’ 
 
Based on your experiences, how would you suggest improving: 
 
a) Transparency in process?   
• There is a need for greater transparency in calls for project tenders. More 
publicity needs to be done for the tendering process.  
• Bank staff should ensure false hopes are not raised. Villages should be told 
that a visit is not a guarantee of a project. 
• Making all documents, even preliminary ones and concrete-specific ones, 
publicly available on the internet. 
• Insistence on good governance on part of government and freedom of 
information. 
• Involvement of civil society members from different sectors and sexes. 
• Work with and listen to local NGOs, not government. 
 
b) Accountability of the World Bank to women’s organizations and 
gender equality advocates? 
• Make gender issues a priority as they have still not been prioritized. 
• Increase publications on gender and women’s issues. 
• Better coordination between EU, UN, WB, gender authorities/ women’s 
machinery. 
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• More consultations with women’s organizations; they should have a say in the 
she shaping of their policies and programmes. 
• World Bank needs to be clear about what results they are trying to achieve 
related to gender equality or else they do not have anything solid to be 
accountable to. 
• Reports should be shared with stakeholders. 
• Making information available before they become policy and before contracts 
are signed with governments. 
• Openness on side of World Bank and engaging with women as a distinct 
group with distinct needs. 
• Give attention to these organizations in its overall plans. 
• Increase the number of gender specialists in the Bank and give them sufficient 
resources and authority to be effective in their work. 
• Integrate a gender perspective into policies and projects by establishing 
concrete operational procedures for Bank staff. 
• Provide resources for gender analysis and research in each procedure, 
including CAS, PRSP, Country Economic Memorandum, etc. 
 
c) Overall decision-making and follow-up by the World Bank? 
 
• The World Bank is trying to incorporate gender into their policies. However 
they need more women in the highest decision-making positions. More 
women must also be involved in consultations as consultants and in day-to-
day management. 
• The World Bank should give NGOs feedback on proposals and why they were 
not accepted. 
• Do evaluations after project has been implemented. 
• Democratization of World Bank governance through election. The World 
Bank should be a ‘world’ bank and not a bank for rich nations. 
• Involving poor countries as well as rich countries in decision making. 
• The culture and traditions of the local people should be considered. 
• Increase the number of women in senior positions within the Bank, 
particularly in regional vice-presidencies and country departments. 
 
If you have other comments or insights which you would like to share with respect 
to your experiences in engaging with the World Bank, please include them here. 
 
• The World Bank needs to publicize its projects more. It should publish and 
disseminate more information about their projects. For instance, information 
on a World Bank project in Asia has not been made widely available and there 
has therefore been a big loss in terms of results and impact.  
• The World Bank has high quality experts whom it is a pleasure to work with. 
• Women need to continue monitoring World Bank policies and projects.  If we 
leave the Bank off of our agenda then it will take gender issues over its 
agenda.  The Bank will not move towards gender equality unless women 
demand it. 
• Initially the World Bank officials had a superiority complex. However they 
accepted the people they worked with who are also experts. Overall, she 
enjoyed and benefited from the engagement. 
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• This world body should recognize the underprivileged in their programmes 
and bypass the governments of the countries they work in. 
• It was a good experience to work with the World Bank, which is better than 
other organizations because they are very professional in preparing and 
executing projects. 
• People ‘talk out of 2 sides of their mouths’ and what is suggested by the more 
liberal staff is often overridden by those with authority. 
• Attention should be given to women in the least developed countries and to 
higher education and removing gender stereotypes in education systems. 
• The World Bank should be careful when dealing with despotic governments 
and be more on the people’s side. 
• The primary issue to consider at this time is that absence of the World Bank 
and IMF from the Beijing +10 process.  They were present in Beijing in 1995 
and Wolfenson responded to women’s demands.  The fact that they have not 
participated in Beijing+10 processes is an indicator of how gender has fallen I 
their priorities. 
• Many women and social movements say that monitoring the World Bank 
promotes structural adjustment and reform projects.  It is also true however 
that the World Bank is still “running the world” in many areas and this is why 
women should be there, pressuring the Bank to carry out the Beijing 
commitments. 
  
   
3.  In Conclusion: 
 
As these survey results show, the experiences of gender equality and women’s rights 
advocates and experts in engaging with the World Bank have been diverse.  In terms 
of actually advocating for changes to the Bank’s policies and projects that would 
advance women’s rights and gender equality (as opposed to engaging with the Bank 
as a paid consultant, for example), experiences have not been positive in that they 
have not resulted in sustained advances for women.  The Bank’s activities continue to 
have harmful impacts on women, as both years of research and the experiences of 
poor women in the South attest to.    
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I. Introduction and background: 
This paper summarises some of the experiences of indigenous peoples with 
participation in World Bank policy processes and World Bank projects and 
programmes. The summary is based on a review of existing literature and 
documentation as well as various published statements and briefings of indigenous 
peoples’ organisations and support NGOs.i  The paper commences with a historical 
sketch of World Bank interactions with indigenous peoples before assessing the quality 
of participation in various standard-setting and sector-review processes. The paper goes 
on to examine briefly various and ongoing problems with the implementation of World 
Bank participation rules in its projects and programmes. A short review of experiences 
with World Bank accountability mechanisms is then undertaken. 
 
The paper finds that indigenous peoples’ experiences of participation in World Bank 
policy processes have often not been favourable. World Bank policy processes have 
failed to address demands that indigenous peoples have made for the last 15 years 
e.g., in relation to human rights and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Recent 
independent sector reviews sponsored by the Bank have enabled more effective 
participation, but the Bank has failed to act on their progressive recommendations - 
creating disillusion among indigenous peoples who engaged with these processes. 
Meaningful indigenous participation remains absent or superficial in the Bank’s 
adjustment and programmatic loans that now form a growing part of its portfolio. At 
the project and programme level, the assessment confirms that participation is often 
low grade and so many projects are still experienced as top-down interventions. The 
paper sets out a series of recommendations calling on the World Bank to undertake 
major reform and adopt a rights-based approach to participation and development. 
 
Who are Indigenous Peoples? 
Though there is no agreed international definition, it is now increasingly accepted that 
indigenous peoples are a self-identified category of peoples in the Americas, Africa, 
Europe, Asia and the Pacific. These peoples define themselves as “indigenous” and as 
distinct from dominant national societies. The principle of self-identification is 
established in ILO Convention 169 and has been consolidated in the formal decisions 
and recommendations of UN human rights bodies.ii The same principle has been 
strongly endorsed by indigenous peoples themselves and has been adopted in Article 8 
of the United Nation’s Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.iii For its 
part, the World Bank applies a broad approach to defining indigenous peoples that 
recognises that “indigenous peoples” may encompass a diversity of human societies 
that exist in a variety of historical, national and local situations.  The Bank’s existing 
policy on Indigenous peoples, known as Operational Policy 4.10, states that for the 
purposes of Bank operations, the term “Indigenous Peoples” refers to a “distinct, 
vulnerable, social and cultural group possessing the following characteristics in 
varying degrees:” 
 
• self-identification and identification by others as members of a distinct indigenous 
cultural group 
• collective attachment to ancestral territories and to natural resources in these areas 
• presence of customary social and political institutions 
• an indigenous language, often different from the national languageiv 
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Relations between the World Bank and Indigenous Peoples: 
Historical relations between indigenous peoples have often been tense and marked by a 
lack of trust. The difficult relations and absence of trust that continue until today stem 
partly from the serious negative social and cultural impacts inflicted on indigenous 
communities by past World Bank-financed infrastructure, extractive and industrial 
projects. These large-scale and destructive Bank projects were widespread in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s, and resulted in severe adverse impacts on indigenous peoples in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. Since the 1980s, deep indigenous resentment of the World 
Bank has also stemmed from its imposition of unwanted austerity and adjustment 
measures that have generated poverty and increased commercial pressures on 
indigenous territories.v Most of these World Bank loans did not involve any 
participation of indigenous peoples in the preparation, design and implementation of 
projects. If any degree of participation was involved, it was usually low grade 
superficial or passive participation during project implementation.vi Bank projects were 
consequently experienced by indigenous peoples as government-backed, top-down and 
imposed development interventions. 
 
For example, in the 1960s and 70s the World Bank provided a loan to the Panamanian 
government for the construction of the Bayano dam, which displaced Kuna families to 
marginal lands without adequate compensation for loss of their fields, crops and 
forests.vii In Guatemala, in the early 1980s the World Bank financed the infamous 
Chixoy dam which involved large-scale forced relocation that was subsequently 
implicated in the government massacre of 369 displaced people.viii In Brazil, World 
Bank support for Amazonian development schemes led to land invasions and high 
mortalities among affected indigenous peoples from introduced diseases.ix In Central 
India the World Bank had supported the establishment of huge timber plantations on 
tribal lands with shattering effects on the displaced Muria people.  In the Philippines, 
the World Bank had offered to support the construction of the Chico Dams, which 
would have flooded some 80,000 Kalinga and Bontoc people off their lands. Tribal 
mobilisation against the dams triggered repression and insurgency.x 
 
Early World Bank Policy on Indigenous Peoples: 
In response to severe international criticism of the destructive impacts of its projects, the 
World Bank adopted its first policy on “tribal” peoples in 1982.xi Known as Operational 
Manual Statement 2.34 (OMS 2.34), this policy required Bank staff to include measures 
to protect affected peoples’ land rights, health, and cultural integrity and ensure their 
participation in project planning and implementation. This groundbreaking policy 
affirmed for the first time that the World Bank should actually set social and 
environmental rules and standards for its lending. However, due to a lack of social 
science staff and a failure to mainstream the policy into its operations, the policy did 
little to reform Bank practicexii and indigenous peoples rarely enjoyed any level of 
participation in Bank projects, which they still experienced as top-down interventions. 
Bank projects therefore continued to have serious negative impacts on indigenous 
peoples throughout the 1980s.xiii  
 
II. Experiences with participation 
 
The first part of this main section of the review paper will examine experiences with 
World Bank policy processes, consultations and sector reviews. The final section of 
part II will briefly review experiences at the project and programme level. 
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A. World Bank policy and review processes 
 
Indigenous peoples’ past and present experiences with Bank policy processes have 
more often than not been unfavourable and reveal a series of problems that have 
impeded effective and informed participation. Experiences of indigenous peoples in 
engaging with sector reviews have been variable. However, even in the few cases 
where review processes have proved useful, indigenous peoples have been bitterly 
disappointed with follow-up processes in which the Bank has failed to act on official 
recommendations relating to indigenous peoples (see below). 
 
World Bank Indigenous Peoples Policy and its Revisions 
The first World Bank policy on “tribal” peoples was elaborated internally by Bank 
staff in 1980-82 without any participation by indigenous peoples. Real engagement 
between the Bank and indigenous peoples on policy and accountability issues first 
occurred in 1987, at a time when the then-new World Bank President, Barber 
Conable, had finally admitted that many of World Bank projects had resulted in 
negative impacts on indigenous peoples and their environment. At a face-to-face 
meeting co-organised by Survival International and Oxfam-America, three indigenous 
leaders from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia recommended to the Bank’s president that 
the Bank undertake major reforms to ensure compliance with its policies. The leaders 
also called for tri-partite binding agreements between the Bank, the Borrower and 
affected peoples in all cases where loan operations affected their communities and 
their territories. 
 
The 1987 meeting did not result in any clear commitments on the part of the Bank. 
However, in an effort to improve implementation, the World Bank did begin to 
employ more environmental and social staff in the late 1980s, including some 
anthropologists with experience of indigenous issues who were set to work at 
reviewing and updating the Bank’s policy towards indigenous peoples. These 
specialists began work on the policy internally without a public consultation process.  
 
In 1990, indigenous organisations such as COICA made clear recommendations to the 
World Bank demanding a policy which included (i) recognition of indigenous rights 
as set out in international law (ii) direct consultations with indigenous peoples in the 
elaboration of the policy (iii) no development projects in indigenous areas without the 
informed consent of the peoples affected (iv) participation of the indigenous 
organisations, which represent the affected peoples, throughout the full project cycle 
(v) establishment of tripartite commissions, including governments, funders and the 
affected peoples, to oversee project implementation and (v) prioritisation of 
indigenous development alternatives.xiv  
 
Unfortunately, these calls for direct indigenous participation were disregarded. Policy 
makers went ahead alone inside the Bank without sharing their drafts and or their 
thinking. The Bank adopted the revised directive on Indigenous Peoples known as 
Operational Directive 4.20 (OD4.20) in 1991. Indigenous leaders and support NGOs 
criticised the World Bank at the time that the new policy was released for not having 
elaborated it through a participatory process in consultation with indigenous peoples. 
The FPP, for instance, noted that the policy did not respect the right of indigenous 
peoples to self-determination, failed to uphold the right to reject unwanted projects, 
ignored key indigenous demands and contained ambiguous provisions.xv 
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The International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, 
which held meetings with the World Bank to discuss the new policy in 1992, also 
called for a much stronger recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights, recognition of 
the right of free prior and informed consent and the establishment of tripartite 
oversight mechanisms to carry out accountable and transparent planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the projects.xvi 
 
Controversial revision of OD4.20 
Since 1994, OD4.20 and other safeguard policies have been undergoing a process of 
revision as part of a Bank-wide “conversion” process that intends to standardise 
policies into a new three-tier format: Operational Policy (OP), Bank Procedures (BP) 
and Good Practice (Sourcebook).xvii The first part of the policy revision process was 
again criticised by indigenous peoples for failing to involve their representative 
organisations at an early stage.xviii Four years into the process, the first round of public 
consultations on an “Approach paper” began in 1998. Indigenous organisations 
submitted written comments and made oral presentations in a series of consultations 
with indigenous peoples’ organisations, governments and NGOs in Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and Russia.xix Each meeting produced 
a brief report of recommendations which was posted on the Bank’s web pages.xx 
 
Indigenous inputs to the consultation reiterated many of their earlier demands that any 
policy: (a) be informed by a participatory review of implementation of the existing 
policy (b) be fully consistent with international standards on the rights of indigenous 
peoples (c) specify that securing indigenous land and resource rights be an essential 
precondition for project appraisal and approval (d) expressly prohibit forced 
relocation (e) recognise the indigenous right to free prior and informed consent to any 
developments proposed on their lands and territories and  (f) require the involvement 
of affected indigenous peoples in negotiations between the World Bank and the client 
government regarding loan agreements. Crucially, indigenous peoples repeatedly 
requested that their key recommendations be incorporated in the revised policy. 
 
After further lengthy internal consultations among Bank staff and governments, the 
World Bank released its first draft of a revised Indigenous Peoples Policy to the 
public in March 2001. Public consultations began in July 2001 and ran until February 
2002 and involved 25 meetings involving participants from 14 countries. The Bank 
was proud that it had carried out so many meetings and had consulted over 1000 
“stakeholders” in total. However, indigenous peoples who engaged with the process 
reported negative experiences and complained of serious flaws with the process. 
 
Indigenous criticisms of the Bank 2001-02 consultation process: 
Indigenous organisations and NGOs asked Bank staff at the outset of the consultation 
how indigenous peoples’ comments would influence the contents of the final draft 
policy. They were alarmed to learn that the contents of the final policy were “unlikely 
to change significantly” and that issues of principle rejected in the first round of 
public consultation in 1998/99 were unlikely to be included in the final draft.xxi Asked 
to clarify this issue, the Bank then asserted that no subject was “off the table”.xxii 
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However, no clear explanation of how external comments would influence the policy 
was ever provided.xxiii Once the Bank’s 2001-02 consultation meetings got underway, 
they were roundly condemned by indigenous peoples for being rushed and for lacking 
informed and representative indigenous participation, and for failing to meet the 
Bank’s own guidelines on meaningful public consultation (Table 1).xxiv 
 
Participants who took part in the consultations report several fundamental problems 
with the consultations. 
 
• letters to the Bank’s policy revision team received perfunctory responsesxxv 
• many in-country meetings did not provide sufficient time for open and reasoned 
discussion, being largely taken up with presentations by Bank staff: of the total of 
25 meetings, 11 of them only lasted for one dayxxvi 
• most meetings lacked a timely prior provision of relevant documentationxxvii 
• some meetings suffered from poor moderation and translation facilities xxviii 
 
In several cases indigenous participants issued public statements and wrote 
letters to the Bankxxix condemning the meetings as insufficient and lacking in 
meaningful and informed participation e.g., 
 
“…this space for discussion established by the World Bank is not 
considered by our organisations as a consultation…” (Joint statement by 
representatives of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador (CONAIE) and the National Indian Council of Venezuela 
(CONIVE), Cuzco, 23 October 2001)xxx 
 
“The external stakeholders’ consultation at New Delhi, 26 November 
2001, cannot be considered as truthful to the objectives of this 
consultation…its recommendations cannot be seen as reflecting the 
perceptions and views of the indigenous peoples of India in any way” 
(Joint Statement by indigenous representatives present at the stakeholders’ 
consultation, India, 26/11/01)xxxi 
 
Throughout the 2001/02 consultations, indigenous organisations also expressed their 
severe disappointment that the revised draft, now known as OP/BP 4.10, did not 
protect indigenous peoples’ in line with internationally agreed standards and had 
disregarded many of their key recommendations made in the first round of public 
consultations in 1998.xxxii In March 2002, 48 indigenous peoples' organisations and 
support NGOs from Central and South America reiterated their concerns about the 
whole revision process in a letter to the President of the World Bank while attending 
an Organisation of American States (OAS) meeting of the Working Group on the 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.xxxiii   
 
In response to the letter, the World Bank invited indigenous leaders to a meeting in 
Washington D.C.. At that meeting in July 2002, six indigenous representatives who 
attended the discussion again underlined the concerns about substance and problems 
with the consultation process. Indigenous participants in the meeting called on the 
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World Bank to address all these unresolved concerns about Draft OP/BP4.10 in a 
collaborative way with indigenous peoples themselves.xxxiv  
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Table 1: A critical summary evaluation the World Bank’s 2001/02 public 
consultations on its draft revised Operational Policy on Indigenous 
Peoples (OP/BP4.10) 
 
World Bank Criteria for effective  
Public consultationxxxv 
Assessment and comments (based on indigenous 
peoples’ statements and reports of support NGOs) 
PREPARATION  
- review lessons from past consultations There was no public assessment of the quality of the 
first round of public consultations on the IP policy 
revision (98-99).   
- identify relevant stakeholders: ensure  
appropriate venue and meeting dates 
Independent indigenous representatives reportedly 
made up just 10% or less of the participants in some 
consultations, except in those that took place at 
indigenous gatherings, such as the Russian 
Indigenous Federation. When indigenous people in 
India noted the extension in the consultation period, 
they requested another consultation with more 
indigenous participation. In response, the Bank 
simply offered an insignificant amount of money for 
them to organise a meeting themselves. 
- develop a participatory consultation strategyThe ‘consultation strategy’ that was released gave no 
benchmarks for measuring the relative success of 
each meeting, and referred to no effectiveness 
criteria.  
- publish advance schedule for consultationThe schedule that was finally posted gave no specific 
information, participant lists were withheld, and the 
schedule changed a number of times. Schedules were 
only made public once the consultations had already 
begun. The last consultations (Africa) were 
announced only a few weeks in advance. 
- disseminate all relevant information well in 
advance of the public meeting (30 days) 
In many cases, participants saw the information for 
the first time upon arrival at the consultation meeting.  
In other cases, they were given the draft policy a 
week or two in advance, with no supporting 
explanatory materials with which to analyse it.  
HOLDING THE CONSULTATION  
- select impartial chairperson(s) with facilitation
 skills to manage opposing interests and 
“solicit views and transmit them frankly”
Rep rts indicate that chairpersons were chosen 
randomly, and facilitators were not prepared. In Peru 
(October 22/01) the facilitator said to indigenous 
participants “Don’t get so upset about this, it is only a 
policy.” 
- establish atmosphere of openness and 
trust among participants 
Because in most of the consultations participants 
were mixed government, World Bank and indigenous 
representatives there was not an atmosphere of 
complete openness.  This could have been remedied 
by holding separate meetings for indigenous people 
to discuss their views independently (as was done in 
the Philippines). 
- provide clear, non-technical 
information in the local language  
There was no clear, non-technical information from 
the World Bank providing an explanatory framework 
for the policy conversion process or the proposed 
changes. 
- Ensure all participants have an The majority of the consultations were one and a half 
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opportunity to express their views 
(levelling techniques). 
 
- Accommodate questions and 
clarifications as well as objections. 
days or less, with limited time for question and 
answer sessions.  Participants were unclear as to how 
their input was going to be taken into account, 
limiting their willingness to contribute.  See 
complaints in reports from Philippines, Peru, Delhi 
and Russia. 
FOLLOW-UP  
- ensure issues raised by participants 
are actively followed-up 
There was no clear direct follow-up to the 
consultation meetings held in 2001/02 to address 
issues raised.  
- report back to stakeholders how 
plans will be modified in the light of 
their comments and recommendations 
A WB summary did not answer important questions 
nor suggest what changes in the revision might be 
expected as a result of the consultations.  Rejection 
of the consultations by several participants is not 
recorded. 
- provide stakeholders with an 
opportunity to review revised draft 
documents  
According to the WB ‘summary,’ participants would 
see the final documents only after the Board of 
Directors approves them.  
- enable participants’ 
recommendations to be incorporated 
into final documents 
Bank staff said that ‘controversial’ issues such as 
prior informed consent and land rights would be 
noted separately to the Bank’s Board, but not 
incorporated into the revision.  
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After intense pressure from indigenous participants in the July 2002 meeting, Bank officials 
agreed to delay the finalisation of OP/BP4.10 to await the completion of its implementation 
review of OD4.20 being carried the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).xxxvi After much 
struggle and after no less than four years, indigenous peoples had persuaded the Bank to accept 
one if its recommendations!xxxvii  
 
At the same time, the World Bank accepted the invitation made by the indigenous participants to 
co-organise and jointly host a roundtable with indigenous peoples’ representatives to discuss 
their multiple concerns in more depth. This face-to-face dialogue went ahead in October 2002 in 
the Bank HQ. During the roundtable discussion which involved 15 indigenous leaders from 
Africa, Asia and the Americas, one indigenous representative from Ecuador reiterated 
indigenous concerns and emphasised that what is important is not the number of consultations 
and participants present, but the quality and credibility of the participation process: 
 
“It is not a question of how many consultation meetings the Bank has carried out. It is 
a question of whether or not indigenous peoples who took part in those meetings feel 
that they have enjoyed proper participation and to what extent they consider that their 
concerns are being addressed in the revised policy”xxxviii 
 
At the end of the discussions the indigenous participants again formally rejected the March 2001 
draft revised policy. They expressed their appreciation for the meeting as a space to air their 
concerns and reiterate their demands, which centred on the Bank’s obligation to uphold 
indigenous peoples’ rights protected under international law.xxxix While closing the meeting, 
Vice-President Ian Johnson made commitments to re-write the OP and explore the feasibility of a 
more focused legal roundtable with indigenous leaders, Bank lawyers and human rights experts 
to jointly assess OP 4.10 safeguards against international law.xl In the meantime, throughout 
2003, indigenous spokespersons continued to press the Bank to address their concerns: at the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)xli and through the World 
Bank’s own Extractive Industries Review (EIR) (see below). The final report of the EIR released 
in December 2003 made specific recommendations in relation to the Bank’s revision of its policy 
on Indigenous Peoples and backed the indigenous call for a legal roundtable. Crucially, the EIR 
affirmed that, to be considered an effective safeguard, the policy must be acceptable to 
indigenous peoples themselves.  
 
The EIR report was followed by a whole series of letters from indigenous organisations and 
support NGOs calling on the Bank to ensure that the final version of OP/BP 4.10 incorporate the 
recommendations of the EIR report. Despite official statements in the UN and follow-up letters 
from indigenous leaders, the World Bank delayed any legal roundtable and declined to make any 
further commitments on the issue. Finally, after more than a year and with very short notice, a 
member of the Bank’s legal team eventually agreed in May 2004 to meet a small number of 
indigenous leaders on the margins of the UNPFII. To the surprise of the participants, the Bank 
sought to maintain that this informal meeting constituted the requested legal roundtable. 
Participants were given just 12 hours to comment on a revised draft of the OP. Indigenous 
participants put it on the record that they did not accept the meeting as the requested formal legal 
roundtable and noted that the time given for comments on the new draft was grossly 
inadequate.xlii 
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More process problems at the final stages of policy revision:  
In December 2004, the Bank team finally released the second draft of the revised OP4.10 for 90 
days’ public consultation. On examining the draft, indigenous leaders and support NGOs 
tracking the process were disappointed that the Bank did not incorporate clear language on FPIC, 
but instead included the retrograde language of Free Prior Informed Consultation (FPICon) that 
emerged from the Bank’s weak and regressive response to the EIR report. This language was 
included in OP 4.10 even though it had been explicitly rejected by indigenous peoples in July 
2004 (see below). At the same time, some potentially useful elements of the draft OP, such as a 
new mandatory requirement for social assessments, have been welcomed. Indigenous leaders 
stressed that they were unable to properly assess the potential utility of other proposed 
safeguards, such as “broad community support”, because they were unable to scrutinise the 
Bank’s draft proposals for binding procedural rules in BP 4.10 that are meant to underpin the 
general safeguard commitments in the OP. 
 
Unfortunately, to the surprise of indigenous organisations and NGOs and contrary to previous 
Bank practice, the World Bank did not release the BP with the OP in December 2004. On 
questioning this radical break from previous policy processes, Bank policy makers advised that 
there had been an internal decision not to circulate the draft BP for comment. Bank officials 
therefore now propose to fundamentally change the status of this critical procedural policy 
instrument to a “non-board” document. The failure to release the BP document prior to Board 
approval further undermined indigenous peoples’ trust in the Bank’s flawed policy-making 
process.  
 
In May 2005, the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved OP4.10 without any significant 
changes to the December 2004 draft. Indigenous peoples’ have noted some positive elements in 
the new policy, but express disappointment that the final revised policy fails to uphold their right 
to free, prior and informed consent, lacks effective provisions to recognise and respect 
indigenous peoples’ customary rights to their lands territories and natural resources and contains 
scant language on informed participation. Indigenous peoples are disappointed that the new 
revised policy has not incorporated their recommendations on the need to include vital 
procedural safeguards to ensure third party verification of the existence or non-existence of 
“broad community support”: 
 
Of specific concern is the World Bank’s recent decision to require a process of free prior 
and informed consultation with affected indigenous peoples’ communities to ascertain 
their broad community support for a project, rather than requiring the free prior and 
informed consent of the affected indigenous people.  By merely requiring the World 
Bank to verify that the borrower has gained the “broad support from representatives of 
major sections of the community”-  with no guarantees as to what information will be 
disclosed and when, how such verification will be conducted and by who,  and how the 
collective decision-making processes and structures of the affected indigenous people 
will be recognized and respected-  the free prior and informed consultation process 
stands to reduce indigenous peoples rights to a mere technical procedure.   The 
weakening of free prior and informed consent as an international standard for indigenous 
peoples stands to severely threaten the lands, territories, and natural resources of 
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indigenous peoples and to undermine their internationally recognized human rights [UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Fourth Session, May 2005: Collective statement 
on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Including 
Free Prior Informed Consent] 
 
World Commission on Dams 
In June 1994, more than 2000 civil society organisations signed the Manibeli Declaration calling 
on the World Bank to establish and “independent comprehensive review of all Bank-funded 
large dam projects”. Anti-dam campaigners, including indigenous organisations and dam-
affected communities, hoped that such a review would vindicate many of their criticisms and 
help lead to a major reform of Bank policies and practice. After dragging its feet, in 1997 the 
World Bank and the IUCN finally agreed to oversee the establishment of the World Commission 
on Dams that would review large dams in general, and not only those financed by the World 
Bank.  
 
The negotiations for agreeing the mandate and modalities of the Commission were tense, and at 
times civil society and indigenous peoples’ organisations threatened to withdraw unless their 
conditions for a credible process were met. The major stumbling block centred on the demands 
that the selection of Commissioners include experts from dam-affected peoples which the World 
Bank and IUCN were reluctant to accept. 
  
In the end, the World Bank backed down and the composition of the 12-member Commission of 
the WCD was agreed in 1998. Crucially, the Commission included one indigenous leader from 
the Philippines. The deliberations of the WCD were assisted by the WCD Forum that constituted 
a consultative body with 68 members, 20 of whom were drawn from NGOs and dam-affected 
grassroots social movements, including indigenous peoples’ organisations.xliii The work of the 
WCD included commissioning case studies and research and holding public hearings in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. WCD also commissioned a thematic study on indigenous peoples, 
ethnic minorities and dams which it agreed should include case studies written by indigenous 
peoples themselves and include a public hearing to listen to the case studies and discuss 
conclusions and recommendations. Indigenous peoples thus prepared their own detailed cases 
outlining the impacts of dams on their peoples and territories in Norway, Guatemala, Namibia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Chile and Canada.xliv The Indigenous peoples were also able to present 
their experiences to WCD consultations and comment on drafts of thematic studies. Despite 
efforts to impede open multi-stakeholder discussions by some governments, the WCD and its 
Commissioners succeeded in agreeing a consensus multi-stakeholder report that was published in 
November 2000. 
 
Though not without problems (e.g., some documents were never translated into local languages), 
the inclusive WCD process has been widely praised by indigenous peoples as well as 
environmental, human rights and development NGOs. This is because the elaboration of the 
WCD mandate and its policy framework involved the active incorporation of different rights 
holders and non-governmental stakeholders whose inputs were able to shape the work 
programme of the Commission and influence its final recommendations.xlv In particular, the 
inclusion of an indigenous commissioner and indigenous participation in the consultative body 
helped ensure that key indigenous recommendations actually made it into the consensus report. 
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Indigenous peoples who engaged in the process were especially satisfied that the final WCD 
guidelines for sustainable dam development fully recognises indigenous peoples’ right to free 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) and establishes that FPIC is a process whereby each stage of 
a project cycle is subject to prior agreement by potentially affected indigenous and tribal 
peoples.xlvi 
 
Disappointment with World Bank response to WCD 
Although the WCD review was considered best practice in public policy-making, the Bank’s 
negative attitude to the process and its limited follow-up to this major global review and has been 
disappointing.xlvii As a major sponsor of the exercise, indigenous organisations and others had 
expected the Bank to act on the WCD recommendations and incorporate new standards in its 
policies. This has not happened and the Bank has only committed to using the WCD report as a 
“valuable reference” tool. Though the WCD process is being followed up by UNEP, the World 
Bank Group has so far still failed to incorporate its major recommendations into its revised 
policy on Indigenous Peoples and its other mandatory safeguard policies. The World Bank’s 
refusal to implement the WCD recommendations has been heavily criticised by civil society and 
indigenous organisations that engaged in the process.xlviii 
 
Indigenous peoples and civil society concerns about the Bank’s reluctance to accept the 
recommendations of the WCD are becoming more acute as the Bank is now planning to 
recommence large-scale lending to “high-reward/high risk hydraulic infrastructure projects” (see 
Section B below).xlix 
  
Extractive Industries Review (EIR) 
The World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (EIR) was an initiative set in motion in 2001 by 
the President of the World Bank Group, James Wolfensohn. The EIR was undertaken primarily 
in response to pressure on the Bank from members of Friends of the Earth-International and 
other environmental NGOs calling on the institution to cease funding for oil, gas and mining 
sector investments. However, after experiencing little direct control over the WCD review and its 
findings, the Bank proposed an EIR procedure which lacked many of the elements of autonomy 
that gave the WCD its credibility with people outside the Bank.  
 
Unlike the WCD, the aim was not to review extractive industries as a whole, but just to focus on 
the World Bank Group’s (WBG) engagement with the extractive sector (oil, mining, gas). 
Another major difference was that whereas the WCD included a whole board of independent 
commissioners, the EIR centred around an ‘Eminent Person’ (EP): Dr Emil Salim ex-Indonesian 
Minister for the Environment and Population during the 1980s and early 1990s. It was Dr Salim 
alone, who had authority to decide what the final report of the consultation process would say.l 
The early terms of reference for the EIR and its organisation were strongly criticised by civil 
society organisations for giving undue influence to the World Bank and for limiting the scope 
and potential outcomes of the study.li In response to these criticisms, the EIR terms of reference 
were partially revised and the EIR secretariat was moved to Jakarta outside the Bank.lii 
 
Despite the problems with the process, indigenous NGOs and support NGOs including the FPP 
were able to persuade the Eminent Person that he should commission a series of fully 
independent indigenous case studies of the impact of World Bank extractive sector activities on 
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indigenous peoples in Colombia, Cameroon, Papua New Guinea, India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Russia.liii The indigenous authors of the studies were able to present their 
powerful stories directly to Emil Salim in a workshop held in April 2003. The participants 
forcefully expressed their frustrations with the World Bank and made far reaching 
recommendations calling on the World Bank to fully respect their rights through reform of their 
policies and practice.liv 
 
Doubts about the credibility of the EIR process were confirmed in early 2003 when the first 
outline draft of the report was posted on the EIR web site. Indigenous organisations and NGOs 
were alarmed to see that their recommendations had been disregarded and the draft report 
concluded that Bank engagement with the sector was beneficial and should continue. In the EIR 
regional Asia-Pacific consultation meeting, indigenous organisations joined NGOs in a walk out 
in order to publicly express their dissatisfaction with the process. Civil society and indigenous 
organisations threatened to pull out of the process altogether unless immediate changes were 
made to the final stages of the EIR process to ensure the final compilation of its report would be 
inclusive, independent, and be guided by a multi-stakeholder advisory panel, that would include 
at least one indigenous expert. This panel was formed in June 2003 and included an indigenous 
leader from Argentina.  
 
Reports from indigenous and NGO panelists indicate that the panel worked relatively well. 
Drafts were shared with members of the advisory panel for comment on a regular basis right up 
until the finalisation of the report. Emil Salim, however, was the sole author of the report and 
exercised complete editorial control. 
 
The result was a frank report that made a series of progressive recommendations about how the 
World Bank Group should reform and how human rights, including indigenous peoples’ rights 
and FPIC, should be respected in World Bank policies and operations.lv Indigenous and support 
organisations that took part in the EIR consider that the combination of direct testimony by 
indigenous peoples and direct indigenous participation in the drafting process helped bring about 
some useful outcomes in the final report. Like the WCD review, the EIR report recognised that 
indigenous peoples should have the right to give their free, prior and informed consent 
throughout each phase of the project cycle and that FPIC should be seen as the principle factor in 
determining if the World Bank, its borrowers and the private sector have a “social license to 
operate’ or not.lvi The same report recommended that the World Bank work with the UNPFII in a 
joint effort to incorporate FPIC and other measures to respect indigenous peoples’ rights into the 
Bank’s safeguard policies and project-related instruments.lvii 
 
Despite these important substantive gains in the final stages of the EIR, indigenous organisations 
and NGOs stress that for much of the two-year process they were obliged to divert a lot of their 
efforts to trying to rectify a review framework that was badly designed and excessively 
controlled by the World Bank and, which had ignored civil society calls for a truly inclusive and 
independent review.  
 
Disillusion with the World Bank response to EIR: 
In June 2004, the World Bank released its formal response to the EIR report and the EIR 
recommendations. Civil society and indigenous organizations that had engaged with the EIR 
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were disappointed with the vague Bank response and the fact that many critical issues were 
deferred to ongoing processes such as the IFC safeguard update and the revision of the Bank’s 
Indigenous Peoples Policy. In particular, indigenous peoples were indignant that the Bank’s 
management response (MR) did not accept the EIR recommendations on indigenous peoples and 
FPIC, but instead advised that the Bank will only support EI projects with free, prior and 
informed consultation (FPICon) resulting in the “broad community support” of affected 
communities.  In a letter to the Bank in July 2004, indigenous organisations strongly rejected 
FPICon language: 
 
The (Bank’s) misappropriation and misinterpretation of FPIC as free, prior and informed 
consultation is unacceptable.  In principle, the same is also the case for applying a ‘broad 
community acceptance/support’ standard to indigenous peoples as this undermines 
indigenous peoples’ internationally guaranteed right to consent to activities that affect us 
and equates indigenous peoples and our rights to those of any local community.  In 
effect, this negates indigenous peoples’ self-determining status and rights by casting 
indigenous peoples as nothing more than a sub-set of local communities.lviii 
 
Indigenous peoples and support NGOs also complain that the Bank’s position on FPIC as cited 
in its initial response to the EIR was clearly incorrect. For example, the Bank affirmed that all 
governments and industry are opposed to FPIC, which is a false statement as FPIC has been 
accepted by a number of countries and industry associations.lix Despite an indigenous petition 
(signed by 60 indigenous organisations worldwide) rejecting the MR and calling on the Bank’s 
governors to fully adopt the EIR recommendations on human rights and Indigenous peoples, the 
flawed management response was endorsed by the Bank’s board in August 2004.lx  
 
The problematic FPICon language repudiated by indigenous peoples was therefore subsequently 
included in the Bank’s revised policy on Indigenous Peoples (OP4.10) adopted in May 2005 (see 
above), though it now seems this flawed language is likely to be deleted from the IFC’s draft 
performance standards. Despite this late move by the IFC to address indigenous complaints, 
serious criticisms of the IFC process still stem from signs that its safeguard policy update process 
is failing to properly address human rights and other key EIR recommendations.lxi 
 
World Bank Fails to learn from past mistakes: 
Taken together, indigenous peoples’ experiences of participation in the World Bank’s 
consultations on its policy revision process have not been good. Indigenous peoples share a 
widespread perception that instead of acting on indigenous priorities, the revisions to the World 
Bank safeguard policies have mainly addressed the concerns of borrower governments and 
private sector clients – thus greatly diminishing their credibility as safeguards for indigenous 
peoples.  While sector reviews have been comparatively more effective at enabling inputs, the 
Bank’s refusal to adopt progressive recommendations that have stemmed from these reviews has 
left indigenous peoples and indigenous activists increasingly sceptical of the Bank’s so-called 
“consultation” processes. The Bank’s own guidelines on public consultation acknowledge that 
such a feeling of alienation is likely to emerge where people judge that their time and energy 
have not influenced a process: 
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 With public participation, the main lesson learned is that the meaningfulness of the 
exercise is proportional to the scope for influencing decisions which may affect 
participants…People may feel alienated and deceived if important decisions have 
already been made before consultation is initiated…” lxii 
 
Face-to-face engagement between indigenous peoples and Bank officials, such as the 2002 
roundtable on draft OP4.10, has proved useful for raising concerns. However, indigenous 
peoples and support NGOs have been frustrated that the Bank has not fulfilled key commitments 
e.g., to hold a legal roundtable. Disenchantment is also high because the World Bank seems to be 
incapable of learning from past mistakes. Recent examples of ongoing errors include: 
 
- Rushed consultations with incomplete documents in the wrong languages. For example, 
in August 2004 the IFC launched a consultation on its Safeguard Policy Update that was 
widely condemned for failing to meet the standards of good faith public consultation.lxiii 
- Making decisions on policies that may directly affect indigenous peoples without 
ensuring their direct participation. For example, in 2004/05 the Bank has rushed through 
a new pilot “Country Systems Approach” that is likely to have major implications for the 
way the Bank will deal with indigenous peoples affected by its loan operations. To date, 
however, the Bank has not held a targeted consultation with indigenous peoples on its 
controversial proposals, which as they stand do not even meet with new commitments 
made in the draft revised OP4.10.lxiv 
- Making key decisions on standards directly relevant to and of interest to Indigenous 
peoples behind closed doors. For example, Bank policy makers and senior management 
took a unilateral decision not to disclose the draft Bank Procedures on Indigenous 
Peoples (BP4.10) prior to its formal adoption – thus depriving indigenous peoples of the 
opportunity to participate in a vital part of the safeguard framework to be employed by 
the Bank. 
 
 
B. World Bank Projects and Programmes 
 
The World Bank does not have a stand-alone policy on public and community participation in its 
projects and programmes. Nonetheless, mandatory participation and information disclosure 
requirements are embedded within 14 World Bank operational policies, including the previous 
and existing policy on indigenous peoples. The previous Indigenous Peoples Policy, which 
remains in force until July 2005, requires that: 
 
The Bank's policy is that the strategy for addressing the issues pertaining to indigenous 
peoples must be based on the informed participation of the indigenous people 
themselves… (Paragraph 8).  
 
In relation to the development and implementation of an IPDP the former policy stipulated that: 
 
Mechanisms should be devised and maintained for participation by indigenous people in 
decision making throughout project planning, implementation, and evaluation... 
(Paragraph 15(d)) (See end note # 68)lxv 
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The Bank’s 1995 guidelines on participation and indigenous peoples advise Bank staff that the 
“building blocks” of effective indigenous participation should include: 
 
 use of vernacular languages with skilled interpreters 
 involvement of indigenous peoples’ representative organisations 
 capacity-building to enable informed engagement 
 adequate time for consultation so that indigenous views can be addressed 
 special procedures to ensure that indigenous women have a voice 
 repetition of meetings …over a long period of timelxvi 
 culturally appropriate participation methodslxvii  
 
Failure to implement participation standards and guidelines: 
Although the World Bank has rightly adopted several binding rules and best practice guidelines 
on participation, these have often not been applied in its projects and programmes affecting 
indigenous peoples. Independent case studies of World Bank projects in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia carried out by indigenous peoples themselves have also found compliance with OD4.20 
is often weak and sometimes highly unsatisfactory, especially with regard to the critical needs 
for indigenous peoples’ participation and secure land rights. These studies confirm that World 
Bank staff and project agency engagement with indigenous peoples has frequently been late, 
perfunctory and/or culturally inappropriate. It is not uncommon for indigenous communities to 
only learn of a project once it has already started after key assumptions made and decisions taken 
by outsiders.lxviii 
 
The failure to implement the existing participation standards is confirmed by the World Bank’s 
own evaluations. A desk-based review of 89 Bank projects affecting indigenous peoples 
approved after January 1992 and closed prior to 31 May 2001  carried out as part of the OED 
evaluation of the implementation of OD4.20 found that 38% of projects had not applied the 
policy at all.lxix Even where the OD had been applied to some degree, the review of the 1992-
2001 project sample found that indigenous peoples were only involved in the decision-making 
process relating to the project in half of the projects – leading to the conclusion that “even among 
the projects that applied the OD...participation of indigenous peoples in decision making and in 
financial management is still low”.lxx OED examination of 87 “open projects” approved after 
2001 that affect indigenous peoples found that almost 20% had little or no measures at all to 
enable indigenous participation.lxxi The same review found that those projects that do include 
participation components, usually confine such measures to conventional consultation 
meetings.lxxii Field evaluation of projects also found that many projects lacked any capacity 
building for affected communities restricted their informed participation in project design and 
implementation.lxxiii A 2004 internal evaluation of 48 full-size and medium-sized projects 
undertaken by the World Bank found that just 28% of its biodiversity projects in Latin America 
involved high levels of indigenous participation on project design. The same review found that 
38% of projects suffered from “low” participation of indigenous peoples and only limited 
involvement of indigenous peoples in project preparation.lxxiv 
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Disagreement over the meaning of informed and effective participation: 
Damning as these official statistics are, the actual level of genuine participation in Bank projects 
may well be far lower in practice. In other words, though the World Bank, implementing 
agencies and evaluation teams may consider participation has taken place in a specific project or 
programme, time and again affected indigenous communities report that consultation and 
participation has been seriously deficient. Today, there is a growing tendency for Bank staff to 
document indigenous “participation” in project preparation processes (usually listing a series of 
meetings and workshops and organisations that attended as an annex to project appraisal 
documents). However, communities and their representative organisations often do not feel they 
have been properly consulted and do not consider they have enjoyed informed participation in 
project design. There is a widespread feeling that so-called “participation” in Bank projects is 
partial and usually restricted to village meetings in which consultants “extract” information about 
development “needs”, more to fulfil their own requirements than to address the genuine priorities 
of indigenous communities. 
 
Indigenous peoples’ affected or “targeted” by World Bank projects experience a serious cultural 
disconnect between their own understandings of effective participation and the understandings of 
“participation” held by World Bank staff, consultants, and government and NGO implementing 
agencies. In many cases, indigenous peoples complain that project agencies confuse 
“consultation” with informed participation, when the two relate to quite distinct processes. 
Indigenous peoples stress that they do not wish to be “consulted” or “participate” in 
development which is beyond their direct control or is without their prior consent.lxxv 
Meaningful participation must include the right to influence decisions and determine their own 
path of development, including the right to reject unwanted development proposals. In many 
cases indigenous organisations complain that they have been unable to influence key decisions 
on project design relating to budget allocations, disbursement and the role of indigenous 
organisations in project governance. Key projects documents and annual operational plans are 
often not available at the community level. Indigenous peoples complain that these documents 
remain in the hands of project elites and government officials in towns and cities.lxxvi   
 
Even projects identified as “best practice” by OED evaluations, are not considered as such by 
some of the key indigenous organisations involved. One example is the Brazil-Bolivia Gas 
Pipeline Project which involved several public meetings with indigenous organisations about 
project design and regarding the IPDP. After these meetings, some indigenous leaders felt they 
had been manipulated and that their own decisions and concerns were not respected by the Bank: 
 
We wanted to alter the proposed route of the pipeline but we had no influence – it was 
already decided. I see it now as a game that has no concrete result for us…the workshops 
and discussions are held simply to comply with Bank guidelines. We conclude that the 
Bank’s discussions are organised to stem our criticism of proposed projects (President, 
Asamblea de Pueblos Guaraní - APG, October 1999)lxxvii 
Indigenous representatives that have occupied places on the executive bodies governing Bank 
loans complain that they do not enjoy effective participation in project governance and lack 
adequate technical assistance and capacity building to enable their informed participation. A case 
in point is the World Bank-implemented Indigenous Management of Protected Areas in the 
Amazon (PIMA) project in Peru. Although the president of the indigenous peoples’ organisation 
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AIDESEP has a seat on the governing body of the project, indigenous leaders complain that their 
priorities are sidelined by the other non-indigenous members who form the majority of the 
project Directorate.lxxviii The PIMA case reveals that, where governance bodies are dominated by 
government and NGOs and a majority voting system is used, indigenous peoples’ representatives 
are often marginalised on key decisions and are thereby actually disempowered by the project. 
 
Project “participation” as a government tool for social control and co-option 
As noted above, another frequent indigenous criticism is that World Bank-sponsored 
consultation meetings are used primarily by project officials and consultants to give legitimacy 
to the project, gain access to communities, divide opinion and pressure local indigenous 
communities to accept the external agendas of governments, development agencies, big business 
and NGOs.lxxix In the worst cases, instruments that are supposed to ensure informed participation 
such as the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) are used by World Bank project 
agencies to promote their own top-down agendas.  
In the Andhra Pradesh Community Forest Management Project, for example, the IPDP was 
largely written by external consultants. The final adopted plan aims to extinguish customary 
rights and reduce the traditional dependence of indigenous communities on forest lands. At the 
village level, most indigenous leaders are not even aware that such a plan exists. On learning of 
its unjust objectives they express stiff opposition to the IPDP goals that threaten to infringe their 
rights and undermine their livelihood security.lxxx  
 
Indigenous peoples often complain that World Bank projects that “target” their communities in 
the name of development and conservation are implemented by NGOs that have weak links to 
the communities. These intermediary NGOs hold consultation meetings and undertake rapid 
“participatory” methodologies that are completed in a very short time. Ironically, “participatory” 
methodologies that were formulated in the 1990s to avoid imposed development planning (e.g., 
Participatory Rural Appraisal – PRA), have become another top-down tool for extraction of local 
information by outsiders and project elites.lxxxi 
 
Lack of effective or culturally appropriate monitoring indicators: 
A further finding of the OED evaluation of the implementation of OD4.20 is that World Bank 
projects typically lack adequate indicators for indigenous participation and some lack monitoring 
systems altogether. Even projects with stand-alone IPDPs normally lack participation indicators. 
In many Bank projects, it is thus impossible to verify if indigenous peoples have participated or 
not. It is even harder to assess the quality of participation as most indicators are based on 
quantitative outputs (number of meetings etc) rather than on measures of the effectiveness of 
type of participation delivered.lxxxii Even where participation indicators are used in World Bank 
projects, this review has found no evidence to show these have been agreed upon in a 
participatory manner with affected communities. 
 
Progress at the Project and Programme Level? 
There are a few cases where indigenous peoples have enjoyed a greater level of participation in the 
Bank projects. In some regions such as Latin America, the Bank has introduced “do good” projects 
targeting indigenous peoples, which aim to support poverty reduction, ‘ethno-development’, natural 
resource management and land titling.lxxxiii These new approaches have brought mixed results and 
critics argue they have caused divisions in national and local indigenous movements, failed to 
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address the underlying structural causes of indigenous poverty and, so far, have not been very 
effective in addressing the policy, legal and practical problems that undermine indigenous land and 
resource security.lxxxiv 
 
Though not without significant problems, indigenous organisations acknowledge that some of the 
Bank’s ethno-development and natural resource management projects in Latin America have 
involved more effective participation. Case studies reveal that more informed participation in these 
projects has been the result of long project preparation times, intensive staff inputs, willingness to 
pay unusually high transaction costs, strong borrower commitments to reform and genuinely 
participatory decision-making both in project preparation and implementation.lxxxv One reported 
example of high quality implementation is found in the Natural Resource Management Project in 
Colombia where a successful land titling programme for indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians 
was supported by the Bank under complex and difficult local circumstances.lxxxvi 
 
Limited or defective participation in national-level policy processes: 
Despite the emergence of a new generation of Bank loans targeting indigenous peoples at the 
project level, indigenous organisations monitoring the World Bank point out that much of the 
Bank’s business is now channelled through country-wide programmatic loans. Many of these new 
loans directly or indirectly promote unsustainable, top-down development based on foreign direct 
investment, export-led growth, structural adjustment and the industrial extraction of natural 
resources. Indigenous peoples complain that these largely unaccountable development 
interventions continue to have severe negative consequences for indigenous peoples and their 
territories throughout the world. They point out that these operations lack transparency and are 
largely unaccountable to the public.lxxxvii 
 
In the same way, indigenous peoples are usually not even consulted in relation to World Bank 
technical assistance loans that assist the reform of natural resource legislation that directly affects 
the rights, territories and welfare of indigenous peoples.lxxxviii  Indigenous peoples point out that 
the World Bank applies double standards in its loan operations. While social development 
projects may feature participatory activities and consultations, major Bank interventions in the 
energy, water, mining, governance, land administration sectors are undertaken behind closed 
doors with little or no indigenous or public participation at all and limited or zero information 
disclosure.lxxxix 
  
In 1999 The World Bank began to introduce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 
highly indebted countries (HIPC) with the aim of replacing its top-down adjustment loans with 
more participatory strategic poverty alleviation programmes driven by grassroots priorities. 
However, the PRSP process has so far failed to foster alternative macroeconomic models. 
Indigenous and civil society groups have been frustrated that their own plans for economic and 
social development have been sidelined by the PRSP process, which has continued to apply the 
conventional adjustment remedies based on privatisation, foreign-direct investment and export-
led growth.  
 
Even if civil society organisations and NGOs gain some level of participation in the PRSP 
process, indigenous organisations are left out or marginalised or just identified as “poor people” 
to be measured, counted and documented. In Rwanda, for example, though much of the PRSP 
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was reported to be written by foreign consultants in coordination with the Ministry of Finance, 
urban-based NGOs were able to make some inputs. However, according to information available 
to this review, indigenous groups such as the Batwa were not meaningfully consulted prior to the 
adoption of the PRSP. One apparent exception to the poor participation record in PRSPs is 
Bolivia, where indigenous representatives were at least involved “to some extent” and succeeded 
in securing some specific policy provisions on indigenous peoples.xc 
 
Is the World Bank learning lessons? 
Evidence from recent projects and programmes in Asia and Africa reveals that some World Bank 
loan operations continue to lack effective indigenous participation during project design and 
preparation. During implementation, projects still tend to apply pro-forma consultation exercises 
that do not enable meaningful participation. In Jharkhand State in India, for example, voices of 
dissent from Adivasi leaders have been routinely ignored in World Bank public consultation 
meetings in 2003 and 2004. The Bank and government have pushed through plans for pilot 
investments for a controversial forestry Joint Forest Management (JFM) project, even though 
numerous statements by Adivasi organisations have rejected the state’s 2001 JFM policy.xci 
 
Despite serious and unresolved controversies over the GEF-assisted India Ecodevelopment 
project (IEP) that closed in 2004, the government of India is seeking GEF and World Bank 
finance for another IEP-style intervention, that is to be renamed a Biodiversity Conservation and 
Rural Livelihood Project. As current proposals stand, there are few indications that indigenous 
and tribal organisations have been consulted about the project. Furthermore, local Adivasi 
communities and support NGOs have not requested this new project. The proposed project has 
all the makings of yet another imposed and unwanted programme conceived and implemented by 
government agencies and conservationists. 
 
There are also signs that the Bank continues to base project preparation on “consultations” in 
countries where freedom of expression is seriously constrained. In 2005, for example, the World 
Bank is moving to lend money to the controversial Nam Theun II dam in Laos. Bank consultants 
acknowledge that the dam will displace 6,200 indigenous people from 17 villages on the Nakai 
plateau.xcii Although indigenous peoples have attended consultation meetings on the project, and 
have been able to express their concerns,xciii native speaking observers have criticised the narrow 
remit of the consultation and the doubtful impartiality of some project information provided in 
local languages.  
 
Despite requests by major donor governments that the World Bank (IDA) “take into account” the 
core values and strategic priorities of the WCD in preparing and evaluating new dam projects, 
Nam Theun II clearly does not conform to WCD strategic priorities. Indigenous peoples’ free, 
prior and informed consent has not been sought during consultations and no agreement on how 
to express and verify consent was made prior to the planning process. Furthermore, communities 
faced with resettlement have not been given access to legal or other independent support. 
Participation has been confined to outdated, low-level “consultation” where the views of 
villagers are listened to and documented by project officials and consultants.xciv 
 
Continuing top-down World Bank interventions in Africa also remain common. For example, in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the World Bank has been heavily criticised by indigenous 
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and civil society organisations for pushing through reforms to the Forest Code without 
meaningful consultation with forest-dependent communities and their representative 
organisations.xcv In Cameroon, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, that has been hailed by the 
Bank as a “model” extractives project, has struggled to ensure meaningful and effective 
participation by affected Bagyéli communities. What modest gains have been made in this 
controversial project have come after long protests and years after they were formally required 
by Bank policies.xcvi 
 
In Latin America, reports indicate that greater indigenous participation in Bank projects has 
become more prevalent in recent years. In Bolivia, for example, indigenous organisations 
complained bitterly in the mid-1990s that they were given virtually no prior information 
regarding the first phase of the World Bank/GEF Sustainability of the Bolivian Protected Area 
System project (GEF I), but had gained some participation in the GEF II project in recent 
years.xcvii Under the GEFII programme some indigenous organisations have been supported by 
the World Bank/GEF to co-manage protected areas. However, indigenous leaders complain that 
the attitudes of some implementing agency staff and government officials still blocks effective 
indigenous participation in decision making, and stifles the disbursement of funds allocated for 
indigenous communities and indigenous project components. 
 
Despite these gains in some programmes, as discussed above, even so-called “do good” projects 
in Latin America still suffer severe problems and have been unable to deliver effective 
participation. In Peru, for example, the Bank learning and innovation loan for the Proyecto de 
Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afroperuanos (PDPIA) has been roundly condemned by 
the indigenous movement for failing to deliver effective indigenous participation, disregarding 
indigenous priorities and overlooking irregularities in the governance of the project.xcviii  
 
There is little evidence from any region to show that the World Bank has enhanced effective 
participation in national policy formulation, programmatic lending or technical assistance loans. 
In India for example, in 2004, civil society organisations condemned the World Bank’s new 
2004 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for being based on a flawed consultation process that 
lacked transparency, failed to provided prior information, provided just two-days notice prior to 
public meetings to discuss the draft CAS and disregarded the concerns of rights holders and 
citizens.xcix 
 
C. Accountability and Redress mechanisms 
 
Independent evaluations of the usefulness of the Inspection Panel have shown that while its has 
proved relatively successful in highlighting compliance problems, its centralised complaints 
procedure is cumbersome for grassroots communities and has so far shown limited capacity to 
stimulate adequate corrective actions to address local grievances.c  Where complaints have been 
launched early on in a project cycle and prior to Board approval, complaints that have been 
upheld by the Inspection Panel have been successful in stopping flawed projects going ahead. 
However, once a project has already got underway, the Inspection Panel has not been effective at 
delivering solutions. 
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There is also mounting evidence that the IFC and MIGA’s centralised Compliance Ombudsman 
Office (CAO) suffers similar problems given its very technical approach, its distant base in 
Washington DC and its reliance on infrequent field “missions”. Affected indigenous 
communities such as those in Singrauli in India have complained that Inspection Panel field 
visits to their communities have been very rushed. Concerns have also been expressed about the 
lack of full independence of panel field missions when investigators have been accompanied by 
government officials and Bank staff involved in the problem project.ci  
 
In Cameroon, NGOs observers report that Inspection Panel visits to affected Bagyéli 
communities in 2003 did not involve impartial translation services. Due to defective translation, 
key issues being raised by the aggrieved community members were not conveyed to the 
investigator resulting in a skewed and unhelpful Inspection Panel report. Communities who took 
the time to work with local NGOs to submit a complaint to the Panel were left deeply 
disillusioned on learning of the contents of the Panel report that did not record their concerns 
faithfully. 
In some cases, indigenous communities that have launched complaints to the Inspection Panel 
have felt disempowered after learning that they have no direct influence over the process after 
submitting their complaint. Many observers point out the Inspection Panel and CAO are not fully 
independent and their assessments of the eligibility of claimant requests for investigation are 
often based on the advice of the Bank’s own legal department. At the same time, the “standards 
of harm” which claimants must meet to be considered eligible have been criticised for being 
unduly narrow and confined solely to issues relating to (now sometimes outdated) safeguard 
policies. Given these limitations with existing accountability mechanisms, indigenous and civil 
society organisations have been calling on the Bank and other IFIs to require complementary 
accountability mechanisms for their development operations at the project or programme level 
that are more agile, more accessible, more independent and mandated to deliver redress.cii 
 
D. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
This review has discussed indigenous peoples’ experiences of participation in four World Bank 
activities: sector reviews, World Bank policy making, national policy processes, and World Bank 
financed programmes and projects. Some key findings and recommendations are set out below. 
 
Sector reviews: 
 
Main findings: 
 
• Concerns expressed by indigenous peoples and civil society about problems with review 
processes and consultation procedures tend to be dismissed by the World Bank – 
resulting in flawed consultations from the outset (e.g., Extractive Industries Review – 
EIR: 2001-2003) 
• World Bank determination to press head with flawed review processes in the face of 
public criticisms generates controversy and wastes time as indigenous peoples’ 
organisations and NGOs expend energy trying to rectify the process or organising to 
boycott it 
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• Indigenous and civil society organisations have not been satisfied with the participation 
in sector reviews run entirely by the Bank because they have not been able to 
significantly shape findings and outcomes of the review (e.g., Forest Policy 
Implementation Review and Strategy Process: 1999-2002). 
• Participation of indigenous peoples has been relatively effective in reviews where 
indigenous experts and indigenous organisations have been part of an inclusive and 
impartial process independent of the World Bank Group (e.g., World Commission on 
Dams) 
• Semi-independent reviews applying the Eminent Person (EP) model have proved useful 
in ensuring balanced participation where an advisory panel has included different rights 
holders and interest groups, but final outcomes ultimately depend on the credibility and 
decisions of the EP e.g., EIR, 2001-03 
• World Bank follow-up and commitment to act on the findings of sector reviews have 
been weak, and this has generated frustration and disillusion among indigenous 
organisations and leaders who engaged with these processes 
• The World Bank failure to adopt progressive recommendations of sector reviews it has 
sponsored has continued to weaken already minimal (and often non-existent) trust that 
indigenous peoples and civil society organisations have in the World Bank Group. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
 Minimum conditions for the engagement of indigenous peoples and civil society 
engagement and participation should be agreed prior to commencing the review 
 The World Bank and other agencies party to (or the subject of) the review must affirm 
how review findings and recommendations will influence policy and practice (as part of 
the agreed terms of engagement) 
 Terms of reference of the review body should be mutually agreed with indigenous 
peoples and major groups 
 Reviews should be conducted in a framework that guarantees maximum independence 
from the World Bank Group 
 Participation, transparency, accountability mechanisms should be built into the work 
programme of the review and into the procedure for compiling the review report and 
recommendations 
 
Policy revisions and standard-setting processes: 
 
Main findings: 
• Indigenous peoples have been deeply disillusioned that the World bank has failed to 
incorporate practical standards on issues that they have requested for over fifteen years 
e.g., human rights and free, prior and informed consent 
• Policy revision processes at the World Bank have been marked by defective public 
consultations that have been condemned by indigenous peoples who engaged with the 
process e.g., revision of World Bank Indigenous Peoples Policy (Draft OP/BP4.10) 
• Public consultation procedures have not complied with the Bank’s own policies nor with 
its guidelines for effective participation processes for indigenous peoples e.g., OP4.10 
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• World Bank policy makers tend to place emphasis on the quantity of consultations, while 
indigenous peoples emphasise what is important is the quality of informed participation 
• Explanations of how indigenous peoples’ inputs to policy processes will or will not affect 
the outcomes of the policy process have not been provided, or explanations are unclear 
(e.g., Draft OP/BP4.10) 
• Bank policy-makers are slow to react to legitimate concerns about process expressed by 
indigenous peoples and support NGOs, sometimes taking years to respond e.g., need for 
full implementation review of OD4.20 to inform Draft OP4.10 
• Policy revision processes have suffered a lack of transparency for long periods where 
indigenous peoples are not informed of progress nor of how their inputs are being dealt 
with e.g., OP4.10 
• Commitments made in face-to-face meetings are not followed up or are fudged e.g., legal 
roundtable on OP4.10 
• The current draft OP4.10 proposes a two-tier standard for participation: one for 
investment projects and one for protected area projects, which is not acceptable 
• Major changes in policy are introduced without adequate consultation e.g., late insertion 
of country systems safeguard option in draft OP4.10 
• Trust has been weakened when policy makers and senior Bank management have closed 
down participation spaces during the final stages of policy revision e.g., decision not to 
publicly release BP4.10 prior to its adoption. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
 The World Bank (and other agencies) should not launch public consultations on policy 
revision until terms of engagement have been mutually agreed with affected rights 
holders and other interested parties 
 Include clear explanations and commitments on how inputs by indigenous peoples will 
influence the policy 
 Where indigenous peoples so choose, in addition to public consultations, establish an 
advisory body with self-selected indigenous experts and/or representatives to give 
guidance on policy analysis and revision 
 Do not ignore rejection of the consultation: attend to these as a matter of urgency 
 Respect and address indigenous concerns about process problems or infringements of the 
agreed terms of engagement in a timely manner 
 Be prepared to suspend a consultation process to address concerns 
 Do not change the consultation process or renege on participation and disclosure 
commitments 
 Provide incentives for staff overseeing the policy revision to ensure all that , as a 
minimum, all consultations meet with World Bank rules and guidelines and indigenous 
peoples participation rights established in international and national laws 
 Where required, provide capacity building to enable indigenous peoples to enjoy 
informed participation the process e.g., funds for autonomous and independent 
preparatory meetings 
 In relation to current revision of the IBRD/IDA Indigenous Peoples Policy: publicly 
release draft BP4.10 and take steps to ensure effective indigenous participation in public 
scrutiny of its contents prior to its finalisation and adoption 
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 In relation to the IFC Safeguard Policy Update Process: ensure that meaningful 
participation is facilitated to enable indigenous peoples to comment on the proposals 
 Refrain from adopting the World Bank/IFC revised policies in the event that indigenous 
peoples do not consider that the draft policies constitute adequate safeguards to protect 
their rights 
 
National policy processes 
 
Main findings: 
• Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) are sometimes formulated without the effective 
participation of indigenous peoples and their representative organisations and contain 
policies and contain policies that are not acceptable to them 
• Participation of indigenous peoples in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) is weak 
or non-existent, and is based on outdated and low-grade consultation procedures 
• CAS and PRSP often fail to properly mainstream human rights, including indigenous 
peoples’ human rights into their policies and objectives 
• World Bank technical assistance loans for national legal and policy reforms affecting 
indigenous peoples lack transparency and do not feature mechanisms for informed 
participation 
• Preparation and appraisal of programmatic adjustment or “development policy” loans 
usually do not enable informed participation of indigenous peoples. 
• Adjustment loans represent a growing part of the World bank’s lending portfolio, but the 
institution has not instituted additional effective public participation mechanisms to adapt 
to its changing business 
 
Recommendations: 
 
 Ensure World Bank country strategies and World Bank-financed policy formulation 
processes mainstream human rights, indigenous peoples’ rights issues into CAS policies 
and objectives 
 Improve and make mandatory public participation mechanisms in World Bank promoted 
or assisted national policy processes, including technical assistance interventions 
 Where particular rights holders, such as indigenous peoples, reject Bank policies in a 
World Bank consultation meeting, the Bank should refrain from adopting such policies. 
As an absolute minimum, objections and dissenting views made in public should be 
recorded in a general way in the preface to such official documents (while protecting the 
identity of specific individuals or organisations). 
 
Projects and programmes: 
 
Main findings: 
• Indigenous peoples still experience most World Bank-assisted project and programmes as 
top-down interventions run by governments and outsiders 
• Affected or “targeted” communities have often not requested such projects 
• Much is written about participation in Bank project and programme documents, but in 
practice the out-dated information-sharing “consultation” model remains dominant. 
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• Such consultations fail to ensure adequate provision of all relevant information and the 
pros and cons of World Bank plans. Incomplete information prevents informed 
participation and drastically inhibits informed decision-making among affected 
communities; 
• Key project documents are often not available to representative organisations and 
communities or are only available inappropriate languages, which frequently prevents 
informed participation 
• Key elements of the project that affect indigenous peoples are designed by outsiders and 
adopted without their prior agreement e.g., IPDPs 
• World Bank projects that affect or involve indigenous peoples are sometimes marked by 
disagreements over whether or not informed participation has taken place.  
• So-called “consultation” is often culturally inappropriate and does not respect cultural 
and linguistic customs and decision-making practices of indigenous peoples 
• Low-level “passive”, “information-giving” and “consultation” modes of participation 
remain the norm in project preparation 
• Project implementation normally only involves low-grade “functional” participation in 
external predetermined project goals and activities are imposed through micro-planning, 
project “committees” or “self-help” groups. 
• World Bank standards on participation contained in its operational policies are routinely 
violated in projects and programmes affecting indigenous peoples, particularly in Africa 
and Asia 
• World Bank projects sometimes violate indigenous peoples’ participation rights 
established in international law and under national legislation 
• Indigenous peoples do not normally participate in negotiations between the World Bank 
and Borrower government over the loan agreement and its conditions 
• Loan agreements between the International Finance Corporation and private sector 
“clients” are confidential and indigenous peoples affected by IFC projects are not 
involved in the negotiation of such agreements 
• Where indigenous peoples do secure some participation in project governance, they are 
often marginalised and their concerns and proposals are overruled by non-indigenous 
project authorities 
• Indigenous representatives on project governance bodies are not provided with technical 
support to enable their informed participation. 
• Participation mechanisms for engagement with World Bank complaints processes are 
weak and defective e.g., Inspection Panel, CAO 
 
Recommendations: 
To move away from the outmoded participation standards confined to measures to ensure benefit 
sharing and social mitigation, the World Bank must ensure that its development standards, 
including its proposed IFC performance standards, adopt a rights-based approach to participation 
and development. To this end, the Bank’s revised policies must: 
 
 Acknowledge the World Bank Group’s responsibilities and obligations under 
international law, including its obligation to respect human rights, including the rights of 
indigenous peoples in all its policies and operations; 
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 Explicitly state that the activities and investments of the World Bank Group shall not 
hinder or undermine state obligations to respect national and international human rights 
norms 
 Include a clear statement that the World Bank will not finance projects/activities that 
contravene borrower/host country obligations under international law, including their 
obligation to respect the rights of indigenous peoples. 
 Establish that the World Bank (including the IFC) will only support projects that have the 
free, prior and informed consent of affected indigenous peoples arrived at through their 
customary decision-making processes and institutions subsequent to meaningful and 
good faith consultation and their informed participation commencing at the earliest stages 
of project design, and agreement on benefits 
 Require indigenous peoples’ informed participation in all decision-making processes in 
relation to World Bank policies and projects that may affect them and may impact on 
their lands and territories 
 Stipulate that all World Bank projects affecting indigenous peoples (not just those 
perceived or judged to have adverse impacts) must respect indigenous peoples’ right to 
give or withhold consent to any proposals that affect their lands and communities 
 Require mechanisms for independent (of the World Bank and borrower/client) third party 
verification and certification that prior agreement exists and has been freely obtained. 
 Where consent is given, require that such prior approval and attached conditions are 
detailed in written agreements between the indigenous peoples, borrower/client and the 
World Bank. The mutual agreement and acceptance of documentation of consent will be 
verified by the representative organisation(s) of the affected community and certified by 
an independent third party. 
 Require that draft IPDP, IPP or any other written project instrument targeting indigenous 
peoples are not adopted until their contents and budget have been agreed by affected 
communities 
 Written agreements on consent and on specific project plans will be included in loan 
covenants and shall provide mechanisms to ensure that indigenous peoples can access 
and obtain meaningful remedies in cases of breach of the written agreement. 
 Establish that Indigenous peoples, if they so choose, have the right to participate in all 
impact assessments and baseline studies. 
 Require a built-in grievance/complaints/mediation mechanism for addressing disputes 
about the existence of consent in the initial and in subsequent stages of project 
discussions and in each stage of the project cycle (should the project go ahead). 
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